The 2008 Global Financial Crisis In Retrospect

This book addresses the causes and consequences of the international financial crisis of 2008. A range of esteemed contributors explore developments in the United States, where the crisis of 2008 originated, as well as the smallest country affected, Iceland, by evaluating developments since 2008. Currently, many countries are facing similar problems as Iceland did in 2008: this book is of interest to economists and policy makers in these countries to study what happened in Iceland, and why the recovery of that economy was strong and swift. The chapters in this book originate from panel discussions and conferences and explore areas including regulation, state projects and inflation.

'If there is a single message that emerges from the wonderful essays contained in this volume, it is that economics is hard. The fact that virtually all economists agree on a handful of simple truths that describe the marketplace belies the fact that, when push comes to shove, dynamic economic processes are notoriously difficult to understand and control. The Economic Crisis in Retrospect provides the reader with a window into how some of the most perceptive economic thinkers of the last two centuries have wrestled with these issues.' Steven G. Medema, University of Colorado, US 'When the financial crisis hit, Ben Bernanke defended the economics profession by arguing that economists such as Bagehot and Thornton had a complete analysis of financial crises. Unfortunately, until the crisis hit, most economics students had never heard of, let alone read, either. That's sad, and this book provides an excellent entrée into past economists' insights and how they relate to the financial crisis. It is a useful read.' David C. Colander, Middlebury College, US 'With apologies to Santayana. . . this excellent work shows that those who can remember past economic thought are condemned to repeat the insights of major economic thinkers and show their relevance by applying them to contemporary economic issues.' Steven Pressman, Monmouth University, US As the United States continues its slow recovery from the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians, policymakers and academics are increasingly turning to the lessons of history to gain insight into how we might address both current and future economic challenges. This volume offers contributions by eminent economists and historians, each commenting on the theories of a particular 20th century economist and the ways in which those theories apply to modern economic thought. Presented in rough chronological order of the lives of the featured economists, these chapters tackle a number of major economic issues, including the role of central banks, monetary and fiscal policy, government spending, entrepreneurship and financial innovation. The contributors apply the theories of Walter Bagehot, Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek to these and other crucial topics, offering both comprehensive historical analysis and vital insights into the modern US and world economies. Two additional chapters on the Great Depression and US monetary and fiscal history round out this critical collection. Students and professors of all economic disciplines will find much to admire in this fascinating volume, as will anyone with an interest in economics both past and present.

This book provides a uniquely comprehensive explanation of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and resulting scholarly research in the context of building an agenda for reform. With the clarity provided by almost a decade of hindsight and a careful eye toward planning for prevention, Elson guides readers through both historical fact and scholarly interpretation, highlighting areas where careful critique of and changes in the international financial architecture and the mainstream macroeconomic paradigm can promote greater financial stability in the future. Given the great public concern over growing income and wealth inequality, the book examines their links to the increased financialization of the economy, both prior to and since the crisis. Finally, the book identifies a number of lessons that need to be recognized if adequate and effective reforms are to be introduced to avoid a financial crisis of similar magnitude in the future. Comprehensive enough for university students and sufficiently innovative for financial policymakers, this book will appeal to a wide range of readers interested in understanding not just where the crisis has brought us, but what key economists have said about it and how we can strengthen our financial system oversight to deal with the continuing challenges of globalization.

This paper investigates empirically the drivers of financial imbalances ahead of the global financial crisis. Three factors may have contributed to the build-up of financial imbalances: (i) rising global imbalances (capital flows), (ii) monetary policy that might have been too loose, (iii) inadequate supervision and regulation. Panel data regressions are performed for OECD countries from 1999 to 2007, so as to shed light on the relative importance of these factors, as well as the extent to which these factors might have interacted in fuelling the build-up. We find that the build-up of financial imbalances was driven by capital inflows and an associated compression of the spread between long and short rates. The effect of capital inflows on the build-up is amplified where the supervisory and regulatory environment was relatively weak. We find that, by contrast, differences in monetary policy cannot account for differences across countries in the build-up of financial imbalances ahead of the crisis.

"Although there have been numerous studies of the causes and consequences of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2010 in the US and abroad, many of these were undertaken only for a small number of countries and before the financial and economic effects were fully realized and before various governmental policy responses were decided upon and actually implemented. This book aims to fill these voids by providing a more thorough assessment now that the worst events and the regulatory reforms are sufficiently behind us and much more information about these developments is available. It reviews and analyzes the causes and consequences of and the regulatory responses to the Great Financial Crisis, particularly from a public policy viewpoint. In the process, it explores such intriguing questions as: What caused the crisis? How did the crisis differ across countries? What is the outlook for another crisis, and when? This is a must read for those who are trying to find answers to these questions."--$cProvided by publisher.

"...Artfully exposes the diverse roots of the crisis and explains how and why US and EU regulators failed to stop its spread." --Edward J. Kanf., Professor of Finance at Boston College.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.