The Accident Hazards Of Nuclear Power Plants

Arguing that the accident risk of present-day nuclear power plants has not been scientifically established, a nuclear-reactor engineer assesses three major types of reactors being used and developed in the United States and explores the potential consequences of accidents.

The book has been developed in conjunction with NERS 462, a course offered every year to seniors and graduate students in the University of Michigan NERS program. The first half of the book covers the principles of risk analysis, the techniques used to develop and update a reliability data base, the reliability of multi-component systems, Markov methods used to analyze the unavailability of systems with repairs, fault trees and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), and failure modes of systems. All of this material is general enough that it could be used in non-nuclear applications, although there is an emphasis placed on the analysis of nuclear systems. The second half of the book covers the safety analysis of nuclear energy systems, an analysis of major accidents and incidents that occurred in commercial nuclear plants, applications of PRA techniques to the safety analysis of nuclear power plants (focusing on a major PRA study for five nuclear power plants), practical PRA examples, and emerging techniques in the structure of dynamic event trees and fault trees that can provide a more realistic representation of complex sequences of events. The book concludes with a discussion on passive safety features of advanced nuclear energy systems under development and approaches taken for risk-informed regulations for nuclear plants.

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age, nuclear experts have labored to imagine the unimaginable and prevent it. They confronted a deceptively simple question: When is a reactor “safe enough” to adequately protect the public from catastrophe? Some experts sought a deceptively simple answer: an estimate that the odds of a major accident were, literally, a million to one. Far from simple, this search to quantify accident risk proved to be a tremendously complex and controversial endeavor, one that altered the very notion of safety in nuclear power and beyond. Safe Enough? is the first history to trace these contentious efforts, following the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as their experts experimented with tools to quantify accident risk for use in regulation and to persuade the public of nuclear power’s safety. The intense conflict over the value of risk assessment offers a window on the history of the nuclear safety debate and the beliefs of its advocates and opponents. Across seven decades and the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, the quantification of risk has transformed both society’s understanding of the hazards posed by complex technologies and what it takes to make them safe enough.