The Aesthetics Of Free Speech

The Aesthetics of Free Speech: Rethinking the Public Sphere is one of the first books to theoretically explore the relationship between free speech and the public sphere. By drawing upon Marxist theory the author, John Michael Roberts, demonstrates how liberal theorists frequently construct an abstract aesthetic of 'rational', 'cultivated' and 'competent' discussion which then serves as a norm through which certain utterances can be humiliated and excluded from participating fully within the public sphere. However, the author also shows how excluded utterances develop their own aesthetic of free speech and how this aesthetic then comes back to haunt the bourgeois public sphere.

Free Speech is a philosophical treatment of a topic which is of immense importance to all of us. Writing with great clarity, wit, and genuine concern, Alan Haworth situates the main arguments for free speech by tracing their relationship to contemporary debates in politics and political philosophy, and their historical roots to earlier controversies over religious toleration. Free Speech will appeal to anyone with an interest in philosophy, politics and current affairs.

Freedom of speech is never very far away from political controversy. In recent years, the rise of populism, the ‘cancel culture’ phenomenon, and online hate attacks are among the developments that have kept it at the forefront of both public and academic discussion. In this new introduction to the subject, Matteo Bonotti and Jonathan Seglow offer an accessible analysis of debates around freedom of speech. They introduce and critically examine three major philosophical arguments for freedom of speech that are based on the values of truth, autonomy, and democracy. They apply these arguments to issues including hate speech, offensive speech, and pornography, and also tackle pressing current issues such as ‘fake news’ and public shaming. This book will be essential for anyone wishing to understand the contemporary significance and philosophical roots of free speech, and how it relates to debates about democracy, feminism and multiculturalism.

This book is about Freedom of Speech and public discourse in the United States. Freedom of Speech is a major component of the cultural context in which we live, think, work, and write, generally revered as the foundation of true democracy. But the issue has a great deal more to do with social norms rooted in a web of cultural assumptions about the function of rhetoric in social organization generally, and in a democratic society specifically. The dominant, liberal notion of free speech in the United States, assumed to be self-evidently true, is, in fact, a particular historical and cultural formation, rooted in Enlightenment philosophies and dependent on a collection of false narratives about the founding of the country, the role of speech and media in its development, and the relationship between capitalism and democracy. Most importantly, this notion of freedom of speech relies on a warped sense of the function of rhetoric in democratic social organization. By privileging individual expression, at the expense of democratic deliberation, the liberal notion of free speech functions largely to suppress rather than promote meaningful public discussion and debate, and works to sustain unequal relations of power. The presumed democratization of the public sphere, via the Internet, raises more questions than it answers—who has access and who doesn’t, who commands attention and why, and what sorts of effects such expression actually has. We need to think a great deal more carefully about the values subsumed and ignored in an uncritical attachment to a particular version of the public sphere. This book seeks to illuminate the ways in which cultural framing diminishes the complexity of free speech and sublimates a range of value-choices. A more fully democratic society requires a more critical view of freedom of speech.

A look at First Amendment coverage of music, non-representational art, and nonsense The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock’s paintings, Arnold Schöenberg’s music, and Lewis Carroll’s poem “Jabberwocky” are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting “the freedom of speech,” even though none involves what we typically think of as speech—the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court’s conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as “speech” for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of “speech.” While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.

Art on trial: exploring the Supreme Court's rulings on free expression

"In this project Randall Bezanson examines judicial interpretations of free speech by means of a broad range of Supreme Court cases, arguing that over the past 15 years the Court has engaged in a truly revolutionary expansion of the reach of the free speech guarantee. The cases include the much-discussed Citizens United decision which granted the full measure of constitutional protection to speech by corporations; the Doe v. Reed case from Washington State that recognized the acts of signing petitions and voting in elections as acts of free speech; the Summum decision holding that the decision to select a monument for a public park and to reject another based on the government's disagreement with the monument's message is an act of government speech immunized from challenge by the First Amendment; and the Hurley and Dale cases that recognized free speech claims for messages and meanings that arose "out of thin air": speech without an author (a parade); and an author without a message (the Boy Scouts). As in earlier books on freedom of the press and of religion, Bezanson aims to arm the reader with the capacity to reach her or his own decision about whether the Court's conduct befitted the independent judicial branch and the consequences of its decisions for a representative democracy"--Provided by publisher.

The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock’s paintings, Arnold Schöenberg’s music, and Lewis Carroll’s poem “Jabberwocky” are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting “the freedom of speech,” even though none involves what we typically think of as speech—the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court’s conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as “speech” for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of “speech.” While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment.