The Age Of Central Banks

Curzio had one of the most fertile and original minds ever to be deployed on questions relating, first, to the interactions between Central Banks, private sector financial intermediaries and the government, and second to the working of the international monetary system in general, and to the role of the IMF specifically within that. His approach has been to apply a theory of history , which provides a beautifully written and illuminating book, much easier and nicer to read and more rounded than the limited mathematical models that have so monopolised academia in recent decades. From the foreword by Charles A.E. Goodhart Curzio Giannini s history of the evolution of central banks illustrates how the most relevant institutional developments have taken place at times of widespread confidence crises and in response to deflationary pressures. The eminent and highly-renowned author provides an analytical perspective to study the evolution of central banking as an endogenous response to crisis and to the ever increasing needs of economic growth. The key argument of the analysis is that crucial innovations in the payment technology (from the invention of coinage to the development of electronic money) could not have taken place without an institution i.e. the central bank - that could preserve confidence in the instruments used as money. According to Curzio Giannini s neo-institutionalist methodological approach, social institutions are, in fact, essential in the coordination of individual decisions as they minimize transaction costs, overcome information asymmetries and deal with incomplete contracts. This enlightening and revealing historical theory perspective on central banking will prove a thought-provoking read for academic and institutional economists, economic historians, and economic policymakers involved in the task of crafting a new institutional arrangement for central banking in the globalized economy.

Both studies of political power and Europeanization studies have tended to neglect central banks. As the age of the euro reaches its 10th anniversary, it is timely to reflect on what it means for central banks, which have been at the forefront of the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union in the European Union. Central banks have been caught up in a major historic political project. What does it mean for them? What does the age of the euro tell us about the power of central banks, their Europeanization and whether they are coming to resemble each other more closely? This book brings together a range of recognized academic specialists to examine the main political aspects of this question. How, and in what ways, has the euro Europeanized central banks (members and non-members of the Euro Area)? What have been its effects on the power of central banks and their use of power? Has the euro generated convergence or divergence in central banking? The book offers the first, in-depth and systematic political analysis of central banks in the first decade of the euro. It places the euro in its global and European contexts, including the US Fed and the Australasian central banks, patterns of differentiated integration in European central banking, and the European Central Bank. It offers a set of case studies of its effects on a representative sample of EU central banks (euro 'insiders' and 'outsiders') and looks at four main thematic areas (monetary policy, financial market supervision, accountability and transparency, and research). The book contributes to Europeanization studies, comparative political economy, and studies of Economic and Monetary Union. It will be of major interest to students of the European Union and European integration, comparative European politics, and area and 'country' studies. More generally, it will interest all those interested in central banking and their pivotal and problematic position between politics and markets.

The twentieth century has seen the rise of modern central banking. At its close, it is also witnessing the first steps in the decline of the role of some of the most famous of these institutions. In this volume, some of the world’s best known specialists examine the process whereby central banks emerged and asserted themselves within the economic and political spheres of their respective countries. Although the theory and the political economy that presided over their creation did not show great divergence across borders, a considerable institutional variety was nevertheless the result. Among the many factors responsible for this diversity, attention is drawn here not only to the idiosyncrasies of domestic financial systems and to the occurrence of political shocks with major monetary repercussions, such as wars, but also to the peculiarities of each economy and of the political and social climate reigning at the time when central banks were created or formalized. The twelve essays cover European, Asian and American experiences and many of them use a comparative approach.

This book discusses the role of central banks and draws lessons from examining their evolution over the past two centuries.

The age of the euro has cast central banks in a newly prominent role in European integration and in macro-economic policy making in Europe. This text examines the effects of the euro as the new European single currency on the central banks of the member states of the European Union.

Theories and practices in central banking and monetary policy have changed radically over recent decades with independence and inflation targeting as the new keywords. This book offers interesting perspectives on the drivers of this development and its implication. It addresses contemporary questions on accountability, transparency and objectives for monetary policy as well as current policy problems related to globalization and financial imbalances. The book is topical, insightful and well written a must for everybody with an interest in central banking and monetary policy. Torben M. Andersen, University of Aarhus, Denmark The number of central banks in the world is approaching 180, a tenfold increase since the beginning of the twentieth century. What lies behind the spread of this economic institution? What underlying process has brought central banks to hold such a key role in economic life today? This book examines from a transatlantic perspective how the central bank has become the bank of banks. Thirteen distinguished economists and central bankers have been brought together to evaluate how central banks work, arrive at their policies, choose their instruments and gauge their success in managing economies, both in times of crisis and periods of growth. Central banks have gained greater independence from government control over the last 20 years. This widespread trend throws up new questions regarding the foundations, prerogatives and future of this economic institution. This book provides a better understanding of the current financial crisis through the in-depth study of the central bank. Researchers in the fields of monetary theory, monetary policy and central banking will find this volume of great interest. It will also appeal to students of economics, political economy, banking and finance, as well as economists, academics, and public policy advisers and analysts.

Deals with the antonomy of monetary authorities: the case of the US. Federal Reserve System; relations between monetary authorities and government institutions: the case of Germany, France, and Italy.

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.