The Arab Israeli Confrontation Of June 1967

The June 1967 war was a watershed in the history of the modern Middle East. In six days, the Israelis defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies, seizing large portions of their territories. Two veteran scholars of the Middle East bring together some of the most knowledgeable experts in their fields to reassess the origins and the legacies of the war. Each chapter takes a different perspective from the vantage point of a different participant, those that actually took part in the war, and also the world powers that played important roles behind the scenes. Their conclusions make for sober reading. At the heart of the story was the incompetence of the Egyptian leadership and the rivalry between various Arab players who were deeply suspicious of each other's motives. Israel, on the other side, gained a resounding victory for which, despite previous assessments to the contrary, there was no master plan.

In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbors, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the Israeli forces being radically changed to create an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the events of 1956. The Israeli forces were honed in low level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast, the Arab forces became complacent, largely due to supplies of arms from the Warsaw Pact states. With proper training, this complacency could have been turned into military effectiveness but the Arab forces were plagued by internal rivalries and high commands too often depending upon politically reliable officers rather than those who were militarily effective. The Egyptian forces were further undermined by their commitment to the debilitating Yemen Civil War which meant they were in no condition to confront Israel. Syria and Jordan, whose forces could not fight the Israelis alone, complained loudly about President Nasser’s lack of action against Israel. Nasser’s decision in early 1967 to regain the prestige he had lost since the heady days of the Suez Crisis with a demonstration in the Sinai Peninsula was interpreted by the Israelis as preparations for an invasion. Nasser did nothing to persuade them otherwise and when it was clear the international community would do nothing the Israelis decided to strike Egypt, and in turn Syria and Jordan. The Israeli campaign was heralded by a massive surprise air attack first on the Egyptians and then on the other neighboring states, and ground offensives then followed in succession. Volume 1 of The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War provides an in-depth background to the long running confrontation between Arab and Jew in the Middle East, a detailed overview of the rival air forces that would become embroiled in the conflict, and an account of the opening Israeli air strikes against Egyptian targets. This volume is illustrated throughout with original photographs and includes specially commissioned full color aircraft profiles.