The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration

"This book, the outgrowth of a conference organized by the editors at Harvard Law School on April 19, 2008, aims to uncover the drivers behind the backlash against the current international investment regime."--Library of Congress Online Calalog.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the CETA Investment Chapter’s ability to overcome the legitimacy crisis facing investment arbitration. To do so, it first examines the root causes behind the legitimacy crisis, ultimately arguing that it reflects a fundamental rule of law crisis within investment arbitration. In particular, it asserts that the normative standpoints of the legitimacy crisis form part of the rule of law, the uniting legal principle from which the legitimacy concerns stem. The book contends that the rule of law is not only the principal normative and causal assumption on which the legitimacy concerns are based, but that it could also be utilized as a platform to evaluate the investment arbitration mechanism in CETA's Investment Chapter. Based on this, the book evaluates CETA's Investment Chapter through the rule of law framework in order to provide a convincing account of the latter's ability to overcome the legitimacy crisis facing investment arbitration. It concludes that CETA's Investment Chapter is unlikely to completely solve the legitimacy crisis simply because it is just a patchwork of reforms rather than a comprehensive reinvention of the substantive and procedural law of investment arbitration. Lastly, the book offers meaningful insights into the way the challenges presented by investment arbitration should be addressed. The book is intended for academics researching international investment law and arbitration as well as for policy-makers focusing on reforming investor-state dispute settlement.

The Selection and Removal of Arbitrators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement explores and assesses two essential features in investor state dispute resolution (ISDS): the selection and the removal of arbitrators. Both topics have received increasing scrutiny and criticism, that have in turn generated calls for reforms In its first part, the book explains the selection of arbitrators procedurally and comparatively under the most-often used arbitration rules.

This book examines the role of home states to investment disputes and questions whether it represents a return to diplomatic protection.

Investment treaty arbitration (sometimes called investor-state dispute settlement or ISDS) has become a flashpoint in the backlash against globalization, with costs becoming an area of core scrutiny. Yet "conventional wisdom" about costs is not necessarily wise. To separate fact from fiction, this book tests claims about investment arbitration and fiscal costs against data so that policy reforms can be informed by scientific evidence. The exercise is critical, as investment treaties grant international arbitrators the power to order states-both rich and poor-to pay potentially millions of dollars to foreign investors when states violate the international law commitments made in the treaties. Meanwhile, the cost to access and defend the arbitration can also climb to millions of dollars. This book uses insights drawn from cognitive psychology and hard data to explore the reality of investment treaty arbitration, identify core demographics and basic information on outcomes, and drill down on the costs of parties' counsel and arbitral tribunals. It offers a nuanced analysis of how and when cost-shifting occurs, parses tribunals' rationalization (or lack thereof) of cost assessments, and models the variables most likely to predict costs, using data to point the way towards evidence-based normative reform. With an intelligent interdisciplinary approach that speaks to ongoing reform at entities like the World Bank's ICSID and UNCITRAL, this book provides the most up-to-date study of investment treaty dispute settlement, offering new insights that will shape the direction of investment treaty and arbitration reform more broadly.

Explores the political context of the rapid changes in the international law on foreign investment made through investment arbitration.

I. Introduction II. History and Limitations of the Traditional System for Resolving Investment Disputes III. The Modern System of Investor-State Arbitration IV. Commonly Used Procedural Rules V. Procedural Law Applicable in Investor-State Arbitration VI. National Court Interference: Anti-Arbitration Injunctions VII. The Course of an Investment Arbitration VIII. Consolidation under Relevant Arbitration Rules or Treaties IX. Governing Law in Investment Disputes X. Consent to Arbitral Jurisdiction XI. The Concept of Investment XII. The Nationality of the Investor XIII. Exhaustion of Local Remedies XIV. Election of Forum: National Courts and Contract Arbitrations XV. Discrimination XVI. Expropriation XVII. "Fair and Equitable Treatment" and "Full Protection and Security" XVIII. Umbrella Clauses XIX. Damages, Compensation, and Non-Pecuniary Remedies XX. Annulment and Set Aside XXI. Enforcement of Awards XXII. The Future of International Investment Arbitration Select Bibliography Index Table of Cases Index of Treaties, Conventions, and International Agreements.

Investment treaty arbitration (sometimes called investor-state dispute settlement or ISDS) has become a flashpoint in the backlash against globalization, with costs becoming an area of core scrutiny. Yet "conventional wisdom" about costs is not necessarily wise. To separate fact from fiction, this book tests claims about investment arbitration and fiscal costs against data so that policy reforms can be informed by scientific evidence. The exercise is critical, as investment treaties grant international arbitrators the power to order states-both rich and poor-to pay potentially millions of dollars to foreign investors when states violate the international law commitments made in the treaties. Meanwhile, the cost to access and defend the arbitration can also climb to millions of dollars. This book uses insights drawn from cognitive psychology and hard data to explore the reality of investment treaty arbitration, identify core demographics and basic information on outcomes, and drill down on the costs of parties' counsel and arbitral tribunals. It offers a nuanced analysis of how and when cost-shifting occurs, parses tribunals' rationalization (or lack thereof) of cost assessments, and models the variables most likely to predict costs, using data to point the way towards evidence-based normative reform. With an intelligent interdisciplinary approach that speaks to ongoing reform at entities like the World Bank's ICSID and UNCITRAL, this book provides the most up-to-date study of investment treaty dispute settlement, offering new insights that will shape the direction of investment treaty and arbitration reform more broadly.