The Battle Of Quatre Bras 1815

Major Richard Llewellyn, who fought at Quatre Bras, wrote in 1837 that, 'Had it not been so closely followed by the... victory of Waterloo, perhaps the gallant exploits and unexampled bravery that marked that day would... have excited even more admiration than was actually associated with it.' This book stands out from the wealth of Napoleonic literature in that it is the first English-language account to focus solely on the battle of Quatre Bras. It is based upon extensive research and in many cases unpublished personal accounts from all participating countries, as well as a detailed topographic, aerial survey of the battlefield. These combine to provide a highly personal, balanced and authoritative work. The author unravels the controversies of a battle where commanders made errors of omission and commission and where cowardice rubbed shoulders with heroism. This is the story of a battle that turned a campaign; of triumph and disaster. It is a story of two great generals, but more importantly, of the intense human experience of those that they led. It is a book that will appeal to both the scholar and the generalist.

A history of the battles of the Waterloo campaign in 1815, of which the defeat of the French forces would end the Napoleonic Wars and mark the end of Napoleon's reign.

The Battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny are often overshadowed by the Battle of Waterloo that took place two days later. Yet the events of 16 June 1815 were crucial, as Napoleon missed his chance of achieving a decisive victory. Peter Hofschro[umlaut]er's authoritative guide to these two critical engagements tells the story of the campaign and investigates each battle in detail, and he takes the reader on a fascinating tour of the present-day battlefields. By skilful use of maps, photographs and diagrams, he describes the movements of the armies and analyses the thinking and actions of the commanders.

Fought on 16 June 1815, two days before the Battle of Waterloo, the Battle of Quatre Bras has been described as a tactical Anglo-allied victory, but a French strategic victory. The French Marshal Ney was given command of the left wing of Napoleons army and ordered to seize the vital crossroads at Quatre Bras, as the prelude to an advance on Brussels. The crossroads was of strategic importance because the side which controlled it could move southeastward along the Nivelles-Namur road.Yet the normally bold and dynamic Ney was uncharacteristically cautious. As a result, by the time he mounted a full-scale attack upon the Allied troops holding Quatre Bras, the Duke of Wellington had been able to concentrate enough strength to hold the crossroads.Neys failure at Quatre Bras had disastrous consequences for Napoleon, whose divided army was not able to reunite in time to face Wellington at Waterloo. This revelatory study of the Waterloo campaign draws primarily on French archival sources, and previously unpublished French accounts, to present a balanced view of a battle normally seen only from the British or Anglo-Allied perspective.