The Bef In France 1939 1940

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the British force in Europe from 19391940 during the Second World War. Commanded by General Lord Gort, the BEF constituted one-tenth of the defending Allied force.The British Expeditionary Force was started in 1938 in readiness for a perceived threat of war after Germany annexed Austria in March 1938 and the claims on the Sudetenland, which led to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. After the French and British had promised to defend Poland, the German invasion of that country began and war was declared on 3 September 1939.The BEF was sent to France in September 1939 and deployed mainly along the BelgianFrench border during the so-called Phoney War leading up to May 1940. The BEF did not commence hostilities until the invasion of France on 10 May 1940. After the commencement of battle, they were driven back through Belgium and north-western France, forcing their eventual evacuation from several ports along the French northern coastline in Operations Dynamo, Ariel and Cycle. The most notable evacuation was from the Dunkirk region and from this the phrase Dunkirk Spirit was coined.

The Crimean War was the most destructive armed conflict of the Victorian era. It is remembered for the unreasoning courage of the Charge of the Light Brigade, for the precise volleys of the Thin Red Line and the impossible assaults upon Sevastopol's Redan. It also demonstrated the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the British military system based on privilege and purchase.??Poor organisation at staff level and weak leadership from the Commander-in-Chief with a lack of appreciation of the conditions the troops would experience in the Crimea resulted in the needless death of thousands of soldiers. The Royal Navy, by comparison, was highly effective and successfully undertook its operations in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.??The relative performance of the two branches of Britain's armed forces is reflected in the despatches sent back to the UK by the?respective commanders. The comparative wealth of detail provided by Admirals Napier, Dundas and Lyons contrast sharply with the limited, though frequent, communications from Generals Raglan, Codrington and Simpson.??The despatches of all these commanding officers are presented in this compilation just as they were when first published in the 1850s. They tell of the great battles of the Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman, of the continuing struggle against Sevastopol and the naval operations which cut the Russian communications and ensured an eventual, if costly, victory. They can be read, just as they were when revealed to the general public more than 150 years ago.

Søgeord:Tyske Blitzkrieg; Frankrig's Fald; Tyskernes Invasion af Belgien, Maj 1940; Belgisk Neutralitet, 1936-1939; British Expeditionary Force; Dunkirk-Evakueringen, 1940; Weygand; Reynaud; van Overstraeten; Pownall; Petain; Leopold III; Keyes; Ironside; Hitler; General Georges; Gamelin; Alexander, H.; Bilotte; Blanchard; Churchill; Chamberlain; Davy, G.; Dill; Dunkirk; Gort, J.; Hore-Belisha; von Manstein; Spaak; Vuillemin; Yser Line;

Between September 1939 and June 1940, the British Expeditionary Force confronted the German threat to France and Flanders with a confused mind-set, an uncertain skills-set and an uncompetitive capability. This book explores the formation's origins, the scale of defeat in France and the campaign's considerable legacy.

Covering the 1939-40 Phoney War in a single chapter, the focus of Major L.F. Ellis s official history of the campaign in France and Flanders falls on the role of the British Expeditionary Force in attempting to defend Belgium and France from the fury of the German Blitzkrieg in May-June 1940. He describes the BEF s advance into Belgium in response to the German attack in accordance with the pre-arranged Anglo-French Dyle Plan , and its rapid retreat as the Germans broke through on the River Meuse. Despite an attempted counter-attack around Arras, Ellis shows how the BEF and their French allies were forced back on the Channel Ports by the swift advance of the German armoured columns. The history culminates in the confusion caused by Belgium s sudden surrender, the failed British stand on the Somme, and the momentous decision to evacuate the BEF from Dunkirk. Illustrated by 7 general maps, 14 situation maps and 17 sketch maps, the book has eleven photographs, and additional appendices detailing the German planning of their spectacularly successful campaign, and listing the British and German forces engaged.

Why France, the major European continental victor in 1918, suffered total defeat in six weeks at the hands of the vanquished power of 1918 only two decades later remains moot. Why the stunning reversal of fortunes? In this volume thirteen prominent scholars reexamine the French debacle of 1940 in interwar perspectives, utilizing fresh analysis, original approaches, and new sources. Although the tenor of the volume is critical, the contributors also suggest that French preparations for war knew successes as well as failures, that French defeat was not inevitable, and that the Battle of France might have turned out differently if different choices had been made and other paths been followed.

The collapse of the French army in 1940 is a well-researched topic in Second World War Studies but a surprising gap in the historiography emerges when it comes to the study of the French military prior to the German offensive of May 1940. Using various public and private sources in different languages, this book aims to address this gap by studying morale on the frontline and its management by the French Government, the Grand Quartier Général, at the scale of the regiment and on a personal level. This research also investigates German and British propaganda in French and aimed at the French sector of the frontline in order to offer the first comprehensive comparative study of French army morale in any language.