The Coalition Provisional Authority S Experience With Economic Reconstruction In Iraq

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of the occupation of Iraq. Based on interviews and nearly 100,000 never-before-released documents from CPA archives, the book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, counter a burgeoning insurgency, and create the basis for representative government.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established in May 2003 to provide for the temporary governance of Iraq, following the conclusion of major combat operations in that country. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 established the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) in May 2003 and assigned the CPA full responsibility for managing the fund. The Resolution stated that DFI funds should be disbursed at the CPA's direction, in consultation with the interim Iraqi administration. It specified the DFI should be used in a transparent manner and for the humanitarian needs of the people; the economic reconstruction and repair of infrastructure; the continued disarmament of Iraq; the costs of civilian administration; and other purposes benefiting the Iraqi people. The DFI comprised revenues from ongoing Iraqi oil sales, unencumbered Oil for Food deposits, and repatriated national assets. During its almost 14-month life, the CPA had access to $20.7 billion in DFI funds, including $10.2 billion in U.S. currency that was flown to Baghdad. Further, the CPA had $6.6 billion under its control when it completed its mission on June 28, 2004. A July 2010 report concluded that weaknesses in DoD's financial and management controls left it unable to properly account for and articulate the disposition of remaining DFI funds following dissolution of the CPA. This audit determined who had authority and control over DFI funds upon dissolution of the CPA and whether DFI funds shipped to Baghdad were properly transferred to Iraqi control and then deposited in the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI). Figures. This is a print on demand report.

This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.