The Colonels Coup And The American Embassy

The so-called Colonels&’ coup of April 21, 1967, was a major event in the history of the Cold War, ushering in a seven-year period of military rule in Greece. In the wake of the coup, some eight thousand people affiliated with the Communist Party were rounded up, and Greece became yet another country where the fear of Communism led the United States into alliance with a repressive right-wing authoritarian regime. In military coups in some other countries, it is known that the CIA and other agencies of the U.S. government played an active role in encouraging and facilitating the takeover. The Colonels&’ coup, however, came as a surprise to the United States (which was expecting a Generals&’ coup instead). Yet the U.S. government accepted it after the fact, despite internal disputes within policymaking circles about the wisdom of accommodating the upstart Papadopoulos regime. Among the dissenters was Robert Keeley, then serving in the U.S. Embassy in Greece. This is his insider&’s account of how U.S. policy was formulated, debated, and implemented during the critical years 1966 to 1969 in Greek-U.S. relations.

"A first-hand account, by a U.S. diplomat, of the 1967 military coup in Greece, and of how U.S. policy was formulated, debated, and implemented during this period. Explores Greek-U.S. relations within the larger historical framework of the Cold War"--Provided by publisher.

"A first-hand account, by a U.S. diplomat, of the 1967 military coup in Greece, and of how U.S. policy was formulated, debated, and implemented during this period. Explores Greek-U.S. relations within the larger historical framework of the Cold War"--Provided by publisher.

The long history of Anglo-Greek relations has deservedly attracted much attention. One of its most controversial -- yet least explored -- phases was that spanning the Greek Colonels' seven-year military junta, from 1967-74. Drawing on a corpus of diverse, original and largely primary material, Maragkou provides the first comprehensive analysis of British policy towards Greece during this tumultuous era. Not only does she contribute to the historiography of Anglo- Greek relations, but her book also serves as a case study of British foreign policy within the Cold War. And by demonstrating that national history can be best understood by analyzing the relationship between a nation state and factors beyond its control, the conclusions drawn can be applied beyond the strictly regional or the exclusively bi-lateral, as they also fit into a transnational paradigm. It was in the 1960s when what we now term 'globalization' was in full swing. Henceforward, no nation -- and no foreign office -- was an island: it was part of a whole, in which both state and non-state actors internationally played their part in the evolution of thinking on foreign affairs. Here is the key to understanding the tortuous history of Britain and the Greek Colonels -- one that has many echoes in our own time.

This book seeks to comprehensively analyze and document U.S. foreign policy toward a strategic Cold War ally that posed a stark challenge to the traditionally-stated U.S. preference for democracy and political freedom. It details the complex ways in which the U.S. reacted to that challenge and went about crafting policies of longer-term accommodation with a regime it wished to retain as a close ally in a strategically important part of the world.

As globalization has deepened in recent years, historians have begun to see that many of the global challenges we face today first drew serious attention in the 1960s. This book examines how the Johnson presidency responded to these problems and draws out the lessons for today.

Based on access to secret documents and interviews with many of the participants, Subversion as Foreign Policy is an extraordinary account of civil war in Indonesia provoked by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and resulting in the killing of thousands of Indonesians and the destruction of much of the country's air force and navy. "This startling new book reveals a covert intervention by the United States in Indonesia in the late 1950s involving, among other things, the supply of thousands of weapons, the creation and deployment of a secret CIA air force and logistical support from the Seventh Fleet. The intervention occurred on such a massive scale that it is difficult to believe it has been kept almost totally secret from the American public for nearly 40 years. And this CIA operation proved to be even more disastrous than the Bay of Pigs". -- San Francisco Chronicle "An exemplary study of an ignominious chapter of the Cold War in Southeast Asia". -- Journal of Asian Studies "Subversion as Foreign Policy is a remarkable book.... The Kahins have provided a rare insight into the workings of U.S. policy towards Indonesia, both clandestine and official". -- London Times Literary Supplement

A groundbreaking comparative analysis of three understudied cases of intelligence democratization revealing new insights into main barriers to reform when states transition from authoritarianism Reforming the intelligence services is essential when a state transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. But which areas should be reformed, how do we know when there has been real transformation, and how and where do authoritarian legacies persist? Intelligence in Democratic Transitions is a comparative examination of the democratic transitions of Portugal, Greece, and Spain starting in the 1970s. Although these three countries began their transitions around the same time, they present significantly different results. Sofia Tzamarelou discovers that main barriers to reform are legacies of the past and legacy personnel. She does this through the lens of five Security Sector Reform (SSR) indicators: Lustration, Control and Oversight, Recruitment, Targeting and Civil Society. Tzamarelou uses primary sources throughout the study, including governmental documents and legal statutes–such as draft laws, bills and presidential decrees–paired with “outside” primary source reporting, such as analysis reporting by the CIA. She complements this rich primary source material with secondary sources from authors in each country and internationally who specialize in intelligence or who provide historical context. Tzamarelou’s unique comparative analysis of intelligence democratization using a common framework–SSR–applied to each country contributes to readers’ understanding of why and how some reforms fail and others succeed and how the SSR framework can be used in the intelligence arena.