The Concept Of Expression

Defining expression as the expression of intentional states, Alan Tormey describes the general conditions under which human conduct may be considered expressive, and then analyzes this conduct as it is manifested in behavior, language, and art. Originally published in 1971. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

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Free expression is under threat. Social media and fake news, misinformation, and disinformation have prompted governments to propose new forms of regulation that are deeply challenging to free expression. Hate speech, far-right populism, campus speech debates, and censorship consistently make headlines in Canada and abroad. Dilemmas of Free Expression offers forward-looking appraisals of ways to confront challenging moral issues, policy problems, and controversies that pay heed to the fundamental right to free expression. The essays in this volume offer timely analyses of the law, policy, and philosophical challenges, and social repercussions to our understanding of expressive freedom in relation to government obligations and public discourse. Free expression and its limits are multifaceted, deeply complex, inherently values-based, and central to the ability of a society to function. Dilemmas of Free Expression addresses the challenges of limiting free expression across a host of issues through an analyses by leading and emerging voices in a number of disciplines, including political science, law, philosophy, and Indigenous studies.

This is a 2001 study of the emergence of physiognomy as a form of popular science.

This systematic philosophical study of self-expression explores the ways in which it reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience. Green defends striking new theses on such topics as our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts.

The French philosopher Renaud Barbaras remarked that late in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s career, “The phenomenology of perception fulfills itself as a philosophy of expression.” In Tracing Expression in Merleau-Ponty: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Biology, and Ontology, Véronique M. Fótiaddresses the guiding yet neglected theme of expression in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. She traces Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about how individuals express creative or artistic impulses through his three essays on aesthetics, his engagement with animality and the “new biology” in the second of his lecture courses on nature of 1957–58, and in his late ontology, articulated in 1964 in the fragmentary text of Le visible et l’invisible (The Visible and the Invisible). With the exception of a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 essay “Cezanne’s Doubt,” Fóti engages with Merleau-Ponty’s late and final thought, with close attention to both his scientific and philosophical interlocutors, especially the continental rationalists. Expression shows itself, in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, to be primordial, and this innate and fundamental nature of expression has implications for his understanding of artistic creation, science, and philosophy.!--?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /--

The Expression of Attitude deals with a number of broad but interrelated questions: what are attitudes, how do they relate to behavior, how are they acquired, and in what ways can they be shared? The author argues that consistency, within attitude structure and between attitudes and behavior, arises primarily from interpersonal rather than intrapersonal processes. Emphasis is placed on how people interpret behavior as an expression of attitude, and what they demand of such behavior before they treat it as decodable in a particular way.

At least since Descartes, philosophers have been interested in the special knowledge or authority that we exhibit when we speak about our own thoughts, attitudes, and feelings. Expression and the Inner contends that even the best work in contemporary philosophy of mind fails to account for this sort of knowledge or authority because it does not pay the right sort of attention to the notion of expression. Following what he takes to be a widely misunderstood suggestion of Wittgenstein's, Finkelstein argues that we can make sense of self-knowledge and first-person authority only by coming to see the ways in which a self-ascription of, say, happiness (a person's saying or thinking, "I'm happy this morning") may be akin to a smile--akin, that is, to an expression of happiness. In so doing, Finkelstein contrasts his own reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind with influential readings set out by John McDowell and Crispin Wright. By the final chapter of this lucid work, what's at stake is not only how to understand self-knowledge and first-person authority, but also what it is that distinguishes conscious from unconscious psychological states, what the mental life of a nonlinguistic animal has in common with our sort of mental life, and how to think about Wittgenstein's legacy to the philosophy of mind.