The Conscience Of A Lawyer

On trial practice, defense lawyers, and legal ethics, by discussing the murder of Lord William Russell in London, May 5, 1840, and a reconstruction of the trial of his valet, Benjamin François Courvoisier.

In 1776, Thomas Paine declared the end of royal rule in the United States. Instead, “law is king,” for the people rule themselves. Paine’s declaration is the dominant American understanding of how political power is exercised. In making law king, American lawyers became integral to the exercise of political power, so integral to law that legal ethics philosopher David Luban concluded, “lawyers are the law.” American lawyers have defended the exercise of this power from the Revolution to the present by arguing their work is channeled by the profession’s standards of ethical behavior. Those standards demand that lawyers serve the public interest and the interests of their paying clients before themselves. The duties owed both to the public and to clients meant lawyers were in the marketplace selling their services, but not of the marketplace. This is the story of power and the limits of ethical constraints to ensure such power is properly wielded. The Lawyer’s Conscience is the first book examining the history of American lawyer ethics, ranging from the mid-eighteenth century to the “professionalism” crisis facing lawyers today.

Clifford Judkins Durr was an Alabama lawyer who played an important role in defending activists and other accused of disloyalty during the New Deal and McCarthy eras. His uncompromising commitment to civil liberties and civic decency caused him to often take unpopular positions. In 1933, Durr moved to Washington to work as a lawyer for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a creation of Roosevelt’s new Democratic administration, becoming a dedicated New Dealer in the process. He was then appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a politically sensitive position as FDR sought to counter the increasing power and concentration of broadcasters, many of whom were opponents of the New Deal. Durr resigned from the FCC in 1948 and after brief employment with the National Farmers Union in Colorado, the Durrs eventually returned to Montgomery, Alabama in the hope of returning to a more prosperous, less controversial life. Durr continued to practice in Montgomery as counsel for black citizens whose rights had been violated and ultimately, in December, 1955, when police arrested Rosa Parks for refusing to give her bus seat to a white man he stepped in and lent his extensive legal prowess to her case and the continuing quest for civil rights. Closing his firm in 1964 Durr began to lecture in the United States and abroad. He died at his grandfather's farm in 1975

THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law. It is the conscience of judges that takes the central place in the research. Conscience is understood in the meaning developed in the theory of Thomas Aquinas as the complex capacity of the human being to make moral judgements which represent acts of reason on the question of what is right or wrong in a particular situation. The reason why we need a theory of conscience in making judicial decisions lies in the nature of the positive law itself. On the one hand, there is an intrinsic conflict between the law as the body of rigid rules and the law as an living experience of those who are involved in social relationships. This conflict particularly finds its expression in the collision of strict justice and equity. The idea of equity does not reject the importance of rules in legal life. What is rejected is an idolatrous attitude to the rules when the uniqueness of a human being, his well being and happiness are disregarded and sacrificed in order to fulfil the observance of the rules. The rules themselves are neither good or bad. What makes them good or bad is their application.

Empowering ethical codes is vital in all branches of law because without these codes we would be unable to differentiate between right and wrong in our personal judgments. Lawyers can either be the most precious or the most precarious parties in a criminal case, depending on the state of their conscience. In such cases, immorality replaces morality, and legal norms become pawns in a game, the goal of which is to serve the economic interests of the lawyer. The lawyer becomes a greater threat to the truth when they support the establishment of special tribunals meant to hide the truth, such as was seen in Iraq, or when they receive payment in order to cover up genocide in places such as Myanmar and in the territories of the superpowers. Such lawyers then turn around and condemn the same crimes in places such as China. They speak out against crimes against humanity carried out by the Iranian government, but do not say a single word about crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed by the Saudi Arabian Israeli, American, French, and British governments. Here, doppelgänger attorneys do not present the true image of justice, but rather work to convince the international public that their brutal clients are innocent. The situation is even more complicated when we are dealing with very sensitive questions of international criminal justice under various criminal procedures directed by lawyers in the ICJ, the ICC, or in ad hoc tribunals. What is the nature of integrity, impartiality, conscience, truth, and payments, and why are lawyers increasingly being sponsored and directed by outsiders? This book reveals the forbidden truth--an embarrassment and moral weakness of conscience. The reader can hardly put the book down! Every library should obtain it.

In this electrifying bestseller, the shrewd and voluble trial lawyer Louis Nizer, who made a long career of representing famous people in famous cases, recounts some of his significant civil and criminal cases. Nizer rose to national fame with his real-life accounts of tension-filled courtrooms and the fervor of the advocate, and “My Life in Court” proved to be no exception: it rose to the top of the Times’s best-seller list on its publication in 1961 and logged 72 weeks as a sales leader. The book is an in-depth collection of some of Mr. Nizer’s court case success stories, including his client Quentin Reynolds’ famous libel action against the columnist Westbrook Pegler, which would also become the basis of the 1963 Broadway play “A Case of Libel.” Praised by critics as “entertaining and philosophically instructive, an unusual combination,” Nizer’s movie-like plots of real-life courtroom drama will keep you captivated until the very last page.

The most commonly cited justification for international criminal law is that it addresses crimes of such gravity that they "shock the conscience of humanity." From decisions about how to define crimes and when to exercise jurisdiction, to limitations on defences and sentencing determinations, gravity rhetoric permeates the discourse of international criminal law. Yet the concept of gravity has thus far remained highly undertheorized. This book uncovers the consequences for the regime's legitimacy of its heavy reliance on the poorly understood idea of gravity. Margaret M. deGuzman argues that gravity's ambiguity may at times enable a thin consensus to emerge around decisions, such as the creation of an institution or the definition of a crime, but that, increasingly, it undermines efforts to build a strong and resilient global justice community. The book suggests ways to reconceptualize gravity in line with global values and goals to better support the long-term legitimacy of international criminal law.

This book sets out to defend the claim that Equity ought to remain a separate body of law; the temptation to iron-out the differences between neighbouring doctrines on the two sides of the Equity/Common Law divide should, in most cases, be resisted. The theoretical part of the book is argues that the characteristics of Equity, namely, appeal to conscience, flexibility, retroactivity and the use of morally-freighted jargon, are essential for the implementation of a legal ideal that has been neglected by the Common Law: 'Accountability Correspondence'. According to this fundamental legal ideal, liability imposed by legal rules should correspond to the pattern of moral duty in the circumstances to which the rules apply. Equity promotes this ideal in the fields of property and obligations by disallowing parties to exploit the rule-like nature of Common Law norms in a way that breaches their moral duty to the other party. By reference to various equitable doctrines, it is argued that the faults identified by critics of Equity, especially from the perspective of the Rule of Law, are highly exaggerated, and that the criticism often reflects a political belief in the supremacy of individualism and free market over empathy and social justice. The theoretical part is followed by three chapters, each dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the equitable doctrines of fiduciary duties, proprietary estoppel, and clean hands. For each doctrine, it is shown how their equitable characteristics are indispensable for achieving their social, ethical and economic purpose.