The Criminalization Of European Cartel Enforcement

Cartel activity is prohibited under EU law by virtue of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Firms that violate this provision face severe punishment from those entities responsible for enforcing EU competition law: the European Commission, the national competition authorities, and the national courts. Stiff fines are regularly imposed on firms by these entities; such firm-focused punishment is an established feature of the antitrust enforcement landscape within the EU. In recent years, however, focus has also been placed on the individuals within the firms responsible for the cartel activity. It is increasingly recognized that punishment for cartel activity should be individual-focused as well as firm-focused. Accordingly, a growing tendency to criminalize cartel activity can be observed in the EU Member States. The existence of such criminal sanctions within the EU presents a number of crucial challenges that need to be met if the underlying enforcement objectives are to be achieved in practice without violating prevailing legal norms. For a start, given the severe consequences of a custodial sentence, the employment of criminal antitrust punishment must be justifiable in principle: one must have a robust normative framework rationalizing the existence of criminal cartel sanctions. Second, for it to be legitimate, antitrust criminalization should only occur in a manner that respects the mandatory legalities applicable to the European jurisdiction in question. These include the due process rights of the accused and the principle of legal certainty. Finally, the correct practical measures (such as a criminal leniency policy and a correctly defined criminal cartel offence) need to be in place in order to ensure that the employment of criminal antitrust punishment actually achieves its aims while maintaining its legitimacy. These three particular challenges can be conceptualized respectively as the theoretical, legal, and practical challenges of European antitrust criminalization. This book analyses these three crucial challenges so that the complexity of the process of European antitrust criminalization can be understood more accurately. In doing so, this book acknowledges that the three challenges should not be considered in isolation. In fact there is a dynamic relationship between the theoretical, legal, and practical challenges of European antitrust criminalization and an effective antitrust criminalization policy is one which recognizes and respects this complex interaction.

The challenges facing the criminalisation of cartel activity in the European Union are threefold: theoretical, legal, and practical. This book analyses these crucial challenges so that the complexity of the process of European antitrust criminalisation can be accurately understood.

This timely book brings together contributions from prominent scholars and practitioners to the ongoing debate on the criminalization of competition law enforcement. Recognizing that existing remedies and sanctions may be insufficient to deter breaches of competition law, several EU Member States have followed the US example and introduced pecuniary penalties for executives, professional disqualification orders, and even jail sentences. Addressing issues such as unsolved legal puzzles, standard of proof, leniency programs and internal cartel stability, this book is a marker for future policy debate. With perspectives from an international cast of contributors, Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement will be of great interest to academics and policy makers as well as students and practitioners in law.

This book is inspired by the international movement towards the criminalisation of cartel conduct over the last decade. Led by US enforcers, criminalisation has been supported by a growing number of regulators and governments. It derives its support from the simple yet forceful proposition that criminal sanctions, particularly jail time, are the most effective deterrent to such activity. However, criminalisation is much more complex than that basic proposition suggests. There is complexity both in terms of the various forces that are driving and shaping the movement (economic, political and social) and in the effects on the various actors involved in it (government, enforcement agencies, the business community, judiciary, legal profession and general public). Featuring contributions from authors who have been at the forefront of the debate around the world, this substantial 19-chapter volume captures the richness of the criminalisation phenomenon and considers its implications for building an effective criminal cartel regime, particularly outside of the US. It adopts a range of approaches, including general theoretical perspectives (from criminal theory, economics, political science, regulation and criminology) and case-studies of the experience with the design and enforcement of existing or contemplated criminal cartel regimes in various jurisdictions (including in Australia, Canada, EU, Germany, Ireland and the UK). The book also explores the international dimensions of criminalisation - its specific practical consequences (such as increased potential for extradition) as well as its more general implications for trends of harmonisation or convergence in competition law and enforcement.

One of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of EU competition law and policy has been the regulation of those serious competition or antitrust violations now often referred to as 'hard core cartels'. Such cartel activity typically involves large and powerful corporate producers and traders operating across Europe and beyond, and comprise practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing, and limiting production in order to ensure 'market stability' and maintain and increase profits. There is little disagreement now, in terms of competition theory and policy at both international and national levels, regarding the damaging effect of such trading practices on public and consumer interests, and such cartels have been subject to increasing condemnation in the legal process of regulating and protecting competition. Regulating Cartels in Europe provides critical evaluation of the way in which European-level regulation has evolved to deal with the activities of such anti-competitive business cartels. They trace the historical development of cartel regulation in Europe, comparing the more pragmatic and empirical approached favored in Europe with the more dogmatic and uncompromising American policy on cartels. In particular, the work considers critically the move towards the use of fully fledged criminal proceedings in this area of legal control, examining evolving aspects of enforcement policy such as the use of leniency programs and the deployment of a range of criminal law and other sanctions. This new edition of the work covers emerging themes and arguments in the discipline, including the judicial review of decisions against cartels, the criminological and legal basis of the criminalization of cartel conduct, and the range and effectiveness of sanctions used in response to cartel activity.

In this book the author examines the compliance of the European anti-cartel enforcement procedure with the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

"In the last few years, the public enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has been thoroughly transformed: the competition authorities of the EU Member States have become active enforcers within the European Competition Network, the European Commission has imposed more and higher fines than ever before, leniency has become a major instrument of cartel detection, and some Member States have introduced criminal penalties. The overall trend towards more and stronger enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has also rekindled discussion on the old question of how to strike the right balance between efficient enforcement and adequate protection of the rights of the defence. This book brings together six essays which analyse from both a legal and an economic perspective the powers of investigation of the European Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States, and the corresponding procedural rights and guarantees, the use of settlements, the theory and practice of fines and of leniency, and the criminalization of European antitrust enforcement."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

Leniency policies are seen as a revolution in contemporary anti-cartel law enforcement. Unique to competition law, these policies are regarded as essential to detecting, punishing and deterring business collusion – conduct that subverts competition at national and global levels. Featuring contributions from leading scholars, practitioners and enforcers from around the world, this book probes the almost universal adoption and zealous defence of leniency policies by many competition authorities and others. It charts the origins of and impetuses for the leniency movement, captures key insights from academic research and practical experience relating to the operation and effectiveness of leniency policies and examines leniency from the perspectives of corporate and individual applicants, advisers and authorities. The book also explores debates surrounding the intersections between leniency and other crucial elements of the enforcement system such as compensation, compliance and criminalisation. The rich critical analysis in the book draws on the disciplines of law, regulation, economics and criminology. It makes a substantial and distinctive contribution to the literature on a topic that is highly significant to a wide range of actors in the field of competition law and business regulation generally. From the Foreword by Professor Frédéric Jenny ' ... fundamental questions are raised and thoroughly discussed in this book which is undoubtedly the most comprehensive scholarly work on leniency policies produced so far ... [the] book should be required reading for all seeking to acquire a deeper insight into the issues related to leniency policy. It is a priceless contribution ... '