The Debate On The International Financial Architecture

This paper briefly surveys the progress made in various areas of reform of the international financial architecture since the outbreak of the East Asian crisis, and explains the principal technical and political obstacles encountered in carrying out fundamental changes capable of dealing with global and systemic instability. It ends with a brief discussion of what developing countries could do at the global, national or regional level to establish defence mechanisms against financial instability and contagion.

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Debating the Global Financial Architecture opens up the contemporary debate surrounding the reform of the "global financial architecture." Economists and political scientists explore the economic and technical content of alternative global financial regimes as well as the political processes through which such changes are negotiated. The contributors, though diverse, jointly fear that rapid removal of the remaining controls on private international financial transactions risks systematic crisis. By initiating a cross-disciplinary discussion, they hope to see the politics of global financial design examined more honestly, yet without discarding or devaluing a solid economic analysis of global money and investment flows.

This book deals with the recent problems arising from the growth of financial globalization (i.e. the growing integration of capital markets across national borders), as reflected in the current global financial crisis, and the need to improve what has come to be known as the international financial architecture.

Tirole analyzes the current views on financial crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Based on the Paolo Baffi Lecture the author delivered at the Bank of Italy, this refreshingly accessible book is teeming with rich insights that researchers, policy makers, and students at all levels will find indispensable.

Kenen (economics and international finance, Princeton University) reviews the reform efforts that followed the 1994-95 Mexican crisis, and evaluates their results in the time since then. He compares the existing efforts with the more radical recommendations of the Meltzer Report, and considers the implications of his analysis for the role of the IMF. He then offers his own recommendations for further reform. c. Book News Inc.

"The Global Credit Crisis of 2008-09 has underscored the urgency of reforming the international financial architecture. While a number of short-term reforms are already in train, this paper contemplates more ambitious reforms of the international financial architecture that might be implemented over the next ten years. It proposes routinizing the expansion of IMF quotas and the conduct of exchange rate surveillance. It contemplates an expanded role for the SDR in international transactions, which would require someone--like the IMF-- to act as market maker. It considers proposals for reimposing Glass-Steagall-like restrictions on commercial and investment banking, something that will have to be coordinated internationally to be feasible. Other proposals would require banks to purchase capital insurance; here the question is who would be on the other side of the market. Again there is likely to be a role for the IMF. Then there are arguments for a new agency or institution to deal with cross-border bank insolvencies. Any such entity will require staff support, which might plausibly come from the Fund. Finally, some insist that international colleges of regulators are not enough- -that it is desirable to create a World Financial Organization (WFO) with the power to sanction members whose national regulatory policies are not up to international standards. A WFO will similarly need staff support, of which the IMF would be one possible source. All this of course presupposes meaningful IMF governance reform so that the institution has the legitimacy and efficiency to assume these additional responsibilities. The paper therefore concludes with some conventional and unconventional proposals for IMF governance reform."- -Abstract.