The Design Of Emu

Pursuit of price stability may, but need not, exacerbate output fluctuations. This paper discusses the monetary strategy of the European Central Bank, the intermediate targets that this should entail, and implications for accountability, transparency, and reputation. Country-specific shocks will remain but output correlation may not reflect the old pattern of core and peripheral countries. The Stability Pact will force some countries to switch off their automatic stabilizers; others, with fewer fiscal problems, can retain them. Output correlations in EMU may reflect a fiscal core and fiscal periphery. Additional labor market flexibility remains the best solution.

Pursuit of price stability may, but need not, exacerbate output fluctuations. This paper discusses the monetary strategy of the European Central Bank, the intermediate targets that this should entail, and implications for accountability, transparency, and reputation. Country-specific shocks will remain but output correlation may not reflect the old pattern of core and peripheral countries. The Stability Pact will force some countries to switch off their automatic stabilizers; others, with fewer fiscal problems, can retain them. Output correlations in EMU may reflect a fiscal core and fiscal periphery. Additional labor market flexibility remains the best solution.

Presenting a sweeping analysis of the legal foundations, institutions, and substantive legal issues in EU monetary integration, The EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union serves as an authoritative reference on the legal framework of European economic and monetary union. The book opens by setting out the broader contexts for the European project - historical, economic, political, and regarding the international framework. It goes on to examine the constitutional architecture of EMU; the main institutions and their legal powers; the core legal provisions of monetary and economic union; and the relationship of EMU with EU financial market and banking regulation. The concluding section analyses the current EMU crisis and the main avenues of future reform.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in December 1991, set a timetable for the European Community's economic and monetary union (EMU) and clearly defined the institutional policy changes necessary for its achievement. Subsequent developments have demonstrated, however, the importance of many key issues in the transition to EMU that were largely neglected at the time. This volume reports the proceedings of a joint CEPR conference with the Banco de Portugal, held in January 1992. In these papers, leading international experts address the instability of the transition to EMU, the long-run implications of monetary union and the single market for growth and convergence in Europe. They also consider the prospects for inflation and fiscal convergence, regional policy and the integration of financial markets and fiscal systems. Attention focuses on adjustment mechanisms with differentiated shocks, region-specific business cycles and excessive industrial concentration and the cases for a two-speed EMU and fiscal federalism.

This open access book discusses financial crisis management and policy in Europe and Latin America, with a special focus on equity and democracy. Based on a three-year research project by the Jean Monnet Network, this volume takes an interdisciplinary, comparative approach, analyzing both the role and impact of the EU and regional organizations in Latin America on crisis management as well as the consequences of crisis on the process of European integration and on Latin America’s regionalism. The book begins with a theoretical introduction, exploring the effects of the paradigm change on economic policies in Europe and in Latin America and analyzing key systemic aspects of the unsustainability of the present economic system explaining the global crises and their interconnections. The following chapters are divided into sections. The second section explores aspects of regional governance and how the economic and financial crises were managed on a macro level in Europe and Latin America. The third and fourth sections use case studies to drill down to the impact of the crises at the national and regional levels, including the emergence of political polarization and rise in populism in both areas. The last section presents proposals for reform, including the transition from finance capitalism to a sustainable real capitalism in both regions and at the inter-regional level of EU-LAC relations.The volume concludes with an epilogue on financial crises, regionalism, and domestic adjustment by Loukas Tsoukalis, President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Written by an international network of academics, practitioners and policy advisors, this volume will be of interest to researchers and students interested in macroeconomics, comparative regionalism, democracy, and financial crisis management as well as politicians, policy advisors, and members of national and regional organizations in the EU and Latin America.

With euro banknotes and coins starting to circulate as of January 2002, this timely book comes at a crucial juncture for the European Union. Exploring the origins of and progress toward the introduction of the euro, the contributors focus on the importance of economic and monetary union (EMU) as part of the larger process of European integration. Thus, chapters consider the value and limits of a range of theoretical approaches for understanding economic and monetary integration, the pros and cons of EMU's institutional design, and country-specific experiences. With an international group of leading scholars representing a range of disciplines, this book offers a broad perspective on the dynamics of EMU.

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

Europe is on the road to monetary union (EMU) even if there may be delays and diversions on the way. The focal point of EMU will be its single currency, valid throughout all participating countries, and replacing the national currencies. There will be considerable transitional pain and stress, most of all for member states with very high public debts. For the rest, the road ahead will not be smooth, but should be assisted by easier monetary policy in Germany since 1993. For some countries at least, the pain will be aggravated unnecessarily by design defects in the transitional rules for entry - which there is still time to remedy. The author - no admirer of a federal Europe - describes how EMU could actually work better in a confederal Europe with no federal chief executive and with a relatively weak Parliament. The independent Eurofed would be responsible for managing economic policy on an EC-wide basis, while national governments could use fiscal policies to mitigate local deviations. Weak regions and poor peripheral countries would require more flexible assistance from EC resources, however.