The Development And Making Of Legal Doctrine

The development of tort law was characterised by fundamental tensions between the law's conceptual logic and changing public values.

Legal doctrine—the creation of doctrinal concepts, arguments, and legal regimes built on the foundation of written law—is the currency of contemporary law. Yet law students, lawyers, and judges often take doctrine for granted, without asking even the most basic questions. How to Do Things with Legal Doctrine is a sweeping and original study that focuses on how to understand legal doctrine via a hands-on approach. Taking up the provocative invitations from the “New Doctrinalists,” Pierre Schlag and Amy J. Griffin refine the conceptual and rhetorical operations legal professionals perform with doctrine—focusing especially on those difficult moments where law seems to run out, but legal argument must go on. The authors make the crucial operations of doctrine explicit, revealing how they work, and how they shape the law that emerges. How to Do Things with Legal Doctrine will help all those studying or working with law to gain a more systematic understanding of the doctrinal moves many of our best lawyers make intuitively.

This essay explores the contradictory coexistence between two approaches to law that have been dominant in all major legal traditions: law as the normative order chosen by the legitimate and effective holders of power in the state and law as a normative order implicit in social life -- a series of detailed models of what relations among people can and should look like in different parts of social experience. The rudimentary form of the first approach is legal thought as the interpretation of law laid down by the sovereign. The simplest form of the second approach is legal thought as authoritative doctrine developed by jurists and judges in the absence of legislation or as its most important source. The central problems of legal theory result from the impossibility of reconciling these two views of law. The solution to those problems is not theoretical; it is practical: the changes in the organization of society, the economy, and the state that would make democratic self-government a reality -- rather than the sham that it continues to be -- and transform the character of both legislation and legal doctrine. Such a practical solution, however, requires, to guide it, a revolution in our thinking about the institutional and ideological regimes, expressed as law, that shape social life. The foremost task of legal thought today, and the answer to the enigmas of its universal history, is to contribute to the development of that way of thinking.

This book explores the development of both the civil law conception of the Legal State and the common law conception of the Rule of Law. It examines the philosophical and historical background of both concepts, as well as the problem of the interrelation between the two doctrines. The book brings together twenty-five leading scholars from around the world and provides both general and specific jurisdictional perspectives of the issue in both contemporary and historical settings. The Rule of Law is a legal doctrine the meaning of which can only be fully appreciated in the context of both the common law and the European civil law tradition of the Legal State (Rechtsstaat). The Rule of Law and the Legal State are fundamental safeguards of human dignity and of the legitimacy of the state and the authority of state prescriptions.

We are in a moment where peoples and states are interested, directly or indirectly, in asserting their "national interest," unilaterally if necessary. In the White House, the national security policy is premised on "America First," while Catalans and Iraqi Kurds have taken steps to unilaterally declare their independence. All of these actions have generated tension both domestically and internationally. However, even though the potential for unilateral action has been receiving a lot of attention, the larger issue of the legality of unilateral acts is often hard to discern. This book provides a history of the doctrine of unilateral acts in international law, tracing their treatment in the international sphere from consent based acts, to obligations erga omnes, to acts of estoppel. ? Through chapter-by-chapter case studies, this book traces the "legalization" of the category of unilateral acts from its 19th Century foundations into a broad category of obligation. To understand why and how this occurred, this book examines the history of the legal doctrine of unilateral acts, which shows that in spite of efforts to progressively make unilateral acts "legal" they are still not precisely defined or easy to apply, challenging the very commitment these acts are meant to establish.

This volume revisits some of the key debates about the nature and shape of contract law, in light of the impact that statutes have had on its development. With contributions from leading contract law scholars, it fills a significant gap in existing theoretical and doctrinal analyses of contract law, which rely primarily on cases to put forward accounts of the general principles and structure of contract law. Statutory rules are, typically, seen as being specific instances of legal regulation that carve out exceptions to these general principles for specific reasons of policy. This treatment of these rules has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the nature of contract law and the principles that underpin it. By drawing specifically on contract statutes, the volume produces a more complete picture of modern contract law. A companion to the ground-breaking Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (Hart Publishing, 2012) this collection will have a significant impact on the study of contract law.

Aimed at undergraduate law students seeking a firm grasp of doctrine and principle, this text combines theoretical precision and depth with a detailed exposition of the law.

How have social and philosophical ideas influenced the development of tort law in Europe?