The Disembodied Mind

Since classical times we have seen considerable progress in our understanding of the physical world through the disciplines of science. However, when it comes to the mind and its most palpable property, consciousness, we have difficulty attempting any kind of meaningful discussion. Can material things be conscious, or is the mind entirely separate from physics? If we insist on the latter, how does the mind relate to the physical world? Relying more on evidence rooted in the empirical sciences than on standard philosophical arguments, this book disseminates a persuasive and self-consistent model implying an objective mind completely unconnected with anything physical. Moreover it means that the mind has no effect on the physical domain, but, by free volition, is able to navigate its way through a myriad of configurations that constitute the world we experience.

Since classical times we have seen considerable progress in our understanding of the physical world through the disciplines of science. However, when it comes to the mind and its most palpable property, consciousness, we have difficulty attempting any kind of meaningful discussion. Can material things be conscious, or is the mind entirely separate from physics? If we insist on the latter, how does the mind relate to the physical world? Relying more on evidence rooted in the empirical sciences than on standard philosophical arguments, this book disseminates a persuasive and self-consistent model implying an objective mind completely unconnected with anything physical. Moreover it means that the mind has no effect on the physical domain, but, by free volition, is able to navigate its way through a myriad of configurations that constitute the world we experience.

Cognitive science arose in the 1950s when it became apparent that a number of disciplines, including psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy, were fragmenting. Perhaps owing to the field's immediate origins in cybernetics, as well as to the foundational assumption that cognition is information processing, cognitive science initially seemed more unified than psychology. However, as a result of differing interpretations of the foundational assumption and dramatically divergent views of the meaning of the term information processing, three separate schools emerged: classical cognitive science, connectionist cognitive science, and embodied cognitive science. Examples, cases, and research findings taken from the wide range of phenomena studied by cognitive scientists effectively explain and explore the relationship among the three perspectives. Intended to introduce both graduate and senior undergraduate students to the foundations of cognitive science, Mind, Body, World addresses a number of questions currently being asked by those practicing in the field: What are the core assumptions of the three different schools? What are the relationships between these different sets of core assumptions? Is there only one cognitive science, or are there many different cognitive sciences? Giving the schools equal treatment and displaying a broad and deep understanding of the field, Dawson highlights the fundamental tensions and lines of fragmentation that exist among the schools and provides a refreshing and unifying framework for students of cognitive science.

A fresh and timely approach to understanding the profound impact of motor development on children of all ages and stages. Based on the authors' more than seventy combined years of professional success working with children of all abilities, Growing an In-Sync Child provides parents, teachers, and other professionals with the tools to give every child a head start and a leg up. Because early motor development is one of the most important factors in a child's physical, emotional, academic, and overall success, the In- Sync Program of sixty adaptable, easy, and fun activities will enhance your child's development, in just minutes a day. Discover how simple movements such as skipping, rolling, balancing, and jumping can make a world of difference for your child—a difference that will last a lifetime.

Leading scholars respond to the famous proposition by Andy Clark and David Chalmers that cognition and mind are not located exclusively in the head.

What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth? Where do moral values come from? Questions like these have stood at the center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumptions-that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is literal, and that reason is disembodied and universal-that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that:Most thought is unconscious. We have no direct conscious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any simple way.Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosopy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is literal in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along.Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body-not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unconscious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences.Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by analytic philosopy all do not exist.Then what does?Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosopy responsible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern analytic philosopy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosopy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language.

How can we better understand and treat those suffering from schizophrenia and manic-depressive illnesses? This important new book takes us into the world of those suffering from such disorders. Using self-descriptions, its emphasis is not on how mental health professional's view sufferers, but on how the patients themselves experience their disorder. Central to the book is the idea that schizophrenic persons live like disembodies spirits or deanimated bodies. As disembodies spirits, they feel like abstract entities that contemplate their own existence and the world from outside. As deanimated bodies, schizophrenic people feel deprived of the possibility of living personal experiences - perceptions, thoughts, emotions - as their own. A new volume in the International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry series, this book will be of great interest to all those working with sufferers from such disorders - helping them to better understand their mental lives and providing important insights into how best to treat them.

These days, the idea of the cyborg is less the stuff of science fiction and more a reality, as we are all, in one way or another, constantly connected, extended, wired, and dispersed in and through technology. One wonders where the individual, the person, the human, and the body are—or, alternatively, where they stop. These are the kinds of questions Hélène Mialet explores in this fascinating volume, as she focuses on a man who is permanently attached to assemblages of machines, devices, and collectivities of people: Stephen Hawking. Drawing on an extensive and in-depth series of interviews with Hawking, his assistants and colleagues, physicists, engineers, writers, journalists, archivists, and artists, Mialet reconstructs the human, material, and machine-based networks that enable Hawking to live and work. She reveals how Hawking—who is often portrayed as the most singular, individual, rational, and bodiless of all—is in fact not only incorporated, materialized, and distributed in a complex nexus of machines and human beings like everyone else, but even more so. Each chapter focuses on a description of the functioning and coordination of different elements or media that create his presence, agency, identity, and competencies. Attentive to Hawking’s daily activities, including his lecturing and scientific writing, Mialet’s ethnographic analysis powerfully reassesses the notion of scientific genius and its associations with human singularity. This book will fascinate anyone interested in Stephen Hawking or an extraordinary life in science.