The Economic Role Of The State

This research review covers the main theories and justifications for and against state intervention as they have developed over two centuries. It also incorporates an institutional approach to the role of the state in enforcing "the rules of the game" of the economy as well as examining specific issues including market failure, rent-seeking and regulation. Economists and political scientists alike will find this to be the ideal guide to the classic and modern arguments surrounding the state's role in the economy.

Ha-Joon Chang evaluates the role of the state in economics and development. In this collection of essays, he reviews theories and practices of state intervention as they have developed over two centuries of modern capitalism. He develops an institutionalist approach to the role of the state in economic change, and examines the issues involved in particular settings including industrial policy, trade policy, intellectual property rights, regulation, and strategies towards transnational corporations. He mounts a sophisticated theoretical and historical case for the continuing essential and constructive roles which the state can and must play in economic development.

Vito Tanzi offers a truly comprehensive treatment of the economic role of the state in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from a historical and world perspective. The book addresses the fundamental question of what governments should do, or have attempted to do, in economic activities in past and recent periods. It also speculates on what they are likely or may be forced to do in future years. The investigation assembles a large set of statistical information that should prove useful to policy-makers and scholars in the perennial discussion of government's optimal economic roles. It will become an essential reference work on the analytical borders between the market and the state, and on what a reasonable 'exit strategy' from the current fiscal crises should be.

Recoge: Introduction Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson PART ICLASSICAL ARGUMENTS FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE 1. David Hume (1985 [1777]), ‘Of the Independency of Parliament’, in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, Essay VI, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 42–46 2. David Hume (2000), ‘Of the Origin of Justice and Property’, ‘Of the Rules, Which Determine Property’ and ‘Of the Transference of Property By Consent’, in David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds), A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3: Part 2: Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 311–31 3. Adam Smith (1961 [1776]), ‘Of the Sources of the General or Public Revenue of the Society’, in Edwin Cannan (ed.), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth Of Nations, Book V, Chapter II, London, UK: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 341–440 4. Frédéric Bastiat (1850 [2007]), The Law, Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1–55 5. Jean-Baptiste Say (2001 [1880]), ‘Of the Effect of Government Regulations Intended to Influence Production’, in A Treatise on Political Economy, Book I, Chapter XVII, Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books, [translated by C.R. Prinsep], 60–83 6. Simon Newcomb (1870), ‘The Let-Alone Principle’, North American Review, CCXXVI (226), January, 1–33 7. Herbert Spencer (1981 [1843]), ‘The Proper Sphere of Government’, in The Man Versus the State: With Six Essays on Government, Society, and Freedom, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 181–263 PART IICRITICS OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 8. John Stuart Mill (1909 [1848]), ‘Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-faire or Non-interference Principle’, in Principals of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Book IV, Chapter XI, London, UK: Longmans, Green and Co., 304–46 9. John Maynard Keynes (2012 [1926]), ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’, in Elizabeth Johnson and Donald Moggridge (eds), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Volume IX: Essays in Persuasion, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 272–94 10. R.G. Tugwell (1932), ‘The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez Faire’, American Economic Review, 22 (1), March, 75–92 11. J.E. Meade (1954), ‘External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation’, Economic Journal, 62 (245), March, 54–67 12. Paul A. Samuelson (1954), ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (4), November, 387–9 13. Francis M. Bator (1958), ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72 (3), August, 351–79 14. George J. Stigler and Paul A. Samuelson (1963), ‘A Dialogue on the Proper Economic Role of the State’, Selected Papers No. 7, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 3–39 PART IIITHE RESTATEMENT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 15. Ludwig von Mises (2005), ‘Liberal Economic Policy’, Liberalism: The Classical Tradition, Chapter 2, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 37–75 16. Friedrich A. Hayek (1980), ‘Individualism: True and False’, in Individualism and Economic Order, Chapter I, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1–32 17. R.H. Coase (1959), ‘The Federal Communications Commission’, Journal of Law and Economics, II, October, 1–40 18. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, III, October, 1–44 19. Murray N. Rothbard (1974), ‘The Anatomy of the State’, in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, Washington, DC, USA: Libertarian Review Press, 34–53 20. James M. Buchanan (1976), ‘The Justice of Natural Liberty’, Journal of Legal Studies, 5 (1), January, 1–16 21. Gordon Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’, Western Economic Journal, 5 (3), June, 224–32 22. Armen A. Alchian (2006), ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’, in The Collected Works of Armen A. Alchian, Volume 2: Property Rights and Economic Behavior, Part 1, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 52–67 23. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87 (3), September, 567–76 PART IVMODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 24. David Friedman (1989), ‘What is Anarchy? What is Government?’, in The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Chapter 28, New Rochelle, NY, USA: Arlington Publishers, 151–4 25. Jack Hirshleifer (1995), ‘Anarchy and its Breakdown’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1), February, 26–52 26. Avinash K. Dixit (2004), ‘Economics With and Without the Law’, in Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Chapter 1, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 1–23, references 27. James E. Rauch (2005), ‘Getting the Properties Right to Secure Property Rights: Dixit’s Lawlessness and Economics’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII (2), June, 480–7 28. Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer (1997), ‘The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand’, American Economic Review, 87 (2), May, 354–8 29. Andrei Shleifer (2009), ‘The Age of Milton Friedman’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLVII (1), March, 123–35 30. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2005), ‘Unbundling Institutions’, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (5), October, 949–95 31. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, Journal of Law and Economic Organization, 11 (1), April, 1–31.

This unique volume offers a definitive new history of European economies at war from 1914 to 1918. It studies how European economies mobilised for war, how existing economic institutions stood up under the strain, how economic development influenced outcomes and how wartime experience influenced post-war economic growth. Leading international experts provide the first systematic comparison of economies at war between 1914 and 1918 based on the best available data for Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the USA, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The editors' overview draws some stark lessons about the role of economic development, the importance of markets and the damage done by nationalism and protectionism. A companion volume to the acclaimed The Economics of World War II, this is a major contribution to our understanding of total war.