The Emergence Of American Amphibious Warfare 1898 1945

The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945 examines how the United States became a military superpower through the use of amphibious operations. While other major world powers pursued and embraced different weapons and technologies to create different means of waging war, the United States was one of the few countries that spent decades training, developing, and employing amphibious warfare to pursue its national interests.Commonly seen as dangerous and costly, amphibious warfare was carefully modernized, refined, and promoted within American political and military circles for years by a small motley group of military mavericks, intellectuals, innovators, and crackpots. This generational cast of underdogs and unlikely heroes were able to do the impossible by predicting and convincing America’s leadership how the United States should fight World War II.David Nasca reveals that despite the new ways that states have to project military power today as seen with airpower, nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, and special operators, amphibious warfare has proven to be the most important element in transforming the theater of battle. In understanding how amphibious warfare allowed the United States to achieve geopolitical supremacy, competitor states are now looking at America’s amphibious past for clues in how to challenge the United States’ global leadership and expand its power and influence in the world.

American Amphibious Warfare offers analysis of the early amphibious landing operations from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War. Through a case study approach, the operational and strategic significance of each action is analyzed and its impact on the development of the United States is assessed. By focusing on seven major campaigns, Gary J. Ohls provides readers with a richer appreciation of the origins of American amphibious warfare. For many Americans, the concept of amphibious warfare derives from the World War II model in which landing forces assaulted foreign shores and faced determined resistance. These actions usually resulted in very high casualty rates, yet they proved uniformly successful. The circumstances of geography coupled with the weapons and equipment available at that time dictated this type of warfare. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, no such equipment or weapons existed for assaulting defended beaches. Commanders attempted to land their forces in areas where the resistance would be light or nonexistent. The initiative and maneuverability inherent in naval forces permitted the delivery of combat power to the point of attack faster that the land-based defenders could react. Ohls explains how amphibious traditions began in this era and shows how they compare with modern amphibious forces, particularly the tactics of today’s U.S. Marine Corps. The author makes a compelling case for a continuing tradition of American amphibious warfare learned and honed through a set of key battles and carried forward. Further, Ohls argues that the Marine Corps is the true inheritor of this warfare tradition formed in early America, concluding that weapons and equipment, coupled with new doctrine, actually allow modern forces to return to the sort of amphibious tactics and operations practiced more than two centuries ago. Both a work of history as well as an analysis of operational conflict, this study should please readers looking for a clearer understanding of U.S. amphibious operations. Since the concepts presented in this book continue to serve as excellent tools for both the professional officer and the analytical historian, American Amphibious Warfare as a whole provides a much-needed comprehensive history of naval and military warfare.

The planning that allowed for the successful amphibious landings at the end of World War II actually began during the 1880s as the Marine Corps sought to define its role in the new Steel Navy. Officers braved skepticism, indifference and outright opposition to develop an amphibious warfare doctrine, with each service contributing. From the 1898 war with Spain through the disastrous 1915 Australian landing to the successful World War II assaults in the Pacific and northwest France, this chronological history explores the successes and failures pivotal to the concept of amphibious warfare through the lives and careers of fourteen officers instrumental to its development. Profiles include General George S. Patton, Jr.; Rear Admiral Walter C. Ansel, USN; Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune, USMC; Admiral William Sims, USN; and Colonel Robert W. Huntington, USMC.

The Fall and Rise of French Sea Power explores the renewal of French naval power from the fall of France in 1940 through the first two decades of the Cold War. The Marine nationale continued fighting after the Armistice, a service divided against itself. The destruction of French sea power—at the hands of the Allies, the Axis, and fratricidal confrontations in the colonies—continued unabated until the scuttling of the Vichy fleet in 1942. And yet, just over twenty years after this dark day, Charles de Gaulle announced a plan to complement the country’s nuclear deterrent with a force of nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines. Completing the rebuilding effort that followed the nadir in Toulon, this force provided the means to make the Marine nationale a fully-fledged blue-water navy again, ready to face the complex circumstances of the Cold War. An important continuum of cooperation and bitter tensions shaped naval relations between France and the Anglo-Americans from World War II to the Cold War. The rejuvenation of a fleet nearly wiped out during the hostilities was underpinned by a succession of forced compromises, often the least bad possible, reluctantly accepted by French politicians and admirals but effectively leveraged in their pursuit of an independent naval policy within a strategy of alliance. Hugues Canuel demonstrates that the renaissance of French sea power was shaped by a naval policy formulated within a strategy of alliance closely adapted to the needs of a continental state with worldwide interests. This work fills a distinct void in the literature concerned with the evolution of naval affairs from World War II to the 1960s. The author, drawing upon extensive research through French, British, American, and NATO archives (including those made public only recently regarding the sensitive circumstances surrounding the French nuclear deterrent) maps out for readers the unique path adopted in France to rebuild a blue-water fleet during unprecedented circumstances.

The ability of the United States Navy to fight and win a protracted war in the Pacific was not solely the result of technology, tactics, or leadership. Naval aviation maintenance played a major role in the U.S. victory over Japan in the second World War. The naval war against Japan did not achieve sustained success until enough aircraft technicians were available to support the high tempo of aviation operations that fast carrier task force doctrine demanded. When the United States realized war was imminent and ordered a drastic increase in the size of its aviation fleet, the Navy was forced to reconsider its earlier practices and develop new policies in maintenance, supply, and technical training. Not only did a shortage of technicians plague the Navy, but the scarcity of aviation supply and repair facilities in the Pacific soon caused panic in Washington. While the surface Navy's modernization of at-sea replenishment was beneficial, it did not solve the problems of sustaining war-time aircraft readiness levels sufficient to a winning a naval air war. Fisher outlines the drastic institutional changes that accompanied an increase in aviation maintenance personnel from fewer than 10,000 to nearly 250,000 bluejackets, the complete restructuring of the naval aviation technical educational system, and the development of a highly skilled labor force. The first comprehensive study on the importance of aircraft maintenance and the aircraft technician in the age of the aircraft carrier, Sustaining the Carrier War, provides the missing link to our understanding of Great Power conflict at sea.

Now in its third edition, American Military History examines how a country shaped by race, ethnicity, economy, regionalism, and power has been equally influenced by war and the struggle to define the role of a military in a free and democratic society. Organized chronologically, the text begins at the point of European conflict with Native Americans and concludes with military affairs in the early 21st century, providing an important overview of the military’s role on an international, domestic, social, and symbolic level. The third edition is fully updated to reflect recent developments in military policy and the study of military history and war and society, thus providing students a foundational understanding of the American military experience. This book will be of interest to students of American history and military history. It is designed to allow instructors flexibility in structuring a course.

Existing literature maintains that the U.S. Marine Corps’ operational success in the Pacific War rested upon two dominant themes: committed theoretical preparation and courageous battlefield action. Put simply, the Marines wrestled with the conceptual challenges of the amphibious assault in the 1920s and 1930s and developed the tools and methods necessary to seize a hostile beach. When Japanese forces attacked at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Corps sent its brave and spirited infantrymen to advance across the enemy-held islands of the South and Central Pacific. But the full story runs much deeper. Though this conventional narrative captures essential elements of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' triumph, it fails to account for substantial interwar deficiencies in fire control and coordination, as well as the critical wartime development of those capabilities between 1942 and 1945. Delivering Destruction is the first detailed study of American triphibious (land, sea, and air) firepower coordination in the Pacific War. In describing the Amphibious Corps' development of fire coordination teams and tactics in the Central Pacific, Hemler underlines the importance of wartime adaptation, battlefield coordination, and the primacy of the human element in naval combat. He reveals the untold story of American fire control and coordination teams in the Central Pacific. Through “bottom-up” adaptation and innovation, American troops and officers worked out practical solutions in the field, learning to effectively apply and integrate air and naval support during a contested amphibious assault. The Americans' ability to mount tremendous, synchronized firepower at the beachhead–a capability established through three years of grueling wartime adaptation–allowed the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to seize any fortified Japanese island of its choice by 1945. ·Despite advancing technology and expanding “domains” of warfare, combat remains a deeply interactive, human endeavor.

Genesis of the Grand Fleet: The Admiralty, Germany, and the Home Fleet, 1896-1914 tells the story of the prewar predecessor to the Royal Navy's war-winning Grand Fleet: the Home Fleet. Established in early 1907 by First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher, the Home Fleet combined an active core of powerful armored warships with a unification of the various reserve divisions of warships previously under the control of the three Royal Navy home port commands. Fisher boasted that the new Home Fleet would be able to counter the growing German Hochseeflotte. While these boasts were accurate, they were not the sole motivation behind the Home Fleet's establishment. The Liberal Party's landslide victory in the 1906 General Election made fiscal economy on the part of the Admiralty even more important than before, and this significantly influenced the Home Fleet's creation. Subsequently the Home Fleet suffered a sustained campaign of criticism by the commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet, Lord Charles Beresford. This campaign ruined many careers including Beresford's and resulted in the assimilation of the Channel Fleet into the Home Fleet in 1909. From 1910 onward the Home Fleet steadily evolved and became the most important single command in the Royal Navy, and the Home Fleet's successive commanders-in-chief had influence on strategic policy rivaled only by the Board of Admiralty. The last prewar commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir George Callaghan achieved this influence by impressing the civilian head of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. A driven reformer, Churchill's influence was almost as important as Fisher's. Against this backdrop of political drama, Genesis of the Grand Fleet: The Admiralty, Germany, and the Home Fleet, 1896-1914 explains how Britain maintained its maritime preeminence in the early twentieth century. As Christopher Buckey describes, the fleet sustained Britain and her allies' path to victory in World War I.