The Endogenous Formation Of Economic Coalitions

Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.

Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.

Broad and diverse ranges of activities are conducted within and by organized groups of individuals, including political, economic and social activities. These activities have become a subject of intense interest in economics and game theory. Some of the topics investigated in this collection are models of networks of power and privilege, trade networks, co-authorship networks, buyer–seller networks with differentiated products, and networks of medical innovation and the adaptation of new information. Other topics are social norms on punctuality, clubs and the provision of club goods and public goods, research and development and collusive alliances among corporations, and international alliances and trading agreements. While relatively recent, the literature on game theoretic studies of group formation in economics is already vast. This volume provides an introduction to this important literature on game-theoretic treatments of situations with networks, clubs, and coalitions, including some applications.

Abstract: Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

The organization of individuals into networks and groups is of fundamental importance in many social and economic interactions. Examples range from networks of personal contacts used to obtain information about job opportunities to the formation of trading partnerships, alliances, cartels, and federations. Much of our understanding of how and why such networks and groups form, and the precise way in which the network or groups structure affects outcomes of social and economic interaction, is relatively new. This volume collects some of the central papers in this recent literature, which have made important progress on this topic.

Hay razones para pensar que llega una cuarta ola de democratización. En la actualidad existen más democracias en el mundo que en ningún periodo anterior. Desde el año 1991, nada menos que cuarenta Estados han emprendido la transición hacia la democracia. La existencia de naciones en vías de democratización o de redemocratización, como los esfuerzos para crear constituciones supraestatales -es el caso de la Unión Europea-, hacen imprescindible avanzar hacia un mejor conocimiento de los procedimientos legislativos y los modelos alternativos de constitución política. La división histórica de las ciencias políticas en distintos campos de estudio ha sesgado el enfoque adoptado por economistas y politólogos sobre numerosos temas y ha supuesto limitaciones artificiales para el análisis de muchas cuestiones sociales relevantes. De ahí la importancia innegable de un estudio unificado de la economía política que explore las fronteras de la interacción entre política y economía. La caracterización de la economía política como síntesis de diversos campos suscitará controversia, a la vez que abre una línea de investigación muy estimulante para elucidar nuestra comprensión sobre las democracias.Este libro recoge los resultados del seminario "La economía política de la democracia", celebrado en Barcelona entre los días 5 y 7 de junio de 2008 con el apoyo de la Fundación BBVA. En él se dieron cita líderes intelectuales en economía y ciencias políticas con el fin de desarrollar planteamientos equilibrados sobre temas comunes de análisis, tales como las estrategias preelectorales, las elecciones, la formación de coaliciones y las prácticas de gobierno, dentro de un único marco integrador. Se prestó una especial atención a campos actuales de desarrollo, entres ellos, la entrada endógena de candidatos, los comportamientos de políticos y votantes, negociaciones y acuerdos, y regímenes políticos.