The Ethics Of Belief Theory

What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do and fail to do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly. However, do we have the kind of control over our beliefs that such responsibility for our beliefs seems to require? Do we have certain obligations to control or influence our beliefs on particular occasions? And do we sometimes believe responsibly despite violating such obligations, namely because we are excused by, say, indoctrination or ignorance? By answering each of these questions, Rik Peels provides a theory of what it is to believe responsibly. He argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence our beliefs by performing actions that make a difference to what we believe. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. We can be held responsible for our beliefs in virtue of such influence on our beliefs. Sometimes, we believe responsibly despite having violated such obligations, namely if we are excused, by force, ignorance, or luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have failed to have that belief, that responsible belief is in a specific sense radically subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that belief.

In these two volumes, Kenneth Cauthen thoroughly examines what he terms "the ethics of belief." Simply stated, Cauthen posits that ethics are a matter of the convictions that individuals and communities have about what is right and wrong, good and evil. He contrasts this with a more traditional view that morality is based upon principles that are universally valid and objectively true. Using a biological and historical approach, in Volume 1 Cauthen systematically develops a theory of Christian ethics based on what love (agape) and justice mean in contemporary society. He examines the interface between our complex civilization and some of the radical demands of the New Testament. Cauthen's ultimate goal is for readers to ask themselves, "How would Christ have us live in the 21st century?" In Volume 2, Cauthen spells out the implications of this ethical theory for a wide variety of contemporary topics. He takes forthright and controversial positions on a number of social and personal issues, including abortion, illegal drugs, prostitution, assisted suicide, capital punishment, church and state relations, religion and politics, democracy, poverty, health care, wealth and income distribution, affirmative action, and homosexuality. The Ethics Of Belief is a thought-provoking work that delves deeply into some of our world's most timely yet timeless issues. A nationally recognized authority on theology and ethics, Kenneth Cauthen is the John Price Crozer Griffith Emeritus Professor of Theology at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School/Crozer Theological Seminary. He is the author of several seminal works that have become standard texts, such as The Impact of American Religious Liberalism, which was selected for a special White House library on American history and culture. His CSS publications include the groundbreaking volumes The Many Faces Of Evil and The Ethics Of Assisted Death. Cauthen received his education from Mercer University (B.A.), Yale Divinity School (B.Div.), Emory University (M.A.), and Vanderbilt University (Ph.D.).

"It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." -- W. K. Clifford The above forthright assertion of mathematician and educator W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) in his famous essay "The Ethics of Belief" drew an immediate response from Victorian-era critics, who took issue with his reasoned and brilliantly presented attack on beliefs "not founded on fair inquiry." An advocate of evolutionary theory, Clifford recognized that working hypotheses and assumptions are necessary for belief formation and that testing and assessing one's beliefs in light of new evidence strengthens those worthy of being held. "The Ethics of Belief" is presented here in complete form, along with an insightful biographical introduction by editor Timothy J. Madigan. Also included are four other noteworthy essays by Clifford: "On the Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought," "Right and Wrong," "The Ethics of Religion," and "The Influence upon Morality of a Decline in Religious Belief."

W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) was a noted mathematician and popularizer of science in the Victorian era. Although he made major contributions in the field of geometry, he is perhaps best known for a short essay he wrote in 1876, entitled "The Ethics of Belief", in which he argued that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." Delivered initially as an address to the august Metaphysical Society (whose members included such luminaries as Alfred Lord Tennyson, William Gladstone, T. H. Huxley, and assorted scientists, clerics and philosophers of differing metaphysical views, "The Ethics of Belief" became a rallying cry for freethinkers and a bone of contention for religious apologists. It continues to be discussed today as an exemplar of what is called 'evidentialism', a key point in current philosophy of religion debates over justification of knowledge claims. In this book, Timothy J. Madigan examines the continuing relevance of "The Ethics of Belief" to epistemological and ethical concerns. He places the essay within the historical context, especially the so-called 'Victorian Crisis of Faith' of which Clifford was a key player. Clifford's own life and interests are dealt with as well, along with the responses to his essay by his contemporaries, the most famous of which was William James's "The Will to Believe." Madigan provides an overview of modern-day critics of Cliffordian evidentialism, as well as examining thinkers who were positively influenced by him, including Bertrand Russell, who was perhaps Clifford's most influential successor as an advocate of intellectual honesty. The book ends with a defense of "The Ethics of Belief" from a virtue-theory approach, and argues that Clifford utilizes an "as-if" methodology to encourage intellectual inquiry and communal truth-seeking.' The Ethics of Belief' continues to provoke and stimulate controversy, which was perhaps Clifford's own fondest hope, although he had no right to believe it would do so.

Volume 1 systematically develops a theory of Christian ethics, examining the tension between our complex civilization and the radical demands of the New Testament. Volume 2 spells out the implications of this ethical theory, and Cauthen takes forthright and controversial positions on a wide variety of contemporary topics.

Shalom and the Ethics of Belief explores Nicholas Wolterstorff's theory of situated rationality from a theological point of view and develops a doxastic, or belief-based, ethic based upon the theology of Wolterstorff's neo-Calvinist, Kuyperian background, which emerges in terms of his biblical ethic and eschatology of shalom. Two epistemological aspects are discussed in Nathan D. Shannon's account of Wolterstorff's philosophical writings: the picture of the belief-forming self present in the work of Thomas Reid, and the connection between belief and obligation. Situated rationality, the sum of Wolterstorff's decades-long work on epistemology and rationality, is argued to be a shalom doxastic ethic-a Christian, common grace ethic of belief pluralism. Wolterstorff incorporates the ethics of belief within the full scope of a person's socio-moral accountability, an accountability that ultimately flows from the teleology of the world as intended by its creator and from the inherent value of humans as bearers of the divine image. Shannon's treatment of belief as grounded in the eschatological, ethical vision of shalom provides a comprehensive and novel account of how Wolterstoroff's Christianity informed and influenced his philosophical writings.

The fundamental question of the ethics of belief is "What ought one to believe?" According to the traditional view of evidentialism, the strength of one's beliefs should be proportionate to the evidence. Conventional ways of defending and challenging evidentialism rely on the idea that what one ought to believe is a matter of what it is rational, prudent, ethical, or personally fulfilling to believe. Common to all these approaches is that they look outside of belief itself to determine what one ought to believe. In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief—that evidentialism is belief's own ethics. A key observation is that it is not merely that one ought not, but that one cannot, believe, for example, that the number of stars is even. The "cannot" represents a conceptual barrier, not just an inability. Therefore belief in defiance of one's evidence (or evidentialism) is impossible. Adler addresses such questions as irrational beliefs, reasonableness, control over beliefs, and whether justifying beliefs requires a foundation. Although he treats the ethics of belief as a central topic in epistemology, his ideas also bear on rationality, argument and pragmatics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and social cognitive psychology.