The Ethics Of Plea Bargaining

The practice of plea bargaining plays a hugely significant role in the adjudication of criminal charges and has provoked intense debate about its legitimacy. This book offers the first full-length philosophical analysis of the ethics of plea bargaining. It develops a sustained argument for restrained forms of the practice and against the free-wheeling versions that predominate in the United States. In countries that have endorsed plea bargains, such as the United States, upwards of ninety percent of criminal defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial. Yet trials, which grant a presumption of innocence to defendants and place a substantial burden of proof on the state to establish guilt, are widely regarded as the most appropriate mechanisms for fairly and accurately assigning criminal sanctions. How is it that many countries have abandoned the formal rules and rigorous standards of public trials in favor of informal and veiled negotiations between state officials and criminal defendants concerning the punishment to which the latter will be subjected? More importantly, how persuasive are the myriad justifications that have been provided for plea bargaining? These are the questions addressed in this book. Examining the legal processes by which individuals are moved through the criminal justice system, the fairness of those processes, and the ways in which they reproduce social inequality, this book offers an ethical argument for restrained forms of plea bargaining. It also provides a comparison between the different plea bargaining regimes that exist within the US, where it is well-established, England and Wales, where the practice is coming under considerable critique, and the European Union, where debate continues on whether it coheres with inquisitorial legal regimes. It suggests that rewards for admitting guilt are distinguished from penalties for exercising the right to trial, and argues for modest, fixed sentence reductions for defendants who admit their guilt. These suggestions for reform include discouraging the current practice of deliberate over-charging by prosecutors and charge bargaining, and require judges to scrutinize more closely the evidence against those accused of crimes before any guilty pleas are entered by them. Arguing that the negotiation of charges and sentences should remain the exception, not the rule, it nevertheless puts forward a normative defense for the reform and retention of the plea bargaining system.

Negotiation is a ubiquitous part of social life. Some even say that social order itself is a negotiated phenomenon. Yet the study of negotiation as an actual discourse activity, occurring between people who have substantial interests and tasks in the real social world, is in its infancy. This is the more surprising because plea bargaining, as a specific form of negotiation, has recently been the center of an enormous amount of research attention. Much of the concern has been directed to basic ques tions of justice, such as how fair the process is, whether it is unduly coercive, and whether it accurately separates the guilty from the innocent. A study such as mine does not try to answer these sorts of questions. I believe that we are not in a position to answer them until we approach plea bargaining on its own complex terms. Previous studies that have attempted to provide a general picture of the process as a way to assess its degree of justness have neglected the specific skills by which prac titioners bargain and negotiate, the particular procedures through which various surface features such as character assessment are accomplished, and concrete ways in which justice is administered and, simultaneously, caseloads are managed.

2013 Christy Award finalist! Plea bargains may grease the rails of justice, but for Jamie Brock, prosecuting criminals is not about cutting deals. In her three years as assistant DA, she’s never plea-bargained a case and vows she never will. But when a powerful defense attorney is indicted for murder and devises a way to bring the entire justice system to a screeching halt, Jamie finds herself at a crossroads. One by one, prisoners begin rejecting deals. Prosecutors are overwhelmed, and felons start walking free on technicalities. To break the logjam and convict her nemesis, Jamie must violate every principle that has guided her young career. But she has little choice. To convict the devil, sometimes you have to cut a deal with one of his demons.

Though originally an interloper in a system of justice mediated by courtroom battles, plea bargaining now dominates American criminal justice. This book traces the evolution of plea bargaining from its beginnings in the early nineteenth century to its present pervasive role. Through the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, judges showed far less enthusiasm for plea bargaining than did prosecutors. After all, plea bargaining did not assure judges “victory”; judges did not suffer under the workload that prosecutors faced; and judges had principled objections to dickering for justice and to sharing sentencing authority with prosecutors. The revolution in tort law, however, brought on a flood of complex civil cases, which persuaded judges of the wisdom of efficient settlement of criminal cases. Having secured the patronage of both prosecutors and judges, plea bargaining quickly grew to be the dominant institution of American criminal procedure. Indeed, it is difficult to name a single innovation in criminal procedure during the last 150 years that has been incompatible with plea bargaining’s progress and survived.

"That relatively few criminal cases in this country are resolved by full Perry Mason-style strials is fairly common knowledge. Most cases are settled by a guilty plea after some form of negotiation over the charge or sentence. But why? The standard explanation is case pressure: the enormous volume of criminal cases, to be processed with limited staff, time and resources. . . . But a large body of new empirical research now demands that we re-examine plea negotiation. Milton Heumann's book, Plea Bargaining, strongly and explicitly attacks the case-pressure argument and suggests an alternative explanation for plea bargaining based on the adaptation of attorneys and judges to the local criminal court. The book is a significant and welcome addition to the literature. Heumann's investigation of case pressure and plea negotiation demonstrates solid research and careful analysis."—Michigan Law Review

Despite a popular view that trials are the focal point of the criminal justice process, in reality, the most frequent way a criminal matter resolves is not through a fiercely fought battle between state and defendant, but instead through a process of negotiation between the prosecution and defence, resulting in a defendant pleading guilty in exchange for agreed concessions from the prosecution. This book presents an original empirical case-study of plea negotiations drawing upon interviews with legal actors and an analysis of defence practitioner case files, to shine light on the processes and ways in which an agreed outcome is reached in criminal prosecutions, within the setting of a jurisdiction, like many others world-wide, which is suffering major shifts in state resources. Plea negotiations, also referred to as “plea bargaining”, “negotiated guilty pleas” and “negotiated resolutions” are neither an alloyed benefit nor a detriment for defendants, victims or the criminal justice system generally, and like all compromises, this book shows how the perfect “justice” outcome gives way to the good, or just the reasonably acceptable justice outcome.

This open access book examines whether a distinctly Nordic procedural or court culture exists and what the hallmarks of that culture are. Do Nordic courts and court proceedings share a distinct set of ideas and values that in combination constitute the core of a regional legal culture? How do Europeanisation, privatisation, diversification and digitisation influence courts and court proceedings in the Nordic countries? The book traces the genesis and formation of Nordic courts and justice systems to provide a richer comprehension of contemporary Nordic legal culture, and an understanding of the relationship between legal cultural stability and change. In answering these questions, the book provides models for conceptualising procedural culture. Nordic procedural culture has partly developed organically and is partly also the product of deliberate efforts to maintain a certain level of alignment between the Nordic countries. Studying Nordic cooperation enables us to gain a deeper understanding of current regional, European and global harmonisation processes within procedural law. The influx of supranational European law, increased use of alternative dispute resolution and growth in regulation density that produces a conflict between specialisation and coherence, have tangible impact on the role of courts in a democratic society, the form of court proceedings and court structures. This book examines whether and why some trends exert more tangible, or perhaps simply more perceptible, influence on procedural culture than others.

The legitimate and illegitimate use of incentives in society today Incentives can be found everywhere—in schools, businesses, factories, and government—influencing people's choices about almost everything, from financial decisions and tobacco use to exercise and child rearing. So long as people have a choice, incentives seem innocuous. But Strings Attached demonstrates that when incentives are viewed as a kind of power rather than as a form of exchange, many ethical questions arise: How do incentives affect character and institutional culture? Can incentives be manipulative or exploitative, even if people are free to refuse them? What are the responsibilities of the powerful in using incentives? Ruth Grant shows that, like all other forms of power, incentives can be subject to abuse, and she identifies their legitimate and illegitimate uses. Grant offers a history of the growth of incentives in early twentieth-century America, identifies standards for judging incentives, and examines incentives in four areas—plea bargaining, recruiting medical research subjects, International Monetary Fund loan conditions, and motivating students. In every case, the analysis of incentives in terms of power yields strikingly different and more complex judgments than an analysis that views incentives as trades, in which the desired behavior is freely exchanged for the incentives offered. Challenging the role and function of incentives in a democracy, Strings Attached questions whether the penchant for constant incentivizing undermines active, autonomous citizenship. Readers of this book are sure to view the ethics of incentives in a new light.