The European Union And The Palestinian Question

European public opinion holds that the gravest obstacle to peace in the Middle East is the unwillingness of both sides to compromise, stemming from Israel’s oppression of Palestinians, Israeli housing settlements on disputed territories and Palestinian suicide attacks. When asked to identify the primary aggressor in the conflict, 43 percent of respondents chose both Israel and the Palestinians, reflecting the chain of retaliations in the conflict. Only 25 percent considered Israel to be the sole aggressor and even less – 13 percent – believed that only the Palestinian side was to blame. Although the European public deeply condemns the Palestinian suicide and rocket attacks on Israel, they are equally critical of Tel Aviv’s response. For example: 46 percent disapprove of the wall built to separate Israel from the West Bank; 53 percent consider the economic blockade of the Gaza Strip to be illegal; and 60 percent condemn the Israeli armed incursion in the area in the winter of 2008–2009. These results show a growing trend in the opinion of European citizens that Israeli government policies are responsible for the failure of the peace process. The Arab democratic wave is fundamentally changing the regional context of the Palestinian issue, and gradually ending the American and European quasi-monopoly as external peace mediators. Obviously, in the past a number of Arab initiatives have occurred, but the gap between leaders and Arab public opinion allowed some – such as Mubarak – to align them with the American stance at the time. The end of the Mubarak regime has brought Egypt much closer to all Palestinians. It was already clear there was no longer support in Egypt for the stifling closure of Gaza. With the end of authoritarianism, Egypt was quick to move to a position quite similar to that of Turkey, in that it combines a genuine desire for peace with Israel with strong support for the rights of the Palestinians, including the right to statehood, an opinion shared by the majority of the European public. Whether a one- or a two-state solution looms on the horizon, the question of civil rights for the Palestinians will not go away, nor will the need of all parties in the conflict to comply with international law. Whatever the circumstances, an approach centered on adherence to laws, norms and fundamental rights seems to be the option that will remain at the heart of EU policy for years to come.

This book offers an analysis of the dynamics of Israeli-European relations and discusses significant developments in that relationship from the late 1950s through to the present day. The emphasis is placed on five broad themes that address different dimensions of the relationship: 1) Israeli-E.U. relations and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; 2) Israeli-E.U. relations in a multilateral context; 3) the bilateral nature of Israeli-E.U. relations; 4) Israeli (mis)perceptions of the E.U.; 5) the future of Israeli-E.U. relations.

This study assimilates diverse interpretations of the origins of the Middle East conflict with emphasis on the fight for Palestine and its religious and political roots. It draws largely on the historical revisionism of the last two decades.

The European Union and the Middle East presents a concise but thorough historical analysis of the relationship between the European Union and its predecessors and the Middle East, from the early 1950s to the present day. The authors provide a survey of the evolution of the foreign policy mechanisms of the EU and an outline of the relevant aspects of modern Middle East history. They examine the relationship betwen the two regions from 1950 to the end of the Cold War, with special emphasis on the period following the 1973/4 oil crisis. They go on to look at the post-Cold War era discussing the conflict with Iraq and examining the EU's continuing involvement in the Middle East peace process.

The European Union (EU) and the Eurozone became the economic integration example to follow for years. However, the worldwide economic crisis that unfolded in 2007 put the whole economic integration process in question, the European project in jeopardy and the euro under pressure, with serious doubts that it can survive its first crisis. The core argument of this book is twofold. First, it seeks to explain the difficult political, economic and fiscal idiosyncrasies of all member states in order to put the reasons for the economic crisis into a new and clear perspective. Second, it argues that the institutional response put forward to explain this tremendous crisis is flawed and dangerous because it does not solve the main underlying problem: the deep differences among member states on their understanding of economic and financial behavior. This study counters the leading institutional explanation for the economic crisis that has impacted the entire EU. It presents a unique and provocative explanation of why the EU and the Eurozone are still immersed in an economic crisis and will be of key interest to students and scholars of European Politics and Economics.

Based primarily on Irish archival sources, parliamentary debates, EU, UN and Israeli documents as well as the Irish media, this work is the first attempt to examine Ireland's evolving policy towards the Palestine question since the birth of Israel in 1948. Beginning with an analysis of Ireland's approach to the issue both prior to and following its entry into the UN in the mid-1950s it then focuses on Ireland's increasing involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict since its accession to the EEC in the early 1970s. Specifically it deals with four distinct phases: 1973-1980 when the issue of Palestine and the role of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), came to the fore in UN and EU discussions on the Middle East; 1980-1988, when the EEC's support for Palestinian aspirations placed the Community increasingly at odds with Israel; 1988-1996, when the PLO's acceptance of a negotiated settlement to its conflict with Israel was followed by the Madrid and Oslo peace processes; and 1996-2004, a time during which the optimism of the early Oslo years has disappeared.