The Failure Of Democracy In Iraq

The Failure of Democracy in Iraq studies democratization in post-2003 Iraq, which has so far failed, due mainly to cultural and religious reasons. There are other factors, such as the legacy of the dictatorial regime, exclusionary policies, the problem of stateness, interference by regional powers, the rentier economy and sectarianism, that have impeded democracy and contributed to its failure, but the employment of religion in politics was the most to blame. The establishment of stable democratic institutions continues to elude Iraq, 15 years after toppling the dictatorship. The post-2003 Iraq could not completely eradicate the long historical tradition of despotic governance due to deep-seated religious beliefs and tribal values, along with widening societal ethno-sectarian rifts which precluded the negotiation of firm and stable elite settlements and pacts across communal lines. The book examines how the fear in neighbouring countries of a region-wide domino effect of the Iraq democratization process caused them to adopt interventionist policies towards Iraq that helped to stunt the development of democracy. The lack of commitment by the initiator of the democratic process, the United States, undermined the prospects of democratic consolidation. This is compounded by serious mistakes such as de-Ba’athification and the disbanding of the Iraqi army and security apparatuses which caused a security vacuum the US forces were not able to fill. The Failure of Democracy in Iraq is a key resource for all students and academics interested in democracy, Islam and Middle East Studies.

Policing Iraq chronicles the efforts of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to rebuild their police force and criminal justice system in the wake of the US invasion. Jesse S. G. Wozniak conducted ethnographic research during multiple stays in Iraqi Kurdistan, observing such signpost moments as the Arab Spring, the official withdrawal of coalition forces, the rise of the Islamic State, and the return of US forces. By investigating the day-to-day reality of reconstructing a police force during active hostilities, Wozniak demonstrates how police are integral to the modern state’s ability to effectively rule and how the failure to recognize this directly contributed to the destabilization of Iraq and the rise of the Islamic State. The reconstruction process ignored established practices and scientific knowledge, instead opting to create a facade of legitimacy masking a police force characterized by low pay, poor recruits, and a training regimen wholly unsuited to a constitutional democracy. Ultimately, Wozniak argues, the United States never intended to build a democratic state but rather to develop a dependent client to serve its neoimperial interests.

Recent outbursts of sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq have made many observers question the viability of the state itself. It is said that due to the artificiality of the state and a lack of deep-seated political institutions, Iraqi politics is doomed to endlessly revert back to primordialism. Political parties are mere facades for the real intention of pursuing ethno-sectarian interests, the argument goes. But the present situation has largely been caused by Saddam Hussein's infamous rule over the past three decades, combined with the plight of international sanctions. Before Saddam's ascent to power in the late 1970s, however, the Iraqi political spectrum was full of political parties operating from ideological platforms. The largest, and arguably most important of these groups, was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). The ICP stands out as the only true cross-sectarian party in Iraqi history, drawing support from all of Iraq's diverse communities. From its inception in 1934, it continuously fought the various regimes in power and endeavoured to spread communist ideology throughout Iraq. At times the party achieved considerable success in this regard, although ultimately never able to seize power. Red Star over Iraqanalyses the twists and turns of the ICP from its inception until its ultimate demise as a significant political force at the hands of Saddam in 1979.

This is the first major study of the alternatives confronting Iraq as it seeks to rebuild its vital oil industry while simultaneously constructing a new political system. A key challenge facing the country is to allocate the revenues oil generates in a way that avoids economic and social instability. Reviewing the present status of the industry, the authors - including Clement Henry, Massoud Karshenas, Roger Owen, Mona Said and John Sfakianakis - use comparative analysis to suggest how it might best be rebuilt. Oil and Democracy in Iraq is an important and timely assessment of Iraq's oil industry. 'Springborg's observations help understand the current stalemate in (or failure) to define the legal and administrative setting needed to undertake a real reconstruction of the national oil industry.' -- Maritza Cricorian, Istituto Affari Internazionali 'This book is exemplary, setting forth clear alternatives, as well as cautionary tales from the experiences of other states, and indeed of Iraq itself in an earlier incarnation.' -- Charles Tripp, School of Oriental and African Studies

America's leading expert on democracy delivers the first insider's account of the U.S. occupation of Iraq-a sobering and critical assessment of America's effort to implant democracy In the fall of 2003, Stanford professor Larry Diamond received a call from Condoleezza Rice, asking if he would spend several months in Baghdad as an adviser to the American occupation authorities. Diamond had not been a supporter of the war in Iraq, but he felt that the task of building a viable democracy was a worthy goal now that Saddam Hussein's regime had been overthrown. He also thought he could do some good by putting his academic expertise to work in the real world. So in January 2004 he went to Iraq, and the next three months proved to be more of an education than he bargained for. Diamond found himself part of one of the most audacious undertakings of our time. In Squandered Victory he shows how the American effort to establish democracy in Iraq was hampered not only by insurgents and terrorists but also by a long chain of miscalculations, missed opportunities, and acts of ideological blindness that helped assure that the transition to independence would be neither peaceful nor entirely democratic. He brings us inside the Green Zone, into a world where ideals were often trumped by power politics and where U.S. officials routinely issued edicts that later had to be squared (at great cost) with Iraqi realities. His provocative and vivid account makes clear that Iraq-and by extension, the United States-will spend many years climbing its way out of the hole that was dug during the fourteen months of the American occupation.

A sobering look at the intimate relationship between political power and the news media, When the Press Fails argues the dependence of reporters on official sources disastrously thwarts coverage of dissenting voices from outside the Beltway. The result is both an indictment of official spin and an urgent call to action that questions why the mainstream press failed to challenge the Bush administration’s arguments for an invasion of Iraq or to illuminate administration policies underlying the Abu Ghraib controversy. Drawing on revealing interviews with Washington insiders and analysis of content from major news outlets, the authors illustrate the media’s unilateral surrender to White House spin whenever oppositional voices elsewhere in government fall silent. Contrasting these grave failures with the refreshingly critical reporting on Hurricane Katrina—a rare event that caught officials off guard, enabling journalists to enter a no-spin zone—When the Press Fails concludes by proposing new practices to reduce reporters’ dependence on power. “The hand-in-glove relationship of the U.S. media with the White House is mercilessly exposed in this determined and disheartening study that repeatedly reveals how the press has toed the official line at those moments when its independence was most needed.”—George Pendle, Financial Times “Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston are indisputably right about the news media’s dereliction in covering the administration’s campaign to take the nation to war against Iraq.”—Don Wycliff, Chicago Tribune “[This] analysis of the weaknesses of Washington journalism deserves close attention.”—Russell Baker, New York Review of Books

By using a method called process tracing to scrutinize institutional engineering in Iraq, it becomes clear why intensified violence followed the drafting and ratification of the Iraqi constitution. It is not surprising that institutional engineering did not forestall violence; therefore, we can conclude that the Iraqi experience does not support theories of institutional design--Publisher's description.