The Final Cause As Principle Of Cognition And Principle In Nature

Reprint of the original, first published in 1875.

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1875 edition. Excerpt: ... Consider, for example, the words of John Stuart Mill, in book i. ch. 3, of his Logic, "Everything is a feeling of which the mind is conscious." What is true in this assertion is what is above admitted, namely, that all being, so far as known by us, appears to us, i.e., is known in the forms, under the conditions, by the means, which are peculiar to human cognition (truismatic as this may sound). I do not inquire whether it be a correct use of terms to identify consciousness with feeling--virtually to define the one by the other. But the whole and only truth of the expression cited (as far as it concerns the point immediately under consideration) is, that all our knowledge of the real must, to be possessed by us, be a part of our individual consciousness. But to affirm that this is the whole truth of the case, is to identify the part with the whole, the aspect with that of which we perceive the aspect, or (better) the form with the content, and the appearance with that which appears. It is true that our metaphysical knowledge (knowledge of the " real") does not come to us through the medium of demonstration. Like all that is ultimate, it is simply apprehended, is acquired and recognized directly, and can be confirmed by indirect demonstration alone. But the testimony of consciousness to its reality is ever present, and furnishes the one conclusive answer and corrective to statements like that now under criticism. Hume showed that the logical issue of such a principle is philosophical scepticism; and it is substantially this to which Mr. Mill himself is led. (See his Examination of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, chs. xi. and xii.) But the considerations, by which philosophical scepticism is shown to be absurd, are too familiar to...

Each volume includes list of members, and "objects of the institute" (except v. 31, which has no list of members). Beginning with v. 12, a list of the papers contained in preceding volumes is issued regularly with each volume.

Reprint of the original, first published in 1876.