The Futility Of Philosophical Ethics

The Futility of Philosophical Ethics puts forward a novel account of the grounds of moral feeling with fundamental implications for philosophical ethics. It examines the grounds of moral feeling by both the phenomenology of that feeling, and the facts of moral feeling in operation – particularly in forms such as moral luck, vicious virtues, and moral disgust – that appear paradoxical from the point of view of systematic ethics. Using an analytic approach, James Kirwan engages in the ongoing debates among contemporary philosophers within metaethics and normative ethics. Instead of trying to erase the variety of moral responses that exist in philosophical analysis under one totalizing system, Kirwan argues that such moral theorizing is futile. His analysis counters currently prevalent arguments that seek to render the origins of moral experience unproblematic by finding substitutes for realism in various forms of noncognitivism. In reasserting the problematic nature of moral experience, and offering a theory of the origins of that experience in unavoidable individual desires, Kirwan accounts for the diverse manifestations of moral feeling and demonstrates why so many arguments in metaethics and normative ethics are necessarily irresolvable.

By the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Presenting a sustained critique of moral theory from Kant onwards, Williams reorients ethical theory towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a new commentary on the text by A.W.Moore and a foreword by Jonathan Lear.

This accessible overview of classical and modern moral theory with short readings provides comprehensive coverage of ethics and unique coverage of rights, justice, liberty and law. Real-life cases introduce each chapter. While the book's content is theoretical rather than applied ethics, Beauchamp consistently applies the theories to practical moral problems. Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Mill are at the books core and they are placed in the context of moral philosophical controversies of the last 30 years. In this edition one-third of the reading selections are new and all the selections in chapter 8 on rights are new. Chapter 7 on Hume has been heavily reshaped. Chapter 1 has been reduced to get students past introductory material and into the philosophers.

Students are invited by this text to examine ethics from the philosopher's point of reference, to understand how different philosophers can reach varying conclusions about the same ethical question.

The Elimination of Morality strikes at the root of the dominant conception of what medical ethics involves. It addresses the fundamental and timely question of the kind of contribution philosophers can make to the discussion of medico-moral issues and the work of health care professionals. It has two main objectives. The first is to establish the futility of bioethics. Anne Maclean challenges the conception of reason in ethics which is integral to the utilitarian tradition and which underlies the whole bioethical enterprise. She argues that the enterprise is philosophically misguided - philosophers do not possess moral expertise and have no special authority to pronounce upon moral issues. In particular, she shows that judgments about the morality of killing cannot be founded on a prior philosophical theory of 'the value of life'.The final chapter demolishes the 'medical model' of illness and health which give exaggerated powers to the doctor, and proposes a role for the philosopher in medical education which deprofessionalises life and death decisions. The second objective is to expose the inadequacy of a utilitarian account of moral reasoning and moral life. The author rejects the utilitarian claim that reason demands the rejection of special obligations; nd argues that the utilitarian drive to reduce rational moral judgment to a single form is ultimately destructive of moral judgment as such. Pure utilitarianism eliminates the essential ingredients of moral thinking.

Marchetti offers a revisionist account of James's contribution to moral thought in the light of his pragmatic conception of philosophical activity. He sketches a composite picture of a Jamesian approach to ethics revolving around the key notion and practice of a therapeutic critique of one's ordinary moral convictions and style of moral reasoning.

Why is ethics part of philosophy? Stephen Darwall's Philosophical Ethics introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions such as “What has value?” and “What are our moral obligations?” with fundamental philosophical issues such as “What is value?” and “What can a moral obligation consist in?”With one eye on contemporary discussions and another on classical texts, Philosophical Ethics shows how Hobbes, Mill, Kant, Aristotle, and Nietzsche all did ethical philosophy—how, for example, they sought to gain insight into what has value through understanding what value itself is. After an introductory section, and one on main approaches to metaethics, chapters discuss “modern” philosophical moralists—Hobbes, Mill, and Kant—and pre- and postmodern philosophical approaches to ethics in Aristotle, Nietzsche, and the ethics of care.Throughout, the reader is invited to do—rather than just read about—philosophical ethics and, in doing so, to think through questions that face all thoughtful human beings. Themes include the nature of value and moral obligation, freedom and choice, human flourishing, excellence and merit, radical critiques of morality, and the importance of relationships for human life.

Immanuel Kant and Henry Sidgwick are towering figures in the history of moral philosophy. Kant’s views on ethics continue to be discussed and studied in detail not only in philosophy, but also theology, political science, and legal theory. Meanwhile, Sidgwick is emerging as the philosopher within the utilitarian tradition who merits the same meticulous treatment that Kant receives. As champions of deontology and consequentialism respectively, Kant and Sidgwick disagree on many important issues. However, close examination reveals a surprising amount of consensus on various topics including moral psychology, moral epistemology, and moral theology. This book presents points of agreement and disagreement in the writings of these two giants of philosophical ethics. The chapters will stimulate discussions among moral theorists and historians of philosophy by applying cutting-edge scholarship on each philosopher to shed light on some of the more perplexing arguments and views of the other, and by uncovering and examining points of agreement between Sidgwick and Kant as possible grounds for greater convergence in contemporary moral philosophy. This is the first full-length volume to investigate Sidgwick and Kant side by side. It will be of major interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy and its history.