The Future Of Arms Control Part 2 Arms Control And Technological Change Elements Of A New Approach

Arms control, for decades at the core of the foreign policy consensus, today is among the more contentious issues in American politics. It is pilloried and considered out of mode in many conservative quarters, while being viewed as nearly sacrosanct in many liberal circles. In this new book, Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon argue that neither the left nor the right has a correct view of the proper utility of arms control in the age of terror. Arms control in the traditional sense--lengthy treaties to limit nuclear and other military competitions among the great powers--is no longer particularly useful. Nor should arms control be pursued as a means to the end of constraining the power of nations or of promoting global government. It is still a critical tool, though, for controlling dangerous technologies, particularly those that, in the hands of hostile states or terrorist organizations, could cause massive death and destruction. Arms control and coercive action, including military force, must be integrated into an overall strategy for preventing proliferation, now more than ever before. Arms control should be used to gain earlier warning of illicit activities inside dangerous states, allowing the international community to take coercive action in a timely way. The authors propose three new criteria to guide future arms control efforts, designed to respond to today's geopolitical realities. Arms control must focus on the dangers of catastrophic technology, not so much in the hands of major powers as of small states and terrorist groups. Their criteria lead to a natural focus on nuclear and biological technologies. Much tougher measures to prevent countries from gaining nuclear weapons technoloty while purportedly complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and procedures for controlling dangerous biological technologies will be most prominent in this framework, while lower priority is giben to efforts such as bilateral nuclear accords and most t

The current standstill in U.S.-Soviet arms limitation negotiations has raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of arms limitation treaties, whether it is possible to negotiate an arms control agreement that would actually cut back on U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, and how such an arms reduction could be accomplished. The authors of this book explore the problems of arms competition in the 1980s and stress the need for a complete reassessment of U.S. security interests lest negotiations become curiously disconnected from defense policy. To protect national interests, they assert, future arms limitation talks must allow for effective unilateral response to new classes of military problems and technologies. Each contributor addresses a specific area of arms negotiations, identifying various options, outlining potential outcomes, and discussing whether the talks actually are focusing on the right military issues. The book also provides an overview of previous U.S. arms limitation strategies and describes the Soviet approach to integrating national security with arms control policies._

This book represents an overview of European security affairs as of 1989–1990. It deals with fundamental theoretical and political-strategic considerations; looks at arms-control developments; and examines European defense economies and military industrial capabilities of U.S. .

Governments have been negotiating about disarmament, or more limited forms of arms control, for forty years. Despite these negotiations, weapons of increasing deadliness and sophistication continue to be developed. Through the use of case studies of particular negotiations (Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban, SALT I and II, INF and START, and MBFR/CFE), the book explores both the reasons for success and the obstacles leading to failure, and assesses the importance of different types of explanation. Dr Carter not only analyses the reasons why negotiations fail, she also examines the conditions under which they are likely to succeed. The result is a balanced comprehensive treatment of the problems and prospects for arms control.

This book presents the results of an international workshop on Modelling and Analysis of Arms Control Problems held in Spitzingsee near Munich in October 1985 under the joint sponsorship of NATO's Scientific Affairs Division and the Volkswagen Foundation. The idea for this workshop evolved in 1983, as a consequence of discussions in the annual Systems Science Seminar at the Computer Science Department of the Federal Armed Forces University ~1unich on the topic of Quantitative Assessment in Arms Control 1) • There was wide agreement among the contribu tors to that seminar and its participants that those efforts to assess the potential contributions of systems and decision sciences, as well as systems analysis and"mathematical modelling, to arms control issues should be ex panded and a forum should be provided for this activity. It was further agreed that such a forum should include political scientists and policy analysts working in the area of arms control.