The Future Of The Sdr In Light Of Changes In The International Monetary System

This book edited by Michael Mussa, James M. Boughton, and Peter Isard, records the proceedings of a seminar held at the IMF in March 1996 on the future of the special drawing right (SDR), given changes in the international monetary system since the inception of the SDR. The seminar focuses on the differences in opinion in the international community on the desirability or feasibility of an additional allocation of SDRs.

This paper explores whether a broader role for the SDR could contribute to the smooth functioning and stability of the international monetary system (IMS). Recent staff assessments highlighted that the IMS has displayed considerable resilience. But episodes of stress point also to some weaknesses, including in external adjustment mechanisms; limitations of official liquidity provisions through the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN); and large-scale reserve accumulation—with systemic side effects. Those weaknesses, together with the expansion of the SDR basket, have renewed interest in the SDR and motivated a discussion of whether there is an economic rationale for a broader SDR role. The paper looks into how those weaknesses can be mitigated by three concepts of the SDR: the official SDR, the reserve asset administered by the IMF (O-SDR); SDR-denominated financial instruments, or “market SDRs” (M-SDR); and the SDR as a unit of account (U-SDR). However, the paper does not propose specific reform options.

In the years since the SDR was created, the international monetary system has experienced a number of profound changes. The present paper sketches the effects of these changes on perceptions of the role that the SDR can and should play in that system.

Following the recent diagnostic of the international monetary system (IMS), the IMF will explore whether a broader role for the SDR could contribute to its smooth functioning. The economic rationale for or against broader use of the SDR will be examined, focusing in particular on identifying any gaps and market failures the SDR could help address in light of the increasingly multi-polar nature of the global economy and growing financial interconnectedness. This note sets out some initial considerations on this matter. The note sketches some key issues bearing on the role of the SDR in each of three concepts: (i) the official SDR, or “O-SDR”, the composite reserve asset issued and administered by the IMF; (ii) SDR-denominated financial market instruments, or “M-SDRs,” which could be both issued and held by any parties; and (iii) the SDR as a unit of account. M-SDRs reduce foreign exchange and interest rate risk relative to single-currency instruments, but there are some drawbacks and challenges. The basket nature of M-SDRs would allow the volatility of returns to be lower than for a similar singlecurrency instrument. However, the SDR only represents one of many possible sets of portfolio weights, and issuers or investors could use existing instruments to replicate their preferred weights at a relatively low cost. There are also challenges to market development, including settling and clearing of M-SDR transactions, dealing with potential basket redefinition, and fostering secondary market trading in order to generate liquidity and market depth. There are potential benefits to using the SDR as a unit of account, which have to be weighed against other considerations. Publishing economic statistics and financial statements in SDR terms could help users identify valuation changes. Statistical authorities would need to invest in communicating the rationale for any change in practices. While the official SDR under its current framework is not playing a significant role in the IMS, a re-examination of its role is expected to inform whether any specific reform options should be pursued. The evolution of the IMS has given rise to an active debate on how much concern is posed by high rates of reserve accumulation, global imbalances, and rising claims on reserve issuers, and on whether the O-SDR could contribute to addressing these issues.

This paper describes how the changed conditions in the international monetary system have undermined the role originally envisaged for the SDR. It argues that the concept of a global stock of international liquidity, which was fundamental to the creation of the SDR, is now no longer relevant. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to satisfy part of the growing demand for international reserves with SDR allocations: (i) there are efficiency gains, as SDRs can be created at zero resource cost, and thus obviate the need for countries to run current account surpluses or engage in expensive borrowing to obtain reserves, and (ii) there would be a reduction in systemic risk, as SDRs would substitute to some extent for borrowed reserves, which are less reliable and predictable source of reserves, especially in times of crisis.

The SDR has enjoyed renewed attention lately in the context of debates on international monetary reform. To be sure, the term SDR has been used to refer to three different concepts—(i) a composite reserve asset created in 1969: the “official SDR” as defined in the Fund’s Articles; (ii) a potential new class of reserve assets: tradable SDRdenominated securities issued by the Fund or an investment vehicle backed by a subset of the Fund’s membership; and (iii) a unit of account, which could be used to price internationally traded assets (e.g., sovereign bonds) and goods (e.g., commodities), to peg currencies, and to report balance of payments data. All three are discussed in this paper.