The Gulf War Of 1980 1988

This book deals with a number of the most important international legal aspects of the Gulf War of 1980-1988. To date, remarkably little attention has been paid to this war from the international legal perspective. However, the need to do so seems obvious. Many more States than the two belligerents have directly or indirectly become involved as a result, in particular, of the extensive activities of the belligerent parties which were detrimental to the shipping of non-participating States. Furthermore, even if the hostilities have finally come to an end, the international community will still have to cope with the international legal aftermath for a prolonged period of time. After all, the Gulf War of 1980-1988 has placed certain matters, which for a long time seemed to have lost their place of prominence, at the centre of interest for international lawyers, notably the law of neutrality and some areas of the law of international armed conflict, particularly the rules regarding the conduct of war.

This volume offers a wide-ranging examination of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), featuring fresh regional and international perspectives derived from recently available new archival material. Three decades ago Iran and Iraq became embroiled in a devastating eight-year war which served to re-define the international relations of the Gulf region. The Iran–Iraq War stands as an anomaly in the Cold War era; it was the only significant conflict in which the interests of the United States and Soviet Union unwittingly aligned, with both superpowers ultimately supporting the Iraqi regime. The Iran–Iraq War re-assesses not only the superpower role in the conflict but also the war’s regional and wider international dimensions by bringing to the fore fresh evidence and new perspectives from a variety of sources. It focuses on a number of themes including the economic dimensions of the war and the roles played by a variety of powers, including the Gulf States, Turkey, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The contributions to the volume serve to underline that the Iran–Iraq war was a defining conflict, shaping the perspectives of the key protagonists for a generation to come. This book will be of much interest to students of international and Cold War history, Middle Eastern politics, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

En gennemgang af krigen mellem Iran og Irak fra begyndelsen i 1980 til konfliktens eskalering i 1987.

This book is a major reinterpretation of the Iran-Iraq War and is a source for reexamining the U.S. involvement in the Gulf. Pelletiere demonstrates that the war was not a standoff in which Iraq finally won a grinding war of attrition through luck, persistence, and the use of poison gas. Instead, Iraq planned the last campaign almost two years prior to its unfolding. [The Iraqis] trained extensively and expended enormous sums of money to make their effort succeed. What won for them was their superior fignting prowess and greater commitment. Gas--if it was used at all--played only a minor part in the victory.' Pelletiere concludes that the key to understanding the war is the Extraordinary Congress of the Ba'th Party held in July 1986. It was there that the initial planning for the final campaign was done, and this campaign is what decided the fate of the conflict. The study centers around the last Iraqi campaign, which Pelletiere argues was based upon World War II blitzkrieg tactics, but he also treats the background, the politics, and the history of the conflict, and analyzes the significance of the war to the Middle East and to the position of the United States there.

After a million deaths and twice that number injured, after the destruction of much of the infrastructure of Iran and Iraq, disruption of trade throughout the Gulf and the involvement of the USA and USSR, was the Gulf War a pointless exercise, a futile conflict which achieved nothing and left the combatants at the end of it all back in exactly the same position from which they started in 1980? In this book, first published in 1989, the authors argue that the lack of territorial gain was irrelevant: the real advantages won by each side were far more important, intangible though they were. For Iran, the channelling of the energies of her people away from domestic concerns meant the continuation of the Islamic revolution and ensured the stability of the mullahs. In Iraq, the war propped up the increasingly shaky regime of Saddam Hussein. The outside world, especially the superpowers, was terrified of the spread of Muslim fundamentalism, so made no effort to prevent Iraq from trying to halt this spread. But Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the oil states also had vested interests in promoting the continuation of the war.

"This book focuses on the role of the air power in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The authors made full use of extensive research, eyewitness accounts, interviews with dozens of people directly involved, as well as recently declassified documents from around the world which are published here for the first time. ... describes and analyzes both the development of the Iranian and the Iraqi air forces, their involvement in combat operations, while simultaneously discussing their organization and capabilities, and detailing their equipment to detail."--Edited from publisher's web site.

The final index entry of "zero-sum game" aptly encapsulates much about the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War (or Gulf War I as the author terms it) and its spinoff of the 1991 Gulf War II, particularly from the perspective of the US. Torock (whose background is unspecified except for the Melbourne signoff on the preface) views Saddam Hussein as a Frankenstein monster created by, and later turning against, the superpowers in a familiar pattern of their contest of political intervention in the Third World. Includes 16 pages of references. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Although the stability of the Persian Gulf region has been of rising importance since World War II, it was during the 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq War threatened to upset the balance of power in the region, that its importance became even more magnified. This collection of essays surveys the current state of that region, placing into clearer perspective the political, security, and diplomatic dimensions of the recently ended war. By reevaluating the political landscape of the Gulf, the book produces a gauge for better assessing those factors and forces that affected the conflict's outcome and that will continue to influence future political and security developments in the region. The volume begins with an introduction by the editor that examines the geography of the Gulf and the primary geopolitical factors that influenced perceptions of the region during the war. The essays are then divided into two sections covering Strategic and Political Dimensions and Diplomatic and Legal Dimensions. Topics covered in the first section include the roots of the crisis, Soviet, Israeli and Arab Gulf states' interests in the conflict, U.S. policy in the region, and the role of U.S. military forces. Section two discusses the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the United Nations' involvement, and the cease-fire negotiations. The book concludes with a selected bibliography and an index. This study will be an important resource for courses in political science, diplomacy, and Mid-East history, as well as a significant addition to both public and university libraries.