The Housing Downturn

A newly updated edition for the fast-changing real estate market in Canada! Over the last two decades Canadians have become convinced that real estate is the “safe haven” investment. This widely held belief and obsession with real estate led millions of Canadians to take on massive amounts of debt — tripling their collective financial burden — ensuring that Canada is one of the most indebted nations on the planet. Drawing on dozens of interviews and even more conversations with individual Canadians and couples, this second edition also tackles the economic conditions and regulatory rules that allowed such a dangerous situation to develop in Canada, formerly a nation of conservative and prudent citizens. Hilliard MacBeth argues that Canada is in the midst of an unprecedented real estate bubble and that there will soon be a crash in house prices, triggering a financial crisis. Individual Canadians and families can still take action to protect themselves from the fallout of the bubble bursting — if they act quickly.

The definitive account of the housing bubble that caused the Great Recession—and earned Wall Street fantastic profits. The American housing bubble of the 2000s caused the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression. In this definitive account, Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter pinpoint its source: the shift in mortgage financing from securitization by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to “private-label securitization” by Wall Street banks. This change set off a race to the bottom in mortgage underwriting standards, as banks competed in laxity to gain market share. The Great American Housing Bubble tells the story of the transformation of mortgage lending from a dysfunctional, local affair, featuring short-term, interest-only “bullet” loans, to a robust, national market based around the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, a uniquely American innovation that served as the foundation for the middle class. Levitin and Wachter show how Fannie and Freddie’s market power kept risk in check until 2003, when mortgage financing shifted sharply to private-label securitization, as lenders looked for a way to sustain lending volume following an unprecedented refinancing wave. Private-label securitization brought a return of bullet loans, which had lower initial payments—enabling borrowers to borrow more—but much greater back-loaded risks. These loans produced a vast oversupply of underpriced mortgage finance that drove up home prices unsustainably. When the bubble burst, it set off a destructive downward spiral of home prices and foreclosures. Levitin and Wachter propose a rebuild of the housing finance system that ensures the widespread availability of the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, while preventing underwriting competition and shifting risk away from the public to private investors.

The United States suffers from a shortage of well-placed homes. This was true even at the peak of the housing boom in 2005. Using a broad array of evidence on housing inflation, income, migration, homeownership trends, and international comparisons, Shut Out demonstrates that high home prices have been largely caused by the constrained housing supply in a handful of magnet cities leading the new economy. The same phenomenon is occurring in leading countries across the globe. Gentrifying cities have become exclusionary bastions in the new postindustrial economy. The US housing bubble that peaked in 2005 is more accurately described as a refugee crisis than a credit bubble. Surging demand for limited urban housing triggered a spike of migration away from the magnet cities among households with moderate and lower incomes who could no longer afford to remain, causing a brief contagion of high prices in the cities where the migrants moved. In this book, author Kevin Erdmann observes that the housing bubble has been broadly and incorrectly attributed to various “excesses.” Policymakers and economists concluded that our key challenge was that we had built too many homes. This misdiagnosis of the problem, according to Erdmann, led to misguided public polices, which were the primary cause of the subsequent financial crisis. A sort of moral panic about supposed excesses in home lending and construction led to destabilizing monetary and regulatory decisions. As the economy slumped, a sense of fatalism prevented the government from responding appropriately to the worsening situation. Shut Out provides a much-needed correction to the causes and consequences of financial crises and secular stagnation.

The world’s housing markets have seen the sharpest slowdown in prices and transactions for over a generation – nowhere more so than in Britain. So what can the property industry learn from the experience? This book sets out the signals that were appearing from 2005 onwards as the foundations of the industry began to crack. Norwood asks: why were they missed? Why did so few people speak out against gluts of apartments in major city centres targeted at falling numbers of investment buyers? Did we not know or care that property scams were becoming rife? Could we not see at least some alarm signals from the problems destroying the property industry in Spain? For the first time, senior figures from all elements of the residential industry – developers, agents, analysts, lenders, planners and pundits – comment on what they believe led to the downturn. The book then sets out what the industry may learn from the experience. It compares those developers and estate agents that down-sized or collapsed altogether with those that survived and, in some cases, even prospered in the downturn. It identifies common indicators amongst those that remained strong through a fifty percent collapse in sales and a twenty-fiver percent plus collapse in prices, and offers insights into how policies of diversification and modernisation helped many companies survive. It also looks to the future and presents a sobering vision, created by scores of experts interviewed during the downturn, of what the market may be like when volumes, prices and spirits move upwards once again.

A detailed analysis of the psychological and mechanical causes of the biggest rally, and subsequent fall, of housing prices ever recorded. Examines the causes of the breathtaking rise in prices and the catastrophic fall that ensued to answer the question on every homeowner's mind: "Why did house prices fall?"--Page 4 of cover

A global look at the reasons behind the recent economic collapse, and the responses to it The speculative bubble in the housing market began to burst in the United States in 2007, and has been followed by ruptures in virtually every asset market in almost every country in the world. Each country proposed a range of policy initiatives to deal with its crisis. Policies that focused upon stabilizing the housing market formed the cornerstone of many of these proposals. This internationally focused book evaluates the genesis of the housing market bubble, the global viral contagion of the crisis, and the policy initiatives undertaken in some of the major economies of the world to counteract its disastrous affects. Unlike other books on the global crisis, this guide deals with the housing sector in addition to the financial sector of individual economies. Countries in many parts of the world were players in either the financial bubble or the housing bubble, or both, but the degree of impact, outcome, and responses varied widely. This is an appropriate time to pull together the lessons from these various experiences. Reveals the housing crisis in the United States as the core of the meltdown Describes the evolution of housing markets and policies in the run-up to the crisis, their impacts, and the responses in European and Asian countries Compares experiences and linkages across countries and points to policy implications and research lessons drawn from these experiences Filled with the insights of well-known contributors with strong contacts in practice and academia, this timely guide discusses the history and evolution of the recent crisis as local to each contributor's part of the world, and examines its distinctive and common features with that of the U.S., the trajectory of its evolution, and the similarities and differences in policy response.

This is a plain-English explanation of how we got into the current economic disaster that developed out of the economics and politics of the housing boom and bust. The "creative" financing of home mortgages and the even more "creative" marketing of financial securities based on American mortgages to countries around the world, are part of the story of how a financial house of cards was built up -- and then suddenly collapsed. The politics behind all this is another story full of strange twists. No punches are pulled when discussing politicians of either party, the financial dangers they created, or the distractions they created later to escape their own responsibility for what happened when the financial house of cards in the financial markets collapsed. What to do, now that we are in the midst of an economic disaster, is yet another story -- one whose ending we do not yet know, but one whose outlines and implications are explored to reveal some surprising and sobering lessons.

The central role of the housing market in the recent recession raised a series of questions about similar episodes throughout economic history. Were the underlying causes of housing and mortgage crises the same in earlier episodes? Has the onset and spread of crises changed over time? How have previous policy interventions either damaged or improved long-run market performance and stability? This volume begins to answer these questions, providing a much-needed context for understanding recent events by examining how historical housing and mortgage markets worked—and how they sometimes failed. Renowned economic historians Eugene N. White, Kenneth Snowden, and Price Fishback survey the foundational research on housing crises, comparing that of the 1930s to that of the early 2000s in order to authoritatively identify what contributed to each crisis. Later chapters explore notable historical experiences with mortgage securitization and the role that federal policy played in the surge in home ownership between 1940 and 1960. By providing a broad historical overview of housing and mortgage markets, the volume offers valuable new insights to inform future policy debates.