The Ideological Origins Of Great Power Politics 1789 1989

How do leaders perceive threat levels in world politics, and what effects do those perceptions have on policy choices? Mark L. Haas focuses on how ideology shapes perception. He does not delineate the content of particular ideologies, but rather the degree of difference among them. Degree of ideological difference is, he believes, the crucial factor as leaders decide which nations threaten and which bolster their state's security and their own domestic power. These threat perceptions will in turn impel leaders to make particular foreign-policy choices. Haas examines great-power relations in five periods: the 1790s in Europe, the Concert of Europe (1815–1848), the 1930s in Europe, Sino-Soviet relations from 1949 to 1960, and the end of the Cold War. In each case he finds a clear relationship between the degree of ideological differences that divided state leaders and those leaders' perceptions of threat level (and so of appropriate foreign-policy choices). These relationships held in most cases, regardless of the nature of the ideologies in question, the offense-defense balance, and changes in the international distribution of power.

Why the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War—the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.–China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past.

When and why do powerful countries seek to enact major changes to international order, the broad set of rules that guide behavior in world politics? This question is particularly important today given the Trump administration's clear disregard for the reigning liberal international order in the United States. Across the globe, there is also uncertainty over what China might seek to replace that order with as it continues to amass power and influence. Together, these developments mean that what motivates great powers to shape and change order will remain at the forefront of debates over the future of world politics. Prior studies have focused on how the origins of international orders have been consensus-driven and inclusive. By contrast, Kyle M. Lascurettes argues in Orders of Exclusion that the propelling motivation for great power order building has typically been exclusionary. Dominant powers pursue fundamental changes to order when they perceive a major new threat on the horizon. Moreover, they do so for the purpose of targeting this perceived threat, be it another powerful state or a foreboding ideological movement. The goal of foundational rule writing in international relations, then, is blocking that threatening entity from amassing further influence, a motive Lascurettes illustrates at work across more than three hundred years of history. Far from falling outside of the bounds of traditional statecraft, order building is the continuation of power politics by other means.

The first twenty years of post-Cold War US defense and diplomatic policies toward Asia have looked a good deal like the previous 50, namely: continued deterrence based upon overwhelming, offensive military predominance. In East Asia, all powers harbor common and divergent interests based on fragmented nationalist identities and complex economic interdependence. In this multipolar Asian system, new Chinese military capabilities could support both the wish to secure its own interests as well as a more expansive vision for regional leadership, which might harbor a destabilizing geopolitical agenda. How the United States addresses this reality via military procurements and employment concepts for the Asian theater could either detract from or enhance crisis stability. The US defense establishment must reorient its force posture to save money, manage conflicts of interest, and prevent future interstate crises. This analysis provides a framework for how the United States should ideally structure and use military power so as to best support the diplomatic resolution of conflicting interests without resorting to full-scale warfare. It also critiques the usual Western military focus on offensive strategic predominance in force postures, itself often fuelled by the unrealistic pursuit of the opponent’s complete submission via victory in decisive battles.

Anti-U.S. base protests, played out in parliaments and the streets of host nations, continue to arise in different parts of the world. In a novel approach, this book examines the impact of anti-base movements and the important role bilateral alliance relationships play in shaping movement outcomes. The author explains not only when and how anti-base movements matter, but also how host governments balance between domestic and international pressure on base-related issues. Drawing on interviews with activists, politicians, policy makers and U.S. base officials in the Philippines, Japan (Okinawa), Ecuador, Italy and South Korea, the author finds that the security and foreign policy ideas held by host government elites act as a political opportunity or barrier for anti-base movements, influencing their ability to challenge overseas U.S. basing policies.

The Routledge Handbook of Ideology and International Relations reviews, consolidates, and advances the study of ideology in international politics. The volume unifies fragmented scholarship on ideology’s impact on international relations into a wide-ranging and go-to volume. Declarations of the ‘end of ideology’ have once again been proven premature: nationalisms of various stripes are thriving; ideological polarization and conflicts both within and among states are growing; and environmentalist, feminist and anti-globalization activists are intensifying their demands on international institutions and states. This timely volume presents ideology as a way of explaining these major developments of world politics, rejecting the simplistic association of ideology with passionate convictions in favor of more complex theories of ideology’s influence. The chapters summarize cutting edge knowledge on major topics, suggest key implications for broader theoretical debates and frameworks, and point the way forwards to future avenues of inquiry. Contributors adopt puzzle-orientated causal, constitutive and/or critical approaches with a central focus on the determinants and effects of ideological phenomena and their interaction with other aspects of politics. This handbook is of key interest to students and scholars of ideologies, international relations, foreign policy analysis, political science, political theory and more broadly to sociology, psychology, and history. The Routledge Handbook of Ideology and International Relations is part of the mini-series Routledge Handbooks on Political Ideologies, Practices and Interpretations, edited by Michael Freeden.

Henry R. Nau’s best-selling book, Perspectives on International Relations, is admired for its even-handed presentation of realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical theory and for expertly applying those perspectives to world affairs in every chapter. Students explore the ways these different perspectives shape our understanding of the root causes of historical events and current controversies, and they learn to think critically about the world’s most urgent issues. The new Seventh Edition includes updates on Brexit, the rise of nationalism, the escalation of terrorism, the use of social media in political protests around the world, and continuing developments in North Korea, Syria, Iran, China, and Russia.

A groundbreaking examination of a central question in international relations: Do states act rationally? To understand world politics, you need to understand how states think. Are states rational? Much of international relations theory assumes that they are. But many scholars believe that political leaders rarely act rationally. The issue is crucial for both the study and practice of international politics, for only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behavior. John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato argue that rational decisions in international politics rest on credible theories about how the world works and emerge from deliberative decision‑making processes. Using these criteria, they conclude that most states are rational most of the time, even if they are not always successful. Mearsheimer and Rosato make the case for their position, examining whether past and present world leaders, including George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, have acted rationally in the context of momentous historical events, including both world wars, the Cold War, and the post–Cold War era. By examining this fundamental concept in a novel and comprehensive manner, Mearsheimer and Rosato show how leaders think, and how to make policy for dealing with other states.