The Impact Of Controlson Capital Movementson The Private Capital Accounts Of Countries Balance Of Payments

This paper reports research on the impact of controls on capital movements on the private capital accounts of countries’ balance of payments using data drawn from 52 countries for the period 1985-92. The results indicate that: (1) capital controls operated by developing countries have not been effective in insulating the private capital accounts of these countries’ balance of payments, and (2) capital controls operated by industrial countries significantly affected the structure of their capital flows mainly by inhibiting net foreign direct and portfolio investment outflows. The results, which are consistent with other observations, raise issues for the policy toward the maintenance and liberalization of controls on capital movements by developing countries.

This paper reports research on the impact of controls on capital movements on the private capital accounts of countries` balance of payments using data drawn from 52 countries for the period 1985-92. The results indicate that: (1) capital controls operated by developing countries have not been effective in insulating the private capital accounts of these countries` balance of payments, and (2) capital controls operated by industrial countries significantly affected the structure of their capital flows mainly by inhibiting net foreign direct and portfolio investment outflows. The results, which are consistent with other observations, raise issues for the policy toward the maintenance and liberalization of controls on capital movements by developing countries.

Authors of Working Papers are normally staff members of the Fund or consultants, although on occasion outside authors may collaborate with a staff member in writing a paper. The views expressed in the Working Papers or their summaries are, however, those of the authors and should not necessarily be interpreted as representing the views of the Fund. Copies of individual Working Papers and information on subscriptions to the annual series of Working Papers may be obtained from IMF Publication Services, International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, Washington, D.C. 20431. Telephone: (202) 623-7430 Telefax: (202) 623-7201 This compilation of summaries of Working Papers released during July-December 1994 is being issued as a part of the Working Paper series. It is designed to provide the reader with an overview of the research work performed by the staff during the period.

As a result of the Asian crisis, methods of coping with volatile international capital markets have received considerable attention from observers and policymakers. It has been argued that the imposition by Chile of a nonremunerated reserve requirement on external borrowing played a useful role in the smooth liberalization of its capital account by allowing Chile to deal effectively with short-term capital inflows and thus to reduce its vulnerability to external shocks, and that such measures should be adopted by other countries. In light of this, this paper reviews Chile’s experience in managing capital flows and draws lessons for policymakers.

The right of governments to employ capital controls has always been the official orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, and the organization's formal rules providing this right have not changed significantly since the IMF was founded in 1945. But informally, among the staff inside the IMF, these controls became heresy in the 1980s and 1990s, prompting critics to accuse the IMF of indiscriminately encouraging the liberalization of controls and precipitating a wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. In Capital Ideas, Jeffrey Chwieroth explores the inner workings of the IMF to understand how its staff's thinking about capital controls changed so radically. In doing so, he also provides an important case study of how international organizations work and evolve. Drawing on original survey and archival research, extensive interviews, and scholarship from economics, politics, and sociology, Chwieroth traces the evolution of the IMF's approach to capital controls from the 1940s through spring 2009 and the first stages of the subprime credit crisis. He shows that IMF staff vigorously debated the legitimacy of capital controls and that these internal debates eventually changed the organization's behavior--despite the lack of major rule changes. He also shows that the IMF exercised a significant amount of autonomy despite the influence of member states. Normative and behavioral changes in international organizations, Chwieroth concludes, are driven not just by new rules but also by the evolving makeup, beliefs, debates, and strategic agency of their staffs.

Contributes to a better understanding of the policy, economic, and legal options of countries struggling with debt problems.

This paper seeks to extend discussion of monetary policy instruments to the situation of a country faced with major capital inflows when the process of domestic financial liberalization is incomplete. It briefly summarizes the recent usage of traditional monetary instruments, discusses the practical limits to classic sterilization measures as well as the pros and cons of using other supplementary measures including tax-based controls on capital inflows. It also examines the efficacy of such measures in Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Spain, and Thailand. The conclusion is that, for a time and as a transitional measure, a country may find it opportune to supplement the traditional instruments with certain “belt and braces” measures including, in some instances, indirect (tax-based) capital controls.