The Imperial Japanese Navy In The Pacific War

An highly illustrated examination of the key ships, tactics and operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the War in the Pacific in World War II. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was the third most powerful navy in the world at the start of World War II, and came to dominate the Pacific in the early months of the war. This was a remarkable turnaround for a navy that only began to modernize in 1868, although defeats inflicted on the Russians and Chinese in successive wars at the turn of the century gave a sense of the threat the IJN was to pose. Bringing together for the first time material previously published in Osprey series books, and with the addition of new writing making use of the most recent research, this book details the Japanese ships which fought in the Pacific and examines the principles on which they were designed, how they were armed, when and where they were deployed and how effective they were in battle. The Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War provides a history of the IJN's deployment and engagements, analysis of the evolution of strategy and tactics, and finally addresses the question of whether it truly was a modern navy, fully prepared for the rigors of combat in the Pacific. Illustrated throughout with photographs and detailed colour artworks, this is a valuable reference source for Pacific War enthusiasts and historians alike.

For almost 20 years, more than 200 reels of microfilmed Japanese naval records remained in the custody of the U.S. Naval History Division, virtually untouched. This unique book draws on those sources and others to tell the story of the Pacific War from the viewpoint of the Japanese. Former Marine Corps officer and Asian scholar Paul Dull focuses on the major surface engagements of the war—Coral Sea, Midway, the crucial Solomons campaign, and the last-ditch battles in the Marianas and Philippines. Also included are detailed track charts and a selection of Japanese photographs of major vessels and actions.

Top-ranking Japanese officers offer their personal perspectives of the Pacific War. Lauded by historians and World War II buffs eager for the Japanese viewpoint, this collection of essays makes significant contributions to the field of World War II literature. This second edition, originally published in 1986, adds five articles to the original twelve to provide a full picture of the Japanese’s navy’s role in the war. Most of these moving accounts were written in the 1950s and retain the immediacy felt by the writers when they participated in the events. They provide valuable information on the strategy, tactics, and operations of the Japanese fleet, as well as insights into the personalities and motives of its leaders. Here, Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome comes to grips with allegations that the assault on Pearl Harbor represented strategic folly, political blundering, and tactical stupidity. Captain Mitsuo Fuchida describes how his bombing group unleashed “devils of doom” on Battleship Row, and Mitsuru Yoshida gives an eye-witness account of the sinking of the famous battleship Yamato. The new contributions to the volume, translated especially for this book by the editor, discuss operations in the Indian Ocean, the battle of the Philippine Sea, the protection of merchant shipping, submarine warfare, and Japan’s overll naval strategy. A brief introduction precedes each essay to set it in historical context, and a biographical summary of each contributor is included. A striking collection of photographs and maps, many of which are new to this edition, augment the text.

One of the great spectacles of modern naval history is the Imperial Japanese Navy's instrumental role in Japan's rise from an isolationist feudal kingdom to a potent military empire stridently confronting, in 1941, the world's most powerful nation. Years of painstaking research and analysis of previously untapped Japanese-language resources have produced this remarkable history of the navy's dizzying development, tactical triumphs, and humiliating defeat. Unrivaled in its breadth of coverage and attention to detail, this important new study explores the foreign and indigenous influences on the navy's thinking about naval warfare and how to plan for it. Focusing primarily on the much-neglected period between the world wars, David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, two widely esteemed historians, persuasively explain how the Japanese failed to prepare properly for the war in the Pacific despite an arguable advantage in capability.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was a pioneer in naval aviation, having commissioned the world's first built-from-the-keel-up carrier, the Hosho. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, it experimented with its carriers, perfecting their design and construction. As a result, by the time Japan entered World War II and attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor in 1941, it possessed a fantastically effective naval aviation force. This book covers the design, development and operation of IJN aircraft carriers built prior to and during World War II. Pearl Harbor, Midway and the first carrier vs carrier battle, the battle of the Coral Sea, are all discussed.

A major work by one of Japan’s leading naval historians, this book traces Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on Japan’s rise as a sea power after the publication of his classic study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Hailed by the British Admiralty, Theodore Roosevelt, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the international bestseller also was endorsed by the Japanese Naval Ministry, who took it as a clarion call to enhance their own sea power. That power, of course, was eventually used against the United States. Sadao Asada opens his book with a discussion of Mahan’s sea power doctrine and demonstrates how Mahan’s ideas led the Imperial Japanese Navy to view itself as a hypothetical enemy of the Americans. Drawing on previously unused Japanese records from the three naval conferences of the 1920s—the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the London Conference of 1930—the author examines the strategic dilemma facing the Japanese navy during the 1920s and 1930s against the background of advancing weapon technology and increasing doubt about the relevance of battleships. He also analyzes the decisions that led to war with the United States—namely, the 1936 withdrawal from naval treaties, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, and the armed advance into south Indochina in July 1941—in the context of bureaucratic struggles between the army and navy to gain supremacy. He concludes that the ""ghost"" of Mahan hung over the Japanese naval leaders as they prepared for war against the United State and made decisions based on miscalculations about American and Japanese strengths and American intentions.

Making extensive use of Japanese and U.S. sources, including wartime intelligence reports from the National Defense Archives in Tokyo and recently declassified U.S. documents, this book examines the reasons for Japan's failure to protect its merchant fleet.