The Infantry S Armor

Tanks, amphibian tanks, and amphibian tractors in action in all theaters, from Africa and Europe to the Pacific How the battalions fought the war, often in the tankers' own words Crystal-clear maps The U.S. Army's separate armored battalions fought in obscurity by comparison with the flashy armored divisions, but they carried the heavier burden in the grim struggle against the Axis in World War II. The battalions participated in every armored amphibious assault that the army conducted. They did most of the bloody work in Italy, made vital contributions in France, and constituted the entire effort in the Pacific.

Tanks, amphibian tanks, and amphibian tractors in action in all theaters, from Africa and Europe to the Pacific. How the battalions fought the war, often in the tankers' own words. Crystal-clear maps.

From the Preface: The following pages provide a narrative analysis of the U.S. Army's development of armored organizations and their related doctrine, materiel, and training activities in the period 1917-1945. This period marked the emergence of clear principles of armored warfare that became the underpinning of the Armor Branch, influencing armored developments long after World War II ended. A unique style of mounted maneuver combat emerged that reflected a mix of tradition an innovation. In the process, American military culture changed, particularly through the adoption of combined-arms principles. Conversely, political actions, budgetary considerations, and senior leadership decisions also shaped the course of armor development. The emergence of an American armored force involved more than simply tank development. It included the creation of an armored division structure steeped in combined-arms principles, organizational flexibility, and revolutionary command and control processes. Parallel developments included the establishment of specialized units to provide antitank, reconnaissance, and infantry support capabilities. Several Army branches played a role in determining the precise path of armored development, and one of them-the Cavalry-became a casualty as a result.

Captures the multifaceted development of the Armored Force from its inauspicious beginnings in World War 1 to its fully mature, operational status at the close of World War 2. Provides an excellent case study in force transformation. Gives attention to training maneuvers conducted in the interwar period. Source material includes reports, memorandums, and correspondence of the majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels associated with armored development since World War I.

This book traces the lineage & honors of the currently active 55 Army National Guard Armor & Cavalry regiments. The lineage of a unit is its military history. It includes the organization of a unit, its entry into Federal service, & any reorganizations, redesignations or conversions the unit may have undergone. The honors of a unit consist of wartime campaigns & unit decoration streamers. Lineages for National Guard units are published at the regimental level as are the lineage & honors of the regiments included in this book. If a regiment is authorized a distinctive unit insignia it is shown to the left of its regimental designation.

This study is an historical analysis of the operational methods of two men who commanded large military formations with great success during World War II: Colonel-General Heinz W. Guderian of the German Army; and General George S. Patton, Jr. of the American Army. The focus of the study is on each man’s conduct of operational art, the connecting link between tactics and strategy. The study analyzes the writings and campaigns of Guderian and Patton and attempts to identify the tenets or principles by which each man guided his conduct of Operational art. The study then compares the tenets each man applied in his conduct of warfare to discover whether there were any principles common to their operational methods. Finally, the study suggests what implications common tenets at the operational level of war might have for Airland Battle Doctrine. The study concludes that Guderian and Patton shared six common tenets in their conduct of operational art and suggests that the American Army’s current organizations at the division and corps levels may not be suitable to conduct the sort of agile operations that will be required on a future battlefield. As well, we must ensure that doctrinal foundations for joint operations involving air and ground forces-as a minimum-are in place before war breaks out. It also suggests that we need to get together with our European Allies and adopt a common doctrinal approach to warfighting in Western Europe, one that supports a common theater strategy. Finally, the study concludes that the American Army should continue to study the history of warfare and learn its lessons.