The Insurgent S Dilemma

Despite attracting headlines and hype, insurgents rarely win. Even when they claim territory and threaten governmental writ, they typically face a military backlash too powerful to withstand. States struggle with addressing the political roots of such movements, and their military efforts mostly just "mow the grass," yet, for the insurgent, the grass is nonetheless mowed-and the armed project must start over. This is the insurgent's dilemma: the difficulty of asserting oneself, of violently challenging authority, and of establishing sustainable power. In the face of this dilemma, some insurgents are learning new ways to ply their trade. With subversion, spin and disinformation claiming centre stage, insurgency is being reinvented, to exploit the vulnerabilities of our times and gain new strategic salience for tomorrow. As the most promising approaches are refined and repurposed, what we think of as counterinsurgency will also need to change. The Insurgent's Dilemma explores three particularly adaptive strategies and their implications for response. These emerging strategies target the state where it is weak and sap its power, sometimes without it noticing. There are options for response, but fresh thinking is urgently needed-about society, legitimacy and political violence itself.

Despite attracting great hype and headlines, insurgents rarely win. Even when they successfully claim territory and usurp governmental prerogatives, they typically face a military backlash too powerful to withstand. States struggle with addressing the political roots of such insurgencies, and their military efforts mostly just 'mow the grass', yet for the insurgent the grass is nonetheless mowed--and the armed struggle must start over again.This is the insurgent's dilemma: the difficulty of asserting oneself as a start-up, of violently challenging authority, and of establishing oneself sustainably as the new source of power, without suffering devastation along the way. In the face of this challenge, some insurgents are learning new ways to ply their trade. As a result, while all states lament the poor track record of recent counterinsurgency campaigns, even greater trouble may still lie ahead. Insurgency is being reinvented--tailored to the vulnerabilities of our times, and with new strategic salience for tomorrow. As successful approaches are copied, refined and repurposed, what we think of as counterinsurgency will also need to change. 'The Insurgent's Dilemma' explores three emerging insurgent strategies that will force a new response, along with fresh thinking about political violence in the twenty-first century.

Despite attracting headlines and hype, insurgents rarely win. Even when they claim territory and threaten governmental writ, they typically face a military backlash too powerful to withstand. States struggle with addressing the political roots of such movements, and their military efforts mostly just ‘mow the grass’; yet, for the insurgent, the grass is nonetheless mowed–and the armed project must start over. This is the insurgent’s dilemma: the difficulty of asserting oneself, of violently challenging authority, and of establishing sustainable power. In the face of this dilemma, some insurgents are learning new ways to ply their trade. With subversion, spin and disinformation claiming centre stage, insurgency is being reinvented, to exploit the vulnerabilities of our times and gain new strategic salience for tomorrow. As the most promising approaches are refined and repurposed, what we think of as counterinsurgency will also need to change. The Insurgent’s Dilemma explores three particularly adaptive strategies and their implications for response. These emerging strategies target the state where it is weak and sap its power, sometimes without it noticing. There are options for response, but fresh thinking is urgently needed–about society, legitimacy and political violence itself.

The rise and fall of the Cold War coincided with the universalization and consolidation of the modern nation-state as the key unit of the wider international system. A key characteristic of the post-Cold War era, in which the US has emerged as the sole superpower, is the growing number of collapsing or collapsed states. A growing number of states are, or have become, mired in conflict or civil war, the antecedents of which are often to be found in the late-colonial and Cold War era. At the same time, US foreign policy (and the actions of other organizations such as the United Nations) may well be compounding state failure in the context of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT) or what is also increasingly referred to as the ‘Long War’. The Long War is often represented as a ‘new’ era in warfare and geopolitics. This book acknowledges that the Long War is new in important respects, but it also emphasizes that the Long War bears many similarities to the Cold War. A key similarity is the way in which insurgency and counterinsurgency were and continue to be seen primarily in the context of inter-state rivalry in which the critical local or regional dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution are marginalized or neglected. In this context American policy-makers and their allies have again erroneously applied a ‘grand strategy’ that suits the imperatives of conventional military and geo-political thinking rather than engaging with what are a much more variegated array of problems facing the changing global order. This book provides a collection of well-integrated studies that shed light on the history and future of insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states in the context of the Long War. This book was previously published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly.

America's wars after the 9/11 attacks were marked by a political obsession with terrorist 'sanctuaries' and 'safe havens'. From mountain redoubts in Afghanistan to the deserts of Iraq, Washington's policy-makers maintained an unwavering focus on finding and destroying the refuges, bases and citadels of modern guerrilla movements, and holding their sponsors to account. This was a preoccupation embedded in nearly every official speech and document of the time, a corpus of material that offered a new logic for thinking about the world. As an exercise in political communication, it was a spectacular success. From 2001 to 2009, President George W. Bush and his closest advisors set terms of reference that cascaded down from the White House, through government and into the hearts and minds of Americans. 'Sanctuary' was the red thread running through all of it, permeating the decisions and discourses of the day. Where did this obsession come from? How did it become such an important feature of American political life? In this new political history, Michael A. Innes explores precedents, from Saigon to Baghdad, and traces how decision-makers and their advisors used ideas of sanctuary to redefine American foreign policy, national security, and enemies real and imagined.

The phenomenon of globalization applies to political violence as well as to more benign aspects of life. Most people in the West, as well as the Third World, politicians and media included, are still missing this point. As a result, they are failing to adapt to the new realities--unlike their enemies. Dilemmas of Democracy and Dictatorship is a collection of essays Radu has published over the past decade. Some are opinion pieces; others are academic articles. The topics include political violence and terrorism in general, and in specific areas--Latin America, the Balkans, Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western and Eastern Europe. Radu discusses the causes and methods of contemporary terrorism, the process of state decay in some African countries, and mentalities and absurdities in Latin and Balkan politics. He also points out Western European illusions, delusions, and attitudes, and reviews American policy and confusion in dealing with the Third World. At times the analysis is political, other times military, and often it is sociological or psychological. In the author's words he is "always politically incorrect." The approach is multidisciplinary. What ties these disparate essays together is Radu's personal experience--both as a field researcher and in a few cases as a participant in ongoing events, and his personal idiosyncrasies, opinions, and perception of areas visited. These essays clearly demonstrate that in the face of globalization the world is not a village but a conglomerate of differences. This volume will be of particular interest to students of political violence, insurgency/guerrilla warfare, and Third World politics, journalists, and policymakers. Michael S. Radu is senior fellow and co-chairman of the Center on Terrorism at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. Educated in communist Romania and at Columbia University, he has taught in the United States and South Africa. He has traveled to over forty countries doing research on local politics and political violence and has served as electoral observer in four countries, including as a UN observer in Cambodia. He is the author or editor of ten books.

In this groundbreaking work, leading scholars and experts set out to explore the utility of the concept of affordance in the study and understanding of terrorism and political violence. Affordance is a concept used in a variety of fields, from psychology to artificial intelligence, which refers to how the quality of an environment or object allows an individual to perform a specific action. This concept can represent an important element in the process of choice involved in behavior, and is closely related to situational analyses of criminal behavior. In this book, the contributors set out to explore how this concept can be used to study terrorism and, as a result, develop management strategies. Essays discuss such topics as affordance in relation to counterterrorism, technology, cyber-jihad, ideology, and political ecologies. By importing the concept of affordance and a new set of research to the study of terrorism, the authors offer an innovative and original work that challenges and adds to various aspects of situational crime prevention and counterterrorism.

This book analyses the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) "Lebanese era" and its aftermath, of the changing position of the Palestinian nationalist movement in Lebanon. It presents the PLO's efforts to maintain for itself a secure political and military base of operations in Lebanon.