The Is Ought Question A Collection Of Papers On The Central Problem In Moral Philosophy

From Descartes to Spinoza, Western philosophers have attempted to propose an axiomatic systemization of ethics. However, without consensus on the contents and objects of ethics, the system remains incomplete. This fourvolume set presents a model that highlights a Chinese philosopher’s insights on ethics after a 22-year study. Three essential components of ethics are examined: metaethics, normative ethics, and virtue ethics. This volume mainly studies meta- ethics. The author not only studies the fi ve primitive concepts of ethics— “value,” “good,” “ought,” “right,” and “fact”— and reveals their relationship, but also demonstrates the solution to the classic “Hume’s guillotine”— whether “ought” can be derived from “fact.” His aim is to identify the methods of making excellent moral norms, leading to solutions on how to prove ethical axioms and ethical postulates. Written by a renowned philosopher, the Chinese version of this set sold more than 60,000 copies and has exerted tremendous infl uence on the academic scene in China. The English version will be an essential read for students and scholars of ethics and philosophy in general.

Some of the most fundamental questions which moral philosophers have been grappling with include: What makes us moral beings? Is morality a product of culture or nature or both? Are ethical norms and principles universal and unchanging or are they relative, being rooted in specific socio-political and historical contexts? Can ethical conclusions be derived from descriptive statements? This book addresses these and similar questions through a comparative study between Alasdair MacIntyre’s views and biological ethics. It discusses how both MacIntyre’s views and biological ethics highlight the importance of human biology for human morality. Based on this discussion, the book proposes that both the rational and the biological (including the emotional) dimensions of humans have to be considered in order to understand the complex and multi-layered phenomenon of human morality. As such, it will prove to be a valuable resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students of moral philosophy, especially those interested in studying the biological approach toward ethics, Thomistic Aristotelian ethics and metaethics.

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".