The Judicialization Of Politics In Asia

Over the last two decades courts have become major players in the political landscape in Asia. This book assesses what is driving this apparent trend toward judicialization in the region. It looks at the variations within the judicialization trend, and how these variations affect political practice and policy outcomes. The book goes on to examine how this new trend is affecting aspects of the rule of law, democratic governance and state-society relations. It investigates how the experiences in Asia add to the debate on the judicialization of politics globally; in particular how judicial behaviour in Asia differs from that in the West, and the implications of the differences on the theoretical debate.

Courts around the globe have become central players in governance, those in Southeast Asia have been no exception. This Element analyses the historical foundations, patterns, and drivers of judicialization of politics by mapping critical junctures that have shaped the emergence of modern courts in the region and providing a basic typology of courts and politics that extends the analysis to the contemporary situation. It also offers a new relational theory that helps explain the dynamics of judicial recruitment, decision-making, court performance-and ultimately perceptions of judicial legitimacy. In a region where power is often concentrated among oligarchs and clientelist political dynamics persist, it posits that courts are best comprehended as institutional hybrids. These hybrids seamlessly blend formal and informal practices, with profound implications for how Southeast Asian courts are molding both the rule of law and political governance.

Shah uncovers the complex interaction between constitutional law, religion and politics in three key plural societies in Asia.

Over the last two decades courts have become major players in the political landscape in Asia. This book assesses what is driving this apparent trend toward judicialization in the region. It looks at the variations within the judicialization trend, and how these variations affect political practice and policy outcomes. The book goes on to examine how this new trend is affecting aspects of the rule of law, democratic governance and state-society relations. It investigates how the experiences in Asia add to the debate on the judicialization of politics globally; in particular how judicial behaviour in Asia differs from that in the West, and the implications of the differences on the theoretical debate.

This book examines constitutional law and practice in five South Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

In Russia, as the confrontation over the constitutional distribution of authority raged, Boris Yeltsin's economic program regularly wended its way in and out of the Constitutional Court until Yeltsin finally suspended that court in the aftermath of his clash with the hard-line parliament. In Europe, French and German legislators and executives now routinely alter desired policies in response to or in anticipation of the pronouncements of constitutional courts. In Latin America and Africa, courts are--or will be-- important participants in ongoing efforts to establish constitutional rules and policies protect new or fragile democracies from the threats of military intervention, ethnic conflict, and revolution. This global expansion of judicial power, or judicialization of politics is accompanied by an increasing domination of negotiating or decision making arenas by quasi- judicial procedures. For better or for worse, the judicialization of politics has become one of the most significant trends of the end of the millenium. In this book, political scientists, legal scholars, and judges around the world trace the intellectual origins of this trend, describe its occurence--or lack of occurence--in specific nations, analyze the circumstances and conditions that promote or retard judicialization, and evaluate the phenomenon from a variety of intellectual and ideological perspectives.

Since 2007, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has emerged as a dominant force in Pakistani politics through its hyper-active use of judicial review, or the power to overrule Parliament’s laws and the Prime Minister’s acts. This hyper-activism was on display during the Supreme Court’s unilateral disqualification of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani in 2012 under the leadership of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Despite the Supreme Court’s practical adoption of restraint subsequent to the retirement of Chief Justice Chaudhry in 2013, the Court has once again disqualified a prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, due to allegations of corruption in 2017. While many critics have focused on the substance of the Court’s decisions in these cases, sufficient focus is not paid to the amorphous case-selection process of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In order to compare the relatively unregulated process of case-selection in Pakistan to the more structured processes utilized by the Supreme Courts of the United States’ and India, this book aims to understand the historical roots of judicial review in each country dating back to the colonial era extending through the foundational period of each nation impacting present-day jurisprudence. As a first in its kind, this study comparatively examines these periods of history in order to contextualize a practical prescription to standardize the case-selection process in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a way that retains the Court’s overall power while limiting its involvement in purely political issues. This publication offers a critical and comparative view of the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s recent involvement in political disputes due to the lack of a discerning case-selection system that has otherwise been adopted by the Supreme Courts of India and the United States’ to varying degrees. It will be of interest to academics in the fields of Asian Law, South Asian Politics and Law and Comparative Law.

In a comprehensive examination of the constitutional systems of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, Po Jen Yap contributes to a field that has traditionally focussed on Western jurisdictions. Drawing on the history and constitutional framework of these Asian law systems, this book examines the political structures and traditions that were inherited from the British colonial government and the major constitutional developments since decolonization. Yap examines the judicial crises that have occurred in each of the three jurisdictions and explores the development of sub-constitutional doctrines that allows the courts to preserve the right of the legislature to disagree with the courts' decisions using the ordinary political processes. The book focusses on how these novel judicial techniques can be applied to four core constitutional concerns: freedom of expression, freedom of religion, right to equality, and criminal due process rights. Each chapter examines one core topic and defends a model of dialogic judicial review that offers a compelling alternative to legislative or judicial supremacy.