The Lessons Of Lebanon

Since 1945, over 200 intrastate conflicts have taken place in countries that achieved independence from colonial rule after the second world war. The case of Lebanon offers a striking illustration of these interlocking influences on projects of national economic development. The persistently sectarian nature of the country's political institutions, the relatively poor quality of governance, and the major civil war that engulfed the country from 1975 to 1990, together define not only the context in which the achievements and failures of Lebanese development must be assessed, but also the continuing challenges that it must face in the era of globalization. This book offers an in-depth analysis of Lebanese economic development during the second half of the twentieth century with special emphasis on the civil war and its aftermath. Makdisi offers a definitive assessment of the principal phases of national development since Lebanese independence in the 1940s, and a study of those conditions requisite for sustainable development for Lebanon, as for many other developing countries.

After the ceasefire, a group of architects and planners from the American University of Beirut formed the Reconstruction Unit to help in the recovery process and in rebuilding the lives of those affected by the 2006 war in Lebanon . Here, a series of case studies documenting the work of the Unit discusses the lessons to be learned from the experiences of Lebanon after the July War, and suggests how those lessons might be applied elsewhere. The cases are diverse in terms of scale, type of intervention, methods, and approaches to the situation on the ground. Critical issues such as community participation, heritage protection, damage assessment and compensation policies, the role of the state, and capacity building are explored and the success and failures assessed.

"Since 1945, over 200 intra-state conflicts have taken place in countries that achieved independence from colonial rule after World War II. The case of Lebanon offers a striking illustration of these interlocking influences on projects of national economics development. The persistently sectarian nature of the country's political instutions, the relatively poor quality of governance and the major civil war that engulfed the country from 1975 to 1990, together define not only the context in which the achievements and failures of Lebanese development must be assessed, but also the continuing challenges that it must face in the era of globalization. This text offers an in-depth analysis of Lebanese economic development during the second half of the 20th century, with special emphasis on the civil war and its aftermath. Makdisi offers a definitive assessment of the principal phases of national development since Lebanese independence in the 1940s, and a study of those conditions requisite for sustainable development for Lebanon, as for many other developing countries."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

This volume, the first in a series of three, covers the lessons of the 1973-1989 Arab-Israeli arms race and of the conflicts of 1973 and 1982. It draws on interviews with Arab and Israeli sources and reveals that if truth is the first casualty of war, then history is the first casualty of peace.

The author underlines what he considers to be the "lessons of Lebanon" for US foreign policy in the greater Middle East and in the world at large. He suggests that the President must take the lead in policy formulation and interagency coordination; diplomacy and force must both be a part of balanced foreign policy; and "loose cannons" like Robert

Find out about the 1958 U.S. intervention that succeeded and apply those lessons to today's conflicts in the Middle East In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission—helping to end Lebanon's first civil war—went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well. Bruce Riedel's new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie. Although Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today's policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Reidel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don't assume the worst.

In this impressive synthesis, William Harris narrates the history of the sectarian communities of Mount Lebanon and its vicinity. He offers a fresh perspective on the antecedents of modern multi-communal Lebanon, tracing the consolidation of Lebanon's Christian, Muslim, and Islamic derived sects from their origins between the sixth and eleventh centuries. The identities of Maronite Christians, Twelver Shia Muslims, and Druze, the mountain communities, developed alongside assertions of local chiefs under external powers from the Umayyads to the Ottomans. The chiefs began interacting in a common arena when Druze lord Fakhr al-Din Ma'n achieved domination of the mountain within the Ottoman imperial framework in the early seventeenth century. Harris knits together the subsequent interplay of the elite under the Sunni Muslim Shihab relatives of the Ma'ns after 1697 with demographic instability as Maronites overtook Shia as the largest community and expanded into Druze districts. By the 1840s many Maronites conceived the common arena as their patrimony. Maronite/Druze conflict ensued. Modern Lebanon arose out of European and Ottoman intervention in the 1860s to secure sectarian peace in a special province. In 1920, after the Ottoman collapse, France and the Maronites enlarged the province into the modern country, with a pluralism of communal minorities headed by Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. The book considers the flowering of this pluralism in the mid-twentieth century, and the strains of new demographic shifts and of social resentment in an open economy. External intrusions after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war rendered Lebanon's contradictions unmanageable and the country fell apart. Harris contends that Lebanon has not found a new equilibrium and has not transcended its sects. In the early twenty-first century there is an uneasy duality: Shia have largely recovered the weight they possessed in the sixteenth century, but Christians, Sunnis, and Druze are two-thirds of the country. This book offers readers a clear understanding of how modern Lebanon acquired its precarious social intricacy and its singular political character.