The Logical Foundations Of Statistical Inference

Everyone knows it is easy to lie with statistics. It is important then to be able to tell a statistical lie from a valid statistical inference. It is a relatively widely accepted commonplace that our scientific knowledge is not certain and incorrigible, but merely probable, subject to refinement, modifi cation, and even overthrow. The rankest beginner at a gambling table understands that his decisions must be based on mathematical ex pectations - that is, on utilities weighted by probabilities. It is widely held that the same principles apply almost all the time in the game of life. If we turn to philosophers, or to mathematical statisticians, or to probability theorists for criteria of validity in statistical inference, for the general principles that distinguish well grounded from ill grounded generalizations and laws, or for the interpretation of that probability we must, like the gambler, take as our guide in life, we find disagreement, confusion, and frustration. We might be prepared to find disagreements on a philosophical and theoretical level (although we do not find them in the case of deductive logic) but we do not expect, and we may be surprised to find, that these theoretical disagreements lead to differences in the conclusions that are regarded as 'acceptable' in the practice of science and public affairs, and in the conduct of business.

Anyone involved in the philosophy of science is naturally drawn into the study of the foundations of probability. Different interpretations of probability, based on competing philosophical ideas, lead to different statistical techniques, and frequently to mutually contradictory consequences. This unique book presents a new interpretation of probability, rooted in the traditional interpretation that was current in the 17th and 18th centuries. Mathematical models are constructed based on this interpretation, and statistical inference and decision theory are applied, including some examples in artificial intelligence, solving the main foundational problems. Nonstandard analysis is extensively developed for the construction of the models and in some of the proofs. Many nonstandard theorems are proved, some of them new, in particular, a representation theorem that asserts that any stochastic process can be approximated by a process defined over a space with equiprobable outcomes.

This book showcases Ian Hacking's early ideas on the central issues surrounding statistical reasoning. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and with a specially commissioned new preface, this influential work is now available for a new generation of readers in statistics, philosophy of science and philosophy of maths.

In May of 1973 we organized an international research colloquium on foundations of probability, statistics, and statistical theories of science at the University of Western Ontario. During the past four decades there have been striking formal advances in our understanding of logic, semantics and algebraic structure in probabilistic and statistical theories. These advances, which include the development of the relations between semantics and metamathematics, between logics and algebras and the algebraic-geometrical foundations of statistical theories (especially in the sciences), have led to striking new insights into the formal and conceptual structure of probability and statistical theory and their scientific applications in the form of scientific theory. The foundations of statistics are in a state of profound conflict. Fisher's objections to some aspects of Neyman-Pearson statistics have long been well known. More recently the emergence of Bayesian statistics as a radical alternative to standard views has made the conflict especially acute. In recent years the response of many practising statisticians to the conflict has been an eclectic approach to statistical inference. Many good statisticians have developed a kind of wisdom which enables them to know which problems are most appropriately handled by each of the methods available. The search for principles which would explain why each of the methods works where it does and fails where it does offers a fruitful approach to the controversy over foundations.

Classic analysis of the foundations of statistics and development of personal probability, one of the greatest controversies in modern statistical thought. Revised edition. Calculus, probability, statistics, and Boolean algebra are recommended.