The Long Road To Baghdad

An account of the Mesopotamian campaign which includes an extensive description of the Battle of Dujaila fought on 8 March 1916, between British and Ottoman forces during the First World War.

Originally published in 1919, this 2 volume work chronicles the British missions in Mesopotamia which the author states the purpose as being 'the safeguarding of India and the destruction of the Turk.' Looking back, Candler dislikes the morbid tone of the early chapters, and looks to change them, yet fortunately for future readers looking for a first hand glimpse into this time period, he has 'left the mournful passages uncorrected.

The diplomatic historian examines the ideas, policies and actions that led from Vietnam to the Iraq War and America’s disastrous role in the Middle East. “What will stand out one day is not George W. Bush’s uniqueness but the continuum from the Carter doctrine to ‘shock and awe’ in 2003.” —from The Long Road to Baghdad In this revealing narrative of America’s path to its “new longest war,” one of the nation’s premier diplomatic historians excavates the deep historical roots of the US misadventure in Iraq. Lloyd Gardner’s sweeping and authoritative narrative places the Iraq War in the context of US foreign policy since Vietnam, casting the conflict as a chapter in a much broader story—in sharp contrast to the dominant narrative, which focus almost exclusively on the actions of the Bush Administration in the months leading up to the invasion. Gardner illuminates a vital historical thread connecting Walt Whitman Rostow’s defense of US intervention in Southeast Asia, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s attempts to project American power into the “arc of crisis” (with Iran at its center), and the efforts of two Bush administrations, in separate Iraq wars, to establish a “landing zone” in that critically important region. Far more disturbing than a simple conspiracy to secure oil, Gardner’s account explains the Iraq War as the necessary outcome of a half-century of doomed US policies. “A vital primer to the slow-motion conflagration of American foreign policy.” —Kirkus Reviews

ABC News’ Chief Global Affairs Correspondent Martha Raddatz shares remarkable tales of heroism, hope, and heartbreak in her account of “Black Sunday”—a battle during one of the deadliest periods of the Iraq War. The First Cavalry Division came under surprise attack in Sadr City on Sunday April 4, 2004. Over 7,000 miles away, their families awaited the news for forty-eight hellish hours—expecting the worst. In this powerful, unflinching account, Martha Raddatz takes readers from the streets of Baghdad to the home front and tells the story of that horrific day through the eyes of the courageous American men and women who lived it. “A masterpiece of literary nonfiction that rivals any war-related classic that has preceded it.”—The Washington Post

An account of the Mesopotamian campaign which includes an extensive description of the Battle of Dujaila fought on 8 March 1916, between British and Ottoman forces during the First World War.

Travel journalist Andrew Eames was in the ancient Syrian city of Aleppo when he met an elderly lady who had known Agatha Christie. Fascinated by the exotic history of this quintessentially English crime writer, he decided to retrace the trip from London to Baghdad which she made in 1928 - a journey which was to change Agatha Christie completely and led to her other life as the wife of an archaeologist in the deserts of Syria and Iraq. Travelling from London to Baghdad by train on the eve of the Iraq war, through the troubled areas of the Balkans and the Middle East, Eames found stark contrasts to the old Orient Express route as well as some unexpected connections with the past.

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1919 edition. Excerpt: ... CHAPTER XIII THE ATTACK ON THE DUJAILA REDOUBT The attack on March 8th on the Sinn position on the right bank was perhaps the most criticised action in the advance. The scheme was to carry the Dujaila Redoubt, the key of the whole position, and thence to pivot round in the enemy's rear and cut off his communications, thus making the right bank untenable. It was hoped that this manoeuvre would compel the Turks to evacuate the north bank, leaving us the command of the river and an open door to Kut. We put into the field for these operations the 3rd Division and three Brigades, the 28th, 35th, and 36th, in all some 20,000 men, including cavalry, sappers, and pioneers. The Turkish force on the right bank between the Shatt-el-Hai and our position was estimated at 10,000, not including the reserves that could be brought up from Shumran or ferried across the Tigris at Magasis. The total force at their command between Baghdad and the firing line was estimated at 35,000. A bolder, though ultimately less ambitious, scheme would have been, instead of attacking the Sinn position, to march straight on Kut and extricate Townshend and his garrison so that they could have joined camps with Aylmer at a point in advance of Orah, leaving the Turk the empty prize of Kut, and the command for the time being of this stretch of the river. Experience had taught us that the cost of these frontal attacks, even when successful, is prohibitive. We had not recovered from the wastage of January 7th, 12th, and 21st; and to waste ourselves again with reinforcements in sight seemed like the act of a man with a broken limb who takes his splints off a day or two before the bone has united. The essential thing was to concentrate our forces for one blow, not to fritter them...