The Macedonian War Machine 359 281 Bc

“[A] splendid and scholarly work . . . an essential guide for all serious students of military history and warfare in the age of Alexander.”—Professor Waldemar Heckel, University of Calgary The army that emerged from the reforms of Philip II of Macedon proved to be one of the most successful in the whole of the ancient period. Much has been written on aspects of Macedonian warfare, particularly the generalship of its most famous proponent, Alexander the Great, yet many studies retread the same paths and draw conclusion on the same narrow evidential base, while leaving important aspects and sources of information untouched. David Karunanithy concentrates on filling the gaps in existing studies, presenting and studying evidence frequently overlooked or ignored. The book is divided into four sections, each presenting a wealth of detail on various aspects: Preparation (including chapters on training techniques, various aspects of arms and armor production and supply and the provision and management of cavalry mounts); Support (eg noncombatant specialists, bridge building, field engineering, construction of field camps and little-known combat units in Asia); Dress and Battle Equipment (drawing on much neglected evidence and including such details as officers’ plumes, wreaths and finger rings); Alexander’s Veterans and Life on Campaign (the Silver Shields; baggage trains and personal kit, servants and families, camp life and recreation). “Karunanithy’s achievement is to draw together all the available evidence—artistic, numeristic, archaeological and literary—producing a thoroughly readable and coherent work . . . it should be a mandatory acquisition for anyone with an interest in the history of ancient Macedonia and its military.”—Ancient Warfare

The Macedonian Empire lasted only 36 years, beginning with Philip II's assumption of the throne in 359 B.C. and ending with the death of his son Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. In that span, the two leaders changed the map in the known world. Philip established new tactics that forever ended the highly stylized mode that had characterized Classic Greek warfare, and Alexander's superb leadership made the army an unstoppable force. This work first examines the 11 great armies and three great navies of the era, along with their operations and logistics. The primary focus is then on each campaign and significant battle fought by Philip or Alexander, detailing how the battles were fought, the tactics of the opposing armies, and how the Macedonians were able to triumph.

When the dying Alexander the Great was asked to whom he bequeathed his vast empire, he supposedly replied 'to the strongest.' There ensued a long series of struggles between his generals and governors for control of these vast territories.Most of these Diadochi, or successors, were consummate professionals who had learned their trade under Alexander and, in some cases, his father Philip. This second volume studies how they applied that experience and further developed the art of war in a further four decades of warfare. This is a period rich in fascinating tactical developments. The all-conquering Macedonian war machine developed by Philip and Alexander was adapted in various ways (such as the addition of war elephants) by the different successors according to their resources. Siege and naval warfare is also included.

This book provides a complete and detailed analysis of the organization and equipment of the Macedonian army built by Philip II and later employed to world-changing effect by his son, Alexander III (the Great). This work explains how Philip took the traditional forces of Macedon and reformed them into the most modern and sophisticated combined-arms force in the Mediterranean world. Not only the formidable pike phalanx and the hard-charging Companion cavalry, but also the less famous components, such as light and cavalry types, are described in detail. The tactics employed in the great battles that won the largest empire the world had seen are analyzed. With numerous color photos showing replica weapons and equipment in use, this is a vivid, detailed and accessible study of the army that made Alexander great.

In August 334 BC, Alexander the Great invaded the Persian Empire and systematically set about its conquest. At the core of Alexander's army were 10,000 members of the phalanx, the phalangites. Armed with a long pike and fighting in formations up to 16 ranks deep, these grizzled veterans were the mainstay of the Macedonian army. Facing them were the myriad armies of the peoples that made up the Persian Empire. At the centre of these forces was the formation known as the Immortals: 10,000 elite infantry, armed with spears and bows. In this study, a noted authority assesses the origins, combat role and battlefield performance of Alexander's phalangites and their Persian opponents in three key battles of the era – the Granicus River, Issus and Gaugamela – at the dawn of a new way of waging war.

The Third Roman-Macedonian War was a disaster for Macedon, a defeat leading to the end of that kingdom's independence. This is usually attributed to an innate superiority of the Roman legionary tactics over the Macedonian system. Graham Wrightson, on the other hand, argues that the blame lies entirely with Perseus, the last king of Macedon. He analyzes the whole war, following the primary source accounts and focusing on Perseus’ military decisions and his battlefield strategies. It confirms the prevailing view of the sources that Perseus was too hesitant and non-committal in his early conduct of the war. More significantly it argues that Perseus mishandled the Macedonian army when it comes to combined-arms tactics by adopting a defensive posture, particularly at the final battle of Pydna. The Macedonian military system based on a slow sarissa phalanx is suited entirely to an offensive battle plan coordinating a frontally irresistible phalanx in the centre and a rapid heavy cavalry attack on one wing. Most importantly, though, Perseus refused to spend money to hire 10,000 Gallic horsemen and the lack of cavalry cost him the initiative and the victory. This is a fascinating and thoroughly researched study of these dramatic events that adds fresh insight to the question of the legion's supposed supremacy over the phalanx.