The Matrix Of Necessity In Modern Criminal Law

This book presents the modern theory of necessity and the current distinctions between necessity and self-defense, dwelling defense and duress. Most legal systems have accepted necessity as general defense. However, justifications for this defense and the distinctions between necessity and tangential in rem general defenses have changed significantly in modern criminal law. In addition, the book presents the function of transformation-of-fault (formerly actio libera in causa) in its modern form. Focusing on the Anglo-American and European-Continental legal systems, the book is divided into four chapters: The Modern Defense of Necessity, Integrating Necessity with the Principle of Fault in Modern Criminal Law, Tangential In Rem Defenses in Criminal Law and their Implications for Necessity, The Function of Transformation of Fault.

This book challenges the assumptions of modern criminal law that insanity is a natural, legally and medically defined phenomenon (covering a range of medical disorders). By doing so, it paves the way for a new perspective on insanity and can serve as the basis for a new approach to insanity in modern criminal law. The book covers the following aspects: the structure of the principle of fault in modern criminal law, the development of the insanity defense in criminal law, tangential in personam defenses in criminal law and their implications for insanity and the legal mechanism of reproduction of fault. The focus is on the Anglo-American and European-Continental legal systems. Given the attention consistently drawn by international and domestic events in this context, the book will be of interest to a broad and growing international audience.

Drawing from scholarship across law, history, politics and philosophy, Self-Defence in International and Criminal Law provides a broad and interdisciplinary approach to the doctrine of self-defence in both domestic criminal and international law. It focuses on the requirement of imminence, which deals with the question of when individuals or States may legitimately resort to defensive force against a serious danger or harm. In both national and international law the imminence requirement, if strictly applied, renders any defensive measure taken in anticipation of a would-be attack illegal. Recently, however, attempts have been made to relax the temporal requirement of the self-defence doctrine (imminence) with a view to allowing individuals or States to employ deadly force to arrest an anticipated threat when they ‘believe’ that using ‘pre-emptive’ lethal force would be the only way to thwart an expected harm. In domestic criminal law, it has been argued that it is necessary to relax the rule of imminence in domestic violence cases where women employ lethal force against their abusive partners when there is no imminent threat to justify defensive force. At the international level, while there has long been controversy as to the justifiability of pre-emptive force in non-confrontational settings, following the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration’s ‘war on terror’ policy radically shifted the focus from the notion of anticipation to that of prevention, making it clear that, if necessary, it would invoke unilateral force against emerging threats before they are fully formed. The book surveys the roots, role, rationale, and objectives of self-defence and questions whether the requirement of imminence should be removed from the traditional contours of the self-defence doctrine in national and international law.

The book develops a general legal theory concerning the liability for offenses involving artificial intelligence systems. The involvement of the artificial intelligence systems in these offenses may be as perpetrators, accomplices or mere instruments. The general legal theory proposed in this book is based on the current criminal law in most modern legal systems. In most modern countries, unmanned vehicles, sophisticated surgical systems, industrial computing systems, trading algorithms and other artificial intelligence systems are commonly used for both industrial and personal purposes. The question of legal liability arises when something goes wrong, e.g. the unmanned vehicle is involved in a car accident, the surgical system is involved in a surgical error or the trading algorithm is involved in fraud, etc. Who is to be held liable for these offenses: the manufacturer, the programmer, the user, or, perhaps, the artificial intelligence system itself? The concept of liability for crimes involving artificial intelligence systems has not yet been widely researched. Advanced technologies are forcing society to face new challenges, both technical and legal. The idea of liability in the specific context of artificial intelligence systems is one such challenge that should be thoroughly explored.