The Methodological Dilemma

This thought-provoking book challenges the way research is planned and undertaken and equips researchers with a variety of creative and imaginative solutions to the dilemmas of method and representation that plague qualitative research. Fascinating and inspiring reading for any researcher in the Social Sciences this comprehensive collection encourages the reader to imagine the world in evermore complex and interesting ways and discover new routes to understanding. Some of the most influential figures in educational research consider questions such as: How does a socio-political context change the course of our research? What counts as a ‘truthful account’ in qualitative research? How do the voices of theory and the voices of ‘research subjects’ struggle to be heard in our research narratives? How can qualitative researchers ethically navigate the difficult terrain of research relationships? How is the material body rendered in qualitative research? Each chapter reveals a range of troubling dilemmas related to the critical aspects of research methodology in the Social Sciences and uses an illustrative case to elucidate the issues encountered by the researcher. Each writer brings a fierce philosophical spirit to her work, showing how methods or techniques of data-gathering grow from the theory and analysis of how research proceeds. A range of topics are addressed in a cross-disciplinary approach which will appeal to all scholars of qualitative research, undergraduate students in education programs and graduate students in a range of disciplines

In The Methodological Dilemma Revisited, authors examine what in their research processes has given pause, thwarted the process of seamless productivity, stalled the easy research output but has, instead, insisted upon a deeper analysis. This resistance of the expedient explanation has consequences both for the research topics under study and the ways in which qualitative research is conducted in a globalized era of deepening social inequality. The book is pedagogical in its orientation and reflects upon the politics of knowledge construction. Working with queer and minoritized youth communities, and other precarious publics, the authors convey their relationships to groups they are inside, outside, or allied with — posing ethical questions about research designs and worldviews. Themes such as representation, refusal and resistance of hegemonies are nuanced by investigations into the ethical, practical, and scholarly dimensions of the turn towards collaboration in qualitative inquiry. Other chapters examine the place, value and concerns of aesthetic representation of qualitative research. Finally, the authors consider issues of criticality in research, and the concepts of compassion and humility. This book contains contributions from some of the most imaginative qualitative researchers, making the most of their research dilemmas in order to reflect upon the challenges and resistances they encounter in the work of qualitative research.

Both thought-provoking and challenging to the way research is planned and undertaken this vital new book will equip researchers with a variety of critical, creative and post-positivist solutions to dilemmas that plague qualitative research.

First Published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This systematic analysis of the nature and development of Talcott Parson’s theory of action offers first an introduction to the conceptual paradigm upon which this theory is based – an introduction, that is, which will make Parson’s writing more easily accessible. Second, the book gives an explanation of the development which the action theory has undergone during the half-century of Parson’s career. Using a scheme of four theory-levels, the author indicates the crucial premises that can be distilled from Parson’s early works. He argues that Parsons, from the very start of his career, was trying to translate abstract premises into a systematically constructed conceptual scheme. The first conceptual translation, however, turned out to be vague and inconsistent in many respects, and this study offers a very specific explanation of the inadequacy of this first (structural-functional) version of the theory of action. Dr Adriaansens argues that it was not until Parsons had found his way out of this ‘conceptual dilemma’ that the premises of the action theory could be adequately translated into a conceptual paradigm.

The major methodological task for modern economists has been to establish the testability of models. Too often, however, methodological assumptions can make a model virtually impossible to test even under ideal conditions, yet few theorists have examined the requirements and problems of assuring testability in economics. In The Methodology of Economic Model Building, first published in 1989, Lawrence Boland presents the results of a research project that spanned more than twenty years. He examines how economists have applied the philosophy of Karl Popper, relating methodological debates about falsifiability to wider discussions about the truth status of models in natural and social sciences. He concludes that model building in economics reflects more the methodological prescriptions of the economist Paul Samuelson than Popper’s ‘falsificationism’. This title will prove invaluable to both students and researchers, and represents a substantial contribution to debates about the scientific status of economics.

Philosophy of Science deals with the problem, 'What is science?' It seems that the answer to this question can only be found if we have an answer to the question, 'How does science function?' Thus, the study of the methodology of social sciences is a prominent factor in any analysis of these sciences. The history of philosophy shows clearly that the answer to the question, 'How does science function?' was the conditio sine qua non of any kind of philosophy of science, epistemology and even of logic. Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, to mention a few classical authors, clearly emphasized the primacy of methodology of science for any kind of philosophy of science. One may even state that analyses of the presup positions, the foundations, the aims, goals and purposes of science are nothing else than analyses of their general and specific formal, as well as practical and empirical methods. Thus, the whole program of any phi losophy of science is dependent on the analysis of the methods of sciences and the establishment of their criteria. If the study of scientific method is the predominant factor in the philosophy of science, then all the other problems will depend on the outcome of such a study. For example, the old question of a possible unity of all social sciences will be brought to a solution by the study of the presuppositions, the methods, as well as of the criteria germane to all social sciences.

To say that someone is aware of a fact is a commonplace expression, not at all a philosopher's term of art. It is often used to criticize, excuse, admonish, and inform others. Such uses of the expression presuppose the existence of a state of awareness that one can be in or fail to be in with regard to some fact. Here lies the phenomenon of factual awareness. It is conventional in epistemology to treat 'S is aware of the fact that p' as either expressing the same thought as 'S knows that p' or at least entailing it. Learning of the failure of conventional views is often both surprising and theoretically fruitful. This book presents a comprehensive case against the view that factual awareness just is knowledge or even essentially related to knowledge: factual awareness is not identical to, and it does not entail, knowing, being in a position to know, or being capable of knowing. It provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as coming 'first' in recent epistemology.