The Methodology Of Constitutional Theory

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions? This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

The need for innovative thinking about alternative constitutional experiences is evident, and readers of Comparative Constitutional Theory will find in its pages a compendium of original, theory-driven essays. The authors use a variety of theoretical perspectives to explore the diversity of global constitutional experience in a post-1989 world prominently marked by momentous transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, by multiple constitutional revolutions and devolutions, by the increased penetration of international law into national jurisdictions, and by the enhancement of supra-national institutions of governance.

This volume makes Schmitt's provocative work on comparative constitutionalism available in English for the first time since it was published in 1928 in Germany.

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution is a volume of original essays that discuss the applicability of Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U.S. constitutional law. The contributors are leading scholars in analytical jurisprudence and constitutional theory, including Matthew Adler, Larry Alexander, Mitchell Berman, Michael Dorf, Kent Greenawalt, Richard Fallon, Michael Green, Kenneth Einar Himma, Stephen Perry, Frederick Schauer, Scott Shapiro, Jeremy Waldron, and Wil Waluchow. The volume makes a contribution both in jurisprudence, using the U.S. as a "test case" that highlights the strengths and limitations of the rule of recognition model; and in constitutional theory, by showing how the model can illuminate topics such as the role of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of precedent, the legitimacy of unwritten sources of constitutional law, the choice of methods for interpreting the text of the Constitution, and popular constitutionalism.

Originalism is a force to be reckoned with in constitutional interpretation. At one time a monolithic theory of constitutional interpretation, contemporary originalism has developed into a sophisticated family of theories about how to interpret and reason with a constitution. Contemporary originalists harness the resources of linguistic, moral, and political philosophy to propose methodologies for the interpretation of constitutional texts and provide reasons for fidelity to those texts. The essays in this volume, which includes contributions from the flag bearers of several competing schools of constitutional interpretation, provides an introduction to the development of originalist thought, showcases the great range of contemporary originalist constitutional scholarship, and situates competing schools of thought in dialogue with each other. They also make new contributions to the methodological and normative disputes between originalists and non-originalists, and among originalists themselves.

Federalism is a very familiar form of government. It characterises the first modern constitution-that of the United States-and has been deployed by constitution-makers to manage large and internally diverse polities at various key stages in the history of the modern state. Despite its pervasiveness in practice, this book argues that federalism has been strangely neglected by constitutional theory. It has tended either to be subsumed within one default account of modern constitutionalism, or it has been treated as an exotic outlier - a sui generis model of the state, rather than a form of constitutional ordering for the state. This neglect is both unsatisfactory in conceptual terms and problematic for constitutional practitioners, obscuring as it does the core meaning, purpose and applicability of federalism as a specific model of constitutionalism with which to organise territorially pluralised and demotically complex states. In fact, the federal contract represents a highly distinctive order of rule which in turn requires a particular, 'territorialised' approach to many of the fundamental concepts with which constitutionalists and political actors operate: constituent power, the nature of sovereignty, subjecthood and citizenship, the relationship between institutions and constitutional authority, patterns of constitutional change and, ultimately, the legitimacy link between constitutionalism and democracy. In rethinking the idea and practice of federalism, this book adopts a root and branch recalibration of the federal contract. It does so by analysing federalism through the conceptual categories that characterise the nature of modern constitutionalism: foundations, authority, subjecthood, purpose, design and dynamics. This approach seeks to explain and in so doing revitalise federalism as a discrete, capacious and adaptable concept of rule that can be deployed imaginatively to facilitate the deep territorial variety that characterises so many states in the 21st century.

What underlies this development? In this concise and highly engaging work, Federal Appeals Court Judge and noted author (From Brown to Bakke) J. Harvie Wilkinson argues that America's most brilliant legal minds have launched a set of cosmic constitutional theories that, for all their value, are undermining self-governance.