The Middle East Oil And The Great Powers

The history of oil is a chapter in the story of Europe's geopolitical decline in the twentieth century. During the era of the two world wars, a lack of oil constrained Britain and Germany from exerting their considerable economic and military power independently. Both nations' efforts to restore the independence they had enjoyed during the Age of Coal backfired by inducing strategic over-extension, which served only to hasten their demise as great powers. Having fought World War I with oil imported from the United States, Britain was determined to avoid relying upon another great power for its energy needs ever again. Even before the Great War had ended, Whitehall implemented a strategy of developing alternative sources of oil under British control. Britain's key supplier would be the Middle East - already a region of vital importance to the British Empire - whose oil potential was still unproven. As it turned out, there was plenty of oil in the Middle East, but Italian hostility after 1935 threatened transit through the Mediterranean. A shortage of tankers ruled out re-routing shipments around Africa, forcing Britain to import oil from US-controlled sources in the Western Hemisphere and depleting its foreign exchange reserves. Even as war loomed in 1939, therefore, Britain's quest for independence from the United States had failed. Germany was in an even worse position than Britain. It could not import oil from overseas in wartime due to the threat of blockade, while accumulating large stockpiles was impossible because of the economic and financial costs. The Third Reich went to war dependent on petroleum synthesized from coal, domestic crude oil, and overland imports, primarily from Romania. German leaders were confident, however, that they had enough oil to fight a series of short campaigns that would deliver to them the mastery of Europe. This plan derailed following the victory over France, when Britain continued to fight. This left Germany responsible for Europe's oil requirements while cut off from world markets. A looming energy crisis in Axis Europe, the absence of strategic alternatives, and ideological imperatives all compelled Germany in June 1941 to invade the Soviet Union and fulfill the Third Reich's ultimate ambition of becoming a world power - a decision that ultimately sealed its fate.

Israel, The Middle East and the Great Powers presents the Israel-Arab conflict to the general public in a uniquely comprehensive and interdisciplinary format. Its form and content reflect the most serious efforts of Israel's intellectual community to analyze the conflict situation in which they live, objectively and honestly. The book argues that recent events have reduced the U.S. role, and changed the policy parameters in the region. A broad cross-section of Israel's foremost orientalists, historians, juridicists and political scientists have contributed a selection of articles and lexicons which embody the essential aspects of the conflict in its broadest sense. Each key element is analyzed within a number of categories: the ideological-theological plane (Judaism, Zionism, the Holocaust, Jerusalem and the three monotheistic religions); the Palestinian sphere (PLO ideology, Jordon and the Judea & Samaria Region, the PLO and the war in lebanon); the superpowers and the wider region (Iran-Iraq, the Islamic resurgence, oil, the Soviet Union and the Middle East, the United States and Israel), etc. Detailed lexicons offer concise factual breakdowns of both the Middle East (inter-Arab aspects, key Arab countries, conventional and nuclear Arab armaments) and the Arab-Israel context (chronology of the conflict, key events and personalities in Zionism, UN involvement, international legal aspects).

First Published in 1981. The objective of this study is to reconstruct the difficulty faced by American and British policy-makers in ‘determining the capabilities and intentions’ of their two main wartime allies regarding the Middle East. Specifically, it seeks to explore the role of great power relations in the Middle East in the breakdown of the wartime alliance and in the origins of the Cold War.

Strategically placed on the global chess board, as well as controlling vast oil resources, the Middle East was one of the main theatres of Cold War. In the 1950s the Soviet Union had taken advantage of Arab Nationalists’ disillusion with British and French Imperialism, along with the emerging Arab-Israeli conflict, to establish relations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The United States responded by moving in to shore up the Western position. Confrontation was inevitable. Superpower Intervention in the Middle East was written in 1978, when this confrontation was at its height. The book’s main theme focuses on how the superpowers became competitively involved in local Middle East conflicts over which they could exercise only limited control, and the risks of nuclear confrontation of the kind which occurred at the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The threat to Western oil supplies is also examined. This is a fascinating work, of great relevance to scholars and students of Middle Eastern history and political diplomacy, as well as those with an interest in the relationship between the Western superpowers and this volatile region.