The Military And Nation Building

In the last decades, the United States Army has often been involved in missions other than conventional warfare. These include low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and nation-building efforts. Although non-conventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the past sixty years, the Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional ground wars. Consequently, in the last ten years, there has been considerable criticism regarding the military’s inability to accomplish tasks other than conventional war. Failed states and the threat they represent cannot be ignored or solved with conventional military might. In order to adapt to this new reality, the U.S. Army must innovate. This text examines the conditions that have allowed or prevented the U.S. Army to innovate for nation-building effectively. By doing so, it shows how military leadership and civil-military relations have changed. Nation-building refers to a type of military occupation where the goal is regime change or survival, a large number of ground troops are deployed, and both military and civilian personnel are used in the political administration of an occupied country, with the goals of establishing a productive economy and a stable government. Such tasks have always been a challenge for the U.S. military, which is not normally equipped or trained to undertake them. Using military effectiveness as the measurement of innovative success, the book analyzes several U.S. nation-building cases, including post World War II Germany, South Korea from 1945-1950, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By doing so, it reveals the conditions that enabled military innovation in one unique case (Germany) while explaining what prevented it in the others. This variation of effectiveness leads to examine prevailing military innovation theories, threat-based accounts, quality of military organizations, and civil-military relations. This text comes at a critical time as the U.S. military faces dwindling resources and tough choices about its force structure and mission orientation. It will add to the growing debate about the role of civilians, military reformers, and institutional factors in military innovation and effectiveness.

Does the withdrawal of armies from direct rule in most countries herald an end to their role as actors in domestic politics? Has political intervention by the military been superseded? This comparative examination of the politicized armed forces looks at * the consequences of military rule for nation building and economic development * the effects of the passing of the Cold War and the rise of globalization on the political role of the military * the role of political armies in the consolidation of civil politics and democratic governance * the lessons for policy makers in global governance and post-conflict reconstruction The contributors build on successive theories about the role of the military in politics and look to the future. The most threatening scenario may be a proliferation of armed actors and the rise of privatized forces of law and order.

Why Nation-Building Matters establishes a framework for building security forces, economic development, and political consolidation that blends soft and hard power into a deployable and effective package.

Addressing the range of nation-building experiences and concerns in the United States and its allies, Watson opens with a discussion of Somalia, Haiti, and Southeastern European experiences during the 1990s. She then shifts to a discussion of the more recent lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. An examination of the growing emphasis within the U.S. government focused on the education officers at the flag rank in combined, joint, and multinational aspects of military activities that form the basis of nation-building underscores the pace of changes taking place today. As nation-building and stability operations have expanded, so too should the discussion of such activities. With increasing pressure on the United States to engage in actions abroad in the long War on Terrorism, a greater understanding among the American public of what is involved in this area is absolutely crucial. The U.S. has been involved in numerous nation-building activities. Watson breaks down the operational and doctrinal shifts that have occurred in military and political circles during the last twenty years in this introductory overview of the topic. She supplements her narrative with brief biographical essays focused on individuals such as Marine General (Ret.) and U.S. commander in Somalia (1992-1994), Anthony Zinni and others who influenced the course of nation-building and stabilization processes now in place. Their impact is underscored in the documents Watson includes, which are taken from various studies, laws, and debates on the subject at hand, making this a useful work for both students and specialists.

Although the United States (US) has been involved in nation-building efforts for the past 100 years it does not have a doctrinal definition to articulate what nation building is. Another challenge for the US is the lack of a designated agency within the US Government (USG) to lead the effort. First, an interagency, agreed upon, doctrinal definition of nation building must be established. Following this, each department and agency within the USG must be examined to identify the role each plays within a nation-building operation. This examination will allow the identification of the relationships between departments of the USG and the resources available to conduct nation building. This thesis examines the role of Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF) in nation building. In order to do so, a definition of nation building is established, key tasks of nation building are derived, and military tasks that support a nation building operation are developed. These military tasks are analyzed against the doctrinal missions and capabilities of ARSOF in order to identify how ARSOF can contribute to nation building. This thesis concludes with recommendations on the employment of ARSOF in nation-building operations.

After forty years of independence. African countries are still battling with the problem of nation building. This thesis examines the possibility of the military playing a direct role in ethnic integration. The variables, which may determine the military's ability to affect national integration, are the political elite, the state and society. It is found that at lower levels of development, these variables do not support the military in the direction of national integration but they do so at higher levels of development. The issue that arises from this finding is whether African countries should wait for development to occur in the hope that it will bring national integration with it. On the other hand, lack of integration causes mistrust. tensions and conflicts, which weaken the thrust to development. African countries should therefore find methods of political organization that reduce such tensions and conflicts in order to facilitate development and consequently national integration. It is this need for stability that the culturally adaptive mode of political organization is recommended for African countries.

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