The Nonbank Bank Nexus And The Shadow Banking System

The present way of thinking about financial intermediation does not fully incorporate the rise of asset managers as a major source of funding for banks through the shadow banking system. Asset managers are dominant sources of demand for non-M2 types of money and serve as source collateral ?mines' for the shadow banking system. Banks receive funding through the re-use of pledged collateral ?mined' from asset managers. Accounting for this, the size of the shadow banking system in the U.S. may be up to $25 trillion at year-end 2007 and $18 trillion at year-end 2010, higher than earlier estimates. In terms of policy, regulators will need to consider the re-use of pledged collateral when defining bank leverage ratios. Also, given asset managers' demand for non-M2 types of money, monitoring the shadow banking system will warrant closer attention well beyond the regulatory perimeter.

This comparative study explores how shadow banking differs from the traditional banking system. It discusses the origins, history, purposes, risks, regulatory constraints, and projected future evolution of both financial sectors of the world economy. This thorough examination of non-bank financial intermediaries follows the migration of services from traditional banks to less-regulated alternative banking products, as well as the evolution of regulations and the Financial Stability Oversight Council to monitor these new entities. Three chapters explore in depth the major financial structures newly designated as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), with particular attention to insurance companies such as MetLife, which seek exemption from the designation. Finally, the focus shifts to international financial institutions' efforts to protect consumers and curtail irresponsible shadow banks, with an eye toward the effects of these actions on future banking practices.

This global handbook provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of shadow banking, or market-based finance as it has been recently coined. Engaging in financial intermediary services outside of normal regulatory parameters, the shadow banking sector was arguably a critical factor in causing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This volume focuses specifically on shadow banking activities, risk, policy and regulatory issues. It evaluates the nexus between policy design and regulatory output around the world, paying attention to the concept of risk in all its dimensions—the legal, financial, market, economic and monetary perspectives. Particular attention is given to spillover risk, contagion risk and systemic risk and their positioning and relevance in shadow banking activities. Newly introduced and incoming policies are evaluated in detail, as well as how risk is managed, observed and assessed, and how new regulation can potentially create new sources of risk. Volume I concludes with analysis of what will and still needs to happen in the event of another crisis. Proposing innovative suggestions for improvement, including a novel Pigovian tax to tame financial and systemic risks, this handbook is a must-read for professionals and policy-makers within the banking sector, as well as those researching economics and finance.

This paper examines the sizable role of rehypothecation in the shadow banking system. Rehypothecation is the practice that allows collateral posted by, say, a hedge fund to its prime broker to be used again as collateral by that prime broker for its own funding. In the United Kingdom, such use of a customer’s assets by a prime broker can be for an unlimited amount of the customer’s assets while in the United States rehypothecation is capped. Incorporating estimates for rehypothecation (and the associated re-use of collateral) in the recent crisis indicates that the collapse in non-bank funding to banks was sizable. We show that the shadow banking system was at least 50 percent bigger than documented so far. We also provide estimates from the hedge fund industry for the - churning - factor or re-use of collateral. From a policy angle, supervisors of large banks that report on a global consolidated basis may need to enhance their understanding of the off-balance sheet funding that these banks receive via rehypothecation from other jurisdictions.

There is much confusion about what shadow banking is. Some equate it with securitization, others with non-traditional bank activities, and yet others with non-bank lending. Regardless, most think of shadow banking as activities that can create systemic risk. This paper proposes to describe shadow banking as “all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. Backstops can come in the form of franchise value of a bank or insurance company, or in the form of a government guarantee. The need for a backstop is in our view a crucial feature of shadow banking, which distinguishes it from the “usual” intermediated capital market activities, such as custodians, hedge funds, leasing companies, etc.

In this paper, we develop an alternative approach to estimate the size of the shadow banking system, using official data reported to the IMF complemented by other data sources. We base our alternative approach on the expansion of the noncore liabilities concept developed in recent literature to encompass all noncore liabilities of both bank and nonbank financial institutions. As opposed to existing measures of shadow banking, our newly developed measures capture nontraditional funding raised by traditional banks. We apply the new approach to 26 jurisdictions and analyze the results over a twelve-year span. We find that noncore liabilities are procyclical and display more volatility than core liabilities for most jurisdictions in the sample. We also compare our measures to existing measures, such as the measure developed by the Financial Stability Board. Our approach can be replicated over time using internationally-comparable data and thus may serve as an operational tool for IMF surveillance and policy analysis.

This report shows how to use data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States to estimate how much funding of nonfinancial businesses, households, and governments is provided by the domestic shadow banking system. The author defines the shadow banking system as the set of entities and activities that provide short-term funding outside of the traditional commercial banking system, but he does not equate all nonbank funding with shadow banking. Results suggest that at the end of 2008, domestic shadow-bank funding of the nonfinancial sector was an important, but fairly modest source of funding relative to that provided by more traditional funding sources such as commercial banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. However, domestic shadow banking played a large role in the increase of nonfinancial-sector debt in the two years before 2008:Q4 and was, at least in an arithmetic sense, the entire reason for the slowdown in nonfinancial-sector debt growth after 2008. Domestic shadow-bank funding of the nonfinancial sector has increased since 2010, but remains well below the level seen right in late 2008. Figures and tables. This is a print on demand report.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.