The Paradox Of Consensualism In International Law

If international law is derived from the consent of States, who should be in a better position to say what has been consented to than the disputing States themselves? It seems that if the doctrine of consent is taken seriously, there would be no room for an 'objective' legal answer to the question `What is law?'. Furthermore, States do not necessarily employ the same criteria for determining the applicable law when engaged in dispute. And the doctrine of sovereignty is of very limited utility, since not all of substantive international law can be explained in terms of the atomic concept of sovereignty. This leaves consent as the mediating concept between the substantive doctrine of international law on the one hand and the actual practice of States (and others whose practice and participation in the global legal order help shape the body of international laws) on the other. Nevertheless, this is not to say that there is nothing `higher' than the actual legal claims forwarded by international actors. International law is no mere superstition, since none argue that there is no (one) legal solution. In that sense, the unity of the international legal order is preserved. The problem is that the solutions actually forwarded in dispute are too numerous and international law too abstract to serve as arbiters between the competing claims. Thus, at the level of substantive doctrine there is a fragmentation of that earlier-mentioned picture of unity. But even here, only consent can mediate between unity and fragmentation, stability and change, order and justice, legislation and revolution. The strength of international law lies in its adaptability to political, strategic and diplomatic necessities. To suggest otherwise is to depart from a picture of international law that presumes the empirical verifiability of international laws. This book has as its principal concern certain orthodoxies of `source thinking' in international law, and is aimed at working out the implications of these. It aims to show how certain theoretical conceptions have shaped the law in action, for good or ill. It will appeal to political theorists, diplomats, global decision-makers, and international lawyers who are interested in the question `What can we do with the international law that we have?', as distinct from the question `What should we do with international law?'.

If international law is derived from the consent of States, who should be in a better position to say what has been consented to than the disputing States themselves? It seems that if the doctrine of consent is taken seriously, there would be no room for an 'objective' legal answer to the question 'What is law?'. Furthermore, States do not necessarily employ the same criteria for determining the applicable law when engaged in dispute. And the doctrine of sovereignty is of very limited utility, since not all of substantive international law can be explained in terms of the atomic concept of sovereignty. This leaves consent as the mediating concept between the substantive doctrine of international law on the one hand and the actual practice of States (and others whose practice and participation in the global legal order help shape the body of international laws) on the other. Nevertheless, this is not to say that there is nothing 'higher' than the actual legal claims forwarded by international actors. International law is no mere superstition, since none argue that there is no (one) legal solution. In that sense, the unity of the international legal order is preserved. The problem is that the solutions actually forwarded in dispute are too numerous and international law too abstract to serve as arbiters between the competing claims. Thus, at the level of substantive doctrine there is a fragmentation of that earlier-mentioned picture of unity. But even here, only consent can mediate between unity and fragmentation, stability and change, order and justice, legislation and revolution. The strength of international law lies in its adaptability to political, strategic and diplomatic necessities. To suggest otherwise is to depart from a picture of international law that presumes the empirical verifiability of international laws. This book has as its principal concern certain orthodoxies of 'source thinking' in international law, and is aimed at working out the implications of these. It aims to show how certain theoretical conceptions have shaped the law in action, for good or ill. It will appeal to political theorists, diplomats, global decision-makers, and international lawyers who are interested in the question 'What can we do with the international law that we have?', as distinct from the question 'What should we do with international law?'.

Contains an extensive review of Dutch state practice from the parliamentary year,1998-1999.

This book explores law-making in international affairs and is compiled to celebrate the 50th birthday of Professor Jan Klabbers, a leading international law and international relations scholar who has made significant contributions to the understanding of the sources of international legal obligations and the idea of constitutionalism in international law. Inspired by Professor Klabbers’ wide-ranging interests in international law and his interdisciplinary approach, the book examines law-making through a variety of perspectives and seeks to breaks new ground in exploring what it means to think and write about law and its creation. While examining the substance of international law, these contributors raise more general concerns, such as the relationship between law-making and the application of law, the role and conflict between various institutions, and the characteristics of the formal sources of international law. The book will be of great interest to students and academics of legal theory, international relations, and international law.

The persistent objector rule is said to provide states with an 'escape hatch' from the otherwise universal binding force of customary international law. It provides that if a state persistently objects to a newly emerging norm of customary international law during the formation of that norm, then the objecting state is exempt from the norm once it crystallises into law. The conceptual role of the rule may be interpreted as straightforward: to preserve the fundamentalist positivist notion that any norm of international law can only bind a state that has consented to be bound by it. In reality, however, numerous unanswered questions exist about the way that it works in practice. Through focused analysis of state practice, this monograph provides a detailed understanding of how the rule emerged and operates, how it should be conceptualised, and what its implications are for the binding nature of customary international law. It argues that the persistent objector rule ultimately has an important role to play in the mixture of consent and consensus that underpins international law.

A reader-friendly overview of leading theoretical approaches to international law for students, scholars, and practitioners.

In Beyond Consent: Revisiting Jurisdiction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Relja Radović investigates the development of jurisdictional rules by arbitral tribunals, against the conventional wisdom that the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is governed by party consent.

This study analyzes the methods used by international criminal tribunals when determining customary international criminal law and to consider the compatibility of these approaches with the nullum crimen sine lege principle. In this context, the following research questions are of particular importance: Is there one approach common to all international criminal tribunals, or can different approaches be detected in their jurisprudence when determining customary international law? Do international criminal tribunals regard both traditional elements of customary international law – State practice and opinio iuris – as necessary elements for the establishment of customary international law? Do international criminal tribunals argue along the lines of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), requiring a high frequency and consistency of State practice that is both “extensive and virtually uniform”?In addition, the book analyzes the evidence used by international criminal tribunals in order to establish the constituent elements of customary international. It then poses the question: Do international criminal tribunals distinguish, as defined by Schwarzenberger, between the “law-creating processes” of public international law on the one hand, and the “law-determining agencies” as a subsidiary means of determining rule of law on the other?Assuming that they exist, how can different methodological approaches to determine customary international law be assessed in light of the nullum crimen sine lege principle? Does the principle require judges to apply the traditional method to establish customary international law as being based on extensive, uniform and enduring State practice accompanied by opinio iuris? Can the principle balance the desire for justice and the specificities of law creation of the international legal order with fairness for the accused? How can the law be accessible and criminal punishment foreseeable, when the underlying legal basis for criminal convictions, namely customary international criminal law, is unwritten in nature?