The Philosopher S Toothache

The Philosopher’s Toothache proposes that early modern Stoicism constituted a radical mode of performance. Stoicism—with its focus on bodily sensation, imagined spectatorship, and daily mental and physical exercise—exists as what the philosopher Pierre Hadot calls a “way of life,” a set of habits and practices. To be a Stoic is not to espouse doctrine but to act. Informed by work in both classical philosophy and performance studies, Donovan Sherman argues that Stoicism infused the complex theatrical culture of early modern England. Plays written and performed during this period gave life to Stoic exercises that instructed audiences to cultivate their virtue, self-awareness, and creativity. By foregrounding Stoicism’s embodied nature, Sherman recovers a vital dimension too often lost in reductive portrayals of the Stoics by early modern writers and contemporary scholars alike. The Philosopher’s Toothache features readings of dramatic works by William Shakespeare, Cyril Tourneur, and John Marston alongside considerations of early modern adaptations of classical Stoics (Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius) and Neo-Stoics such as Justus Lipsius. These plays model Stoic virtues like unpredictability, indifference, vulnerability, and dependence—attributes often framed as negative but that can also rekindle a sense of responsible public action.

First published in 2002. This book carries on the work of The Structure of Metaphysics and Studies in Metaphilosophy. Setting out to construct a hypothesis which would explain both the nonexistence of stable results in one of the oldest of the intellectual disciplines, this title then applies the hypothesis to basic and representative problems in the major branches of philosophy. Lazerowitz describes the constant motivation of this book as 'to improve our understanding of philosophy; an enigmatic, if time-honoured, subject'.

Based on a detailed analysis of gender in Stanley Cavell's treatment of the skeptical problem, this book addresses the relationship between gender and religion in modern skepticism. Engaging in dialogue with Julia Kristeva's philosophy, Viefhues claims that a religious problem underlies Cavell's understanding of the feminine. The feminine which the skeptic fears is construed as a placeholder for the beyond, marking the transcendence of our origins which are elusive yet at the same time part of ourselves. It is argued that a religious question of origins thus lies at the heart of the modern skeptical problem.

This highly accessible account offers an illuminating introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind and to his conception of philosophy. Combining passages from Wittgenstein's writings with detailed interpretation and commentary, Hacker leads us into a world of philosophical investigation in which 'to smell a rat is ever so much easier than to trap it.' Wittgenstein claimed that the role of philosophy is to dissolve conceptual confusions, to untie the knots in our understanding that result from entanglement in the web of language. He overturned centuries of philosophical reflection on the nature of 'the inner', of our subjective experience and of our knowledge of self and others. Traditional conceptions of 'the outer', of human behaviour, were equally distorted and so too was the relation between the inner and the outer. Hacker shows how Wittgenstein's examination of our use of words clarifies our notions of mind, body and behaviour.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection. The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance. The author's reason for writing this book is that the philosophy of Thomas Reid is widely unread, while the combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled.

Can a person suffer radical change and still be the same person? Are there human beings who are not persons at all? Western philosophers, from the ancient Greeks to contemporary thinkers, gave the concept of “person” great importance in their discussions. They saw it as crucial to our understanding of our world and our place in it. Prompted by tragedy — a loved one’s descent into dementia — Warren Bourgeois explored Western philosophical ideas to discover what constitutes a “person.” The first edition of Persons — What Philosophers Say About You was the result of his search. This new second edition focuses on making this material easily available and accessible to students, and has been redesigned as an introduction to the philosophy of mind and its history, concentrating on the central concept of “person” in contemporary controversies concerning abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and human rights. Bourgeois has mined Western philosophy for ideas students can apply today as technology challenges their beliefs about what we are. He then uses the concept of person to unite the various subdivisions of philosophy, applying theories of knowledge, reality and value to help students understand what we believe about ourselves. The result is a living philosophy and an “introductory text with a difference.” While the ideas of the great philosophers cannot be meaningfully summarized in one introductory text, this book provides a comparison of what many of them say about the concept of person, and will encourage students to read further.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Most of the papers appearing in volume 87 numbers, 1-2 are based on papers presented at the Colloquium on the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein held at the Department of Philosophy at Florida State University on 7-8 April 1989. We owe warm thanks to Florida State University for generously supporting this colloquium. The English translation of the chapter entitled 'Philosophie', from Wittgenstein's typescript number 213 (von Wright), appears here with permission of Wittgenstein's literary heirs, without affecting existing copyrights. The original German version of this chapter was edited by Heikki Nyman and appeared in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 43 (1989), pp. 175-203. Jaakko Hintikka's article (87, No.2) first appeared in a shorter form in The Times Literary Supplement No. 4565 (28 September to 4 October 1990, p. 1030). The present version appears with the permis sion of The Times Literary Supplement, which is gratefully acknowl edged. Our thanks are due to all the participants of the colloquium and the contributors to these special numbers.