The Polish Underground Army The Western Allies And The Failure Of Strategic Unity In World War Ii

This military history covers the attempts of General Wladyslaw Sikorski and his successor (General Kazimierz Sosnkowski) to integrate Polish forces into Western strategy, and to have their clandestine forces declared an allied combatant. It addresses such topics as Poland's part in the Norwegian and French campaigns, the Battle of Britain, Polish intelligence services, Polish radio communications, the Polish Parachute Brigade, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Bomber Offensive, the Katyn graves, Polish air crews in the RAF Transport Command, the Tehran Conference, Polish Wings in the 2nd Tactical Air Force, the Bardsea Plan, the invasion of Normandy, the Pierwsza Pancera, the Warsaw Uprising, Operation Freston, the disbanding of the Polish Home Army, and the Yalta Conference.

The plane crash at the height of the Second World War which claimed the life of the Polish Prime Minister, General W?adys?aw Sikorski, ranks among the most enduring mysteries of the conflict. It was a death that shifted European alliances and loyalties, brought Stalin into the Anglo-American camp, and sealed Poland's fate for the remainder of the twentieth century. Poland and the Soviet Union’s historically precarious relationship had taken an even darker turn in September 1939 when the Third Reich’s Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union's Josef Stalin divided the nation and forced its government to relocate first to France and then to Britain in 1940. Sikorski’s Polish government-in-exile established a military, political, and personal relationship with Winston Churchill’s government, only to see it fractured by the United States’ entrance into the war and the Western Allies’ courtship of Stalin following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. The Allies overall support of Stalin’s denials following the 1943 discovery of 20,000 bodies of Polish officers murdered and buried by the Soviets in Katyn Forest only made matters worse. Sikorski’s open protests against describing the Soviet dictator as a benevolent ‘Uncle Joe’ made him publicly and privately ‘difficult’ to the new Anglo-American-Soviet coalition. As per reports of the British and Polish intelligence services, seemingly not doing enough to stand up to the Soviets had also strained Sikorski’s relationship with different Polish government factions. Leaving from a layover stop at Gibraltar on 4 July 1943, having visited Polish Army units in Iran, Sikorski's RAF Liberator, AL523, crashed into the sea just sixteen seconds into its flight. while Stalin privately blamed Churchill, the Germans were more public in accusing the British. Others pointed to the Soviets or even the Poles. A British Court of Inquiry convened in 1943 presented an inconclusive report on the crash’s cause or foul play and locked up most of its files until 2043. Lacking a respected leader, Poland fell out of favour with the Allies, who allowed Stalin to redraw the Polish borders and establish a pro-communist puppet state in Poland until 1990. Not only exploring what happened on that fateful day in 1943, but also the events leading up to it and those that followed, The Death of General Sikorski is more of a political thriller than a conspiracy book, telling an often complex, and enthralling story of a tragedy within a tragedy – that of a man and his nation.

In the Second World War, the home fronts of many countries became as important as the battle fronts. As governments tried to win and hold the trust of domestic and international audiences, communication became central to their efforts. This volume offers cutting-edge research by leading and emerging scholars on how information was used, distributed and received during the war. With a transnational approach encompassing Germany, Iberia, the Arab world and India, it demonstrates that the Second World War was as much a war of ideas and influence as one of machines and battles. Simon Eliot, Marc Wiggam and the contributors address the main communication problems faced by Allied governments, including how to balance the free exchange of information with the demands of national security and wartime alliances, how to frame war aims differently for belligerent, neutral and imperial audiences and how to represent effectively a variety of communities in wartime propaganda. In doing so, they reveal the contested and transnational character of the ways in which information was conveyed during the Second World War. Allied Communication during the Second World War offers innovative and nuanced perspectives on the thin border between information and propaganda during this global war and will be vital reading for World War II and media historians alike.

Poland was the 'tripwire' that brought Britain into the Second World War, but it was largely the fear of the new Nazi-Soviet Pact rather than the cementing of an old relationship that created the formal alliance. But neither Britain, nor Poland's older ally, France, had the material means to prevent Poland being overrun in 1939. The broadcast, 'Poland is no longer alone' had a distinctly hollow ring. During the next four years the Polish Government in exile and armed forces made a significant contribution to the allied war effort; in return the Polish Home Army received a paltry 600 tons of supplies. Poland Alone focuses on the bloody Warsaw Uprising of 1944, when the Polish Resistance attempted to gain control of their city from the German Army. They expected help from the Allies but received none, and they were left helpless as the Russians moved in. The War ended with over five million Poles dead, three million of whom died in the concentration camps. Jonathan Walker examines whether Britain could have done more to save the Polish people in their crisis year of 1944, dealing with many different aspects such as the actions of the RAF and SOE, the role of Polish Couriers, the failure of British Intelligence and the culpability of the British Press.

A reference to the ideological, military, political, biographical, and social topics surrounding World War II, which is often considered the pivotal event of the twentieth century.

This book examines the outcome of the British commitment to reconstitute a sovereign Polish state and establish a democratic Polish government after the Second World War. It analyses the wartime origins of Churchill’s commitment to Poland, and assesses the reasons for the collapse of British efforts to support the leader of the Polish opposition, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, in countering the attempt by the Polish communist party to establish one-party rule after the war. This examination of Anglo-Polish relations is set within the broader context of emerging early Cold War tensions. It addresses the shift in British foreign policy after 1945 towards the US, the Soviet Union and Europe, as British leaders and policymakers adjusted both to the new post-war international circumstances, and to the domestic constraints which increasingly limited British policy options. This work analyses the reasons for Ernest Bevin’s decision to disengage from Poland, helping to advance the debate on the larger question of Bevin’s vision of Britain’s place within the newly reconfigured international system. The final chapter surveys British policy towards Poland from the period of Sovietisation in the late 1940s up to the October 1956 revolution, arguing that Poland’s process of liberalisation in the mid-1950s served as the catalyst for limited British reengagement in Eastern Europe.

The New York Times said of Józef Hieronim Retinger that he was on intimate terms with most leading statesmen of the Western World, including presidents of the United States. He has been repeatedly acknowledged as one of the principle architects of the movement for European unity after the World War II, and one of the outstanding creative political influences of the post war period. He has also been credited with being the dark master behind the so-called "Bilderberg Group," described variously as an organization of idealistic internationalists, and a malevolent global conspiracy. Before that, Retinger involved himself in intelligence activities during World War II and, given the covert and semi-covert nature of many of his activities, it is little wonder that no biography has appeared about him. This book draws on a broad range of international archives to rectify that.